




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THE GREEK LANGUAGE IN ITS RELATION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS

BY HERBERT WEIR SMYTH

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BEFORE the battle of Plataea, when the Spartan ambassadors urged Athens to reject the proposals made by the envoys of the Medes, the Athenians responded that they could never betray the cause of Greece, allied as it was by blood and language, the common sanctuaries and sacrifices to the gods, and the community of Hellenic customs (Herodotus 8, 144).

This is the earliest conscious formulation of the conception of nationality extant in the history of Europe; though the impulses making for a national Hellenic unity must have been dimly felt long before the fifth century B. C., perhaps when the separate immigrant tribes from the north first came into contact with "Carian" civilization. If we add to the definition (what is latent in the utterance of the Athenians), the will of the different members of a people to regard descent, language, religion, and customs as common ties, we have the mint-marks of ancient nationality, in effect the consciousness of the same past that carries with it

the prospect of the same future. Nationality is not identical with patriotism, nor yet with racial affinity. Nor is it as objective elements, but at the conscious expression of Hellenic feelings, that language and descent derive their significance as factors of national sentiment. Despite the variations in speech of almost every state or canton, the Greeks recognized that a common language marked their individuality as a people; though it was not till the third century A. D. that, with but one notable exception, the last of the local dialects had given way before the Koinè, which, after Alexander, first attained the position of a "high" Greek, and finally, together with Aramaic and Latin, became one of the so-called world-languages of ancient times.

Doubtless Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schelling went too far in maintaining that the individuality of a people is *created* by its language. The speech of the Hellenes, we should rather say, is one of the products of their national mind, a product in which their national mind most readily, and perhaps first, gave expression to its individuality. Though national differences are marked by language rather than created by it, language more than any other expression of national life displays the native endowments of a people and discloses the innermost physiognomy of its nationality.¹

It is to certain aspects of this general theme, the language of the Greeks as the most complete expression of their national psychology, that I especially invite your attention. An adequate treatment of this theme carries with it an attempt to characterize the language from certain psychological points of view and to discuss certain qualities of national character. By singling out some departments of the investigation of Greek that deserve ampler attention than they receive at present, I shall endeavor to

¹ F. A. Wolf maintained the unique hypothesis that Greek mirrored the life of the nation without distortion because it was not till late that the language fell under the control of the grammarians.

open up here and there certain avenues of approach to that ideal which we all have in mind,—a history of the Greek tongue in its relations to the other factors of Greek life. We have, indeed, many Greek grammars, but no history of Greek speech as an index of Greek nationality.

A thesis that has as its basis the determination of the national mind of any people is of course open to the objection that the conception of national mind is elusive. Nor need one have any hesitation in admitting that the science of national psychology, as set forth by its adherents, is liable to error on every hand, and nowhere more fatally than when it descends to arguments drawn from the rigid insistence on the details of national character and soul. Terms denoting the characteristics of nationality may be easily extended in their application beyond their legitimate scope. Phenomena of language may be interpreted in different ways. The necessities of one language may be the luxuries of another; thus the relations of time may be much more strictly expressed in one language than in another, which is therefore not obscure in this regard; error is possible in ascribing to one people a conservative character, to another a progressive spirit, because of the retention or abandonment of inherited sounds (as the vowels and especially the diphthongs, the aspirates, the spirants, final consonants), cases (the locative, instrumental, ablative), or the tenses and moods (the aorist, the optative), and in many other particulars, such as the dual number. Then there is the danger of seeking to discover marks of capacity for emotion or of individuality in the attribution of gender to senseless things. But more than all, as the individual in his totality resists final psychological analysis, so, *a fortiori*, the nation. Especially in the case of ancient peoples we lack the means to arrive at even a partial conception of the national soul; the total outcome of our investigation is the

mere moraine cast upon the surface by the movement of the glacier forces of national existence.

The national type furthermore seems to vanish in the presence of the individual. The student of national types, like the traveler, constantly meets with individuals whose anomalies apparently resist his classification under the hypothetical type; as was long ago recognized by Apuleius of Madaura in his *Apology* (24): "quando non in omnibus gentibus varia ingenia provenere? quanquam videantur quaedam stultitia vel sollertia insigniores, apud socor-dissimos Scythas Anacharsis sapiens natus est, apud Athenienses catos Meletides fatuus." In Greece the mass and the individual stand in a certain opposition. The mass-type may be predominant, as among the Romans; whereas the forces making for individuality among the Greeks are far more marked than among the Latin peoples, who have few men of the distinct individuality of a Cato. So striking is the centrifugal tendency in Greece that in certain respects not a few of the greatest writers present characteristics that seem unhellenic; for example, Thucydides and Aristotle; Polybius is largely Romanized. National character is the result of the clashing of the mass-type and the individual-type: the insubordination of the individual is compelled to moderation (as the national phonetic laws restrict the tendency of the dialects to deflect from the norm); the mass receives in exchange an indeterminate impress from the individual. The national mind of the Greeks, then, while it differs from the mind of each of the individuals composing the nation, nevertheless exercises a controlling influence over all. Notwithstanding the tendencies of Greek particularism, so pervasive are the dominant qualities of the mass-type that the sum of the differences between any two poets or prose writers is less than the sum of their points of resemblance to two writers not

Hellenes. Or possibly (despite the opposition of Ionian and Dorian), we may even go so far as to make this statement of any two individuals.

The national mind of the Greeks is a product of ethnological, sociological, and historical factors. Scientific proof of relative degrees of national capacity is not afforded by arguments based on ethnological considerations of the descent and racial characteristics of the members of the Indo-European group, all of which we may assume inherited a certain common endowment of potential capacity; yet that native endowment has manifested itself in the most diverse creations of literature, art, religion, language, architecture (the language of form), and other products of civilization. Nations alike in one respect, as intellectual character, often differ in other respects and find points of resemblance with nations of a different type. We may conjecture that by some subtle alchemy the fusion of the Hellenic element with another stock yielded, as so often in the case of the union of alien races, the peculiar quality of genius that gives the Hellenes their separateness; yet after all comes the inevitable admission that the processes of nature which create diversity among nations, as among children of the same parents, defy all ultimate analysis. Certainly all theories of the comparative æsthetics of the structure of language fail to penetrate into the secrets of national ability. Whatever the embryonic mind of the Greeks was, their physical environment merely modified it or gave it opportunity to express itself in different terms. The Greeks brought with them from their inland home no memories of the sea;¹ nor did they inherit from their Aryan progenitors names for the marine divinities; it was their contact with the Ægean that made them a seafaring folk, as it was their inherent qualities as a people that made

¹ Pictet thought the Indo-European peoples were familiar with the Caspian.

Poseidon the god of the "on-swelling" waters and populated the deep with the creations of their poetic fancy. We cannot penetrate beyond this fact: that it was the unique prerogative of the Greeks that their language possessed in its earliest known stages the power of expressing delicate relations of thought and feeling; while from the dawn of Hellenic history the sovereignty of their greatest poet was imposed on intellect and heart alike.

It is in form rather than in content that the individuality of the Greek mind is expressed most inwardly. The religion, the customs of the Greeks mark rather the expression of individuality as regards content: their language sets forth not merely the content of thought; it sets forth the form, the movement of thought; it best voices the Hellenic conception of the world. But it is not merely that the Hellenic language expresses the mode of Hellenic thought: the language reacts on the mode of thought. "Human reason," as Eduard Meyer says, "grows *with* and *in* language." From the first day that Greek speech consciously obeyed the will of the Greeks, it continually adjusted itself to the enrichment of their mind; until reflection, reacting on thought and aiming to idealize feeling, created the language of the subtlest dramatic poetry and of philosophy.

Assuming by a broad generalization a division among different peoples on the lines of a predominance of the intellect or of the emotions, the Romans are a people whose language in its literary and "popular" expression is marked by the intellectual quality. In most uncivilized peoples feeling predominates, as is apparent in part from their abundant use of simile and metaphor. Among all languages that unite the qualities of intellect and emotion, Greek stands supreme.

Will, too, enters into the question as an element of language. Though the part it plays in the structure of na-

tional character is strongly marked (witness the difference between Greece and Rome), its function in the differentiation of languages is less well known; nor can I have the hardihood to attempt to set apart the activity of the will from that of the intellect and feelings in this brief study of the relation of the physiognomy of the Greek mind to Greek speech.

To this study there are two methods of approach, each of which has its proper advantages. We may contrast the Greeks with themselves at different periods of their history, —*tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis*. Or we may seek to discover the characteristics of Greek speech by comparison with Latin or with the modern languages. For my present purpose it is this method to which I shall give special prominence.

For the study of the qualities of the Hellenic mind we have the direct evidence of the peoples with which the ancient Greeks came into contact. To this secondary source of information the moderns must have recourse, but a surer guide is afforded by their own examination of the expression of mind and character that is contained in the records of the Greeks themselves.

The Roman characterization of the Greeks presents no exception to the rule that the estimation of one people by another is colored by the national traits of the observer. Roman analysis is in the main deduced from contemporary observation.¹ The Roman writers were not impelled to search for the psychological causes that produced Hellenic superiority when Hellenic intellect or Hellenic arms achieved their highest preëminence.

On the social side the Romans did not fail of appreciation of the Greek *comitas* (Tacitus, *Agr.* 4), *liberalitas*, *facilitas*

¹ The evidence is collected by Wölflin in *Archiv für Latein. Lexicographie und Grammatik*, 7 (1890-92), 140f.

and *elegantia*. Capitolinus, *Maximinus* (29, 3), says: *soror mea* (*i. e.* of Alexander Aurelius) *Graesis munditiis erudita*.

To the keenness of the Greek, particularly the Attic, intellect, the Roman pays tribute. *Graeca facundia* is echoed from Sallust to Ausonius. Quintilian (12, 10, 36) opposes the strength of his countrymen to the mental agility of the Greek: *non possumus esse tam graciles, simus fortiores; subtilitate vincimur, valeamus pondere*. Greek sales, lepor, subtilitas, salsi eloquii venustas, the *nasus Atticus*, are commonplaces of Roman criticism, but not infrequently the sensitiveness of the Greek intellect appears as *ingenium molle* to the rugged and less delicate Roman. But it is the *levitas propria Graecorum* (Cicero, *pro Flacco*, 57) that is the dominant note. Lactantius says: *quorum levitas... incredibile est quantas mendaciorum nebulas excitaverit* (*Div. Inst.*, 1, 15). Akin to this *levitas* is the *negligentia* of the Greek (Cicero, *Epist.* 16, 4, 2); the Greek is *otiosus et loquax* (*de Orat.* 1, 102). Cicero says: *hoc vitio (inertum esse) cumulata est eruditissima Graecorum natio* (*de Orat.* 2, 18). Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, 2, 14) speaks of the *lascivia Graecorum* in the same breath with which he brands their *levitas*. The accusation of luxury is brought against them by Trebellius Pollio (*xxx tyr.* 16, 1), and by Paulus (*Festus*, p. 215). Greek arts of flattery are reprehended in the *Graeca adulatio* of Tacitus (*Ann.* 6, 18) and the *Graecia blanda* of Ennodius (344, 18); their vainglory prompts the remark of Pliny (*N. H.* 3, 42), *Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum*; and that of the scholiast on Juvenal 3, 121, *Graeci enim soli volunt maioribus amici esse*. The "dregs of Achaea" disgust Juvenal because of the effrontery of Greek versatility. But it is above all the *mala fides* that stamps the Hellene. *Graecia mendax* is echoed again and again. Greek *calliditas* is emphasized by Livy and

Silius Italicus. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 38, 5, says outright: oration *pro Flacco*, 9, Cicero has given, together with his impostor et Graecus est. In the famous passage in the verdict on Greek superiority his condemnation of the vital defect in Greek character; hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam...testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit. Even where it was not a question of a superiority of the national sense of public honor, the Greek failed to satisfy the Roman censor: the exquisite aroma of his mythology, which the Latins assimilated only in its crude externalities, was the basis for the criticism of Claudius Marius Victor, *Alcth.* 3, 194, mendax Graecia...veris falsa insinuare laborat, and of a writer in the *Mythogr. Vat.* 3, 9, 12: pulchre mendax Graecia.

To the Roman, then, the Greek was keen-witted, eloquent, refined in speech and generally in manners, but marked by levity, bad faith, untruthfulness, vainglory, and the arts of insinuation. The national ideal of the Romans—their gravitas, continentia, and animi magnitudo (Cic. *Tusc.* 1, 1, 2)—was the antithesis of the Hellenic ideal. Deeds rather than words marked the vir fortis atque strenuus; and Sallust voices an essential part of Roman character in saying (*Cat.* 8, 5): optimus quisque facere quam dicere malebat; whereas the greatest of the statesmen of Greece was λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατότατος (Thuc. 1, 139). The modern estimate of the essential qualities of the Greek mind and character does not deny the justice of the Roman verdict. Indeed the Roman arraignment of the defects of the Greeks is not so severe as that which Polybius, no mere courtier of success, levels against his own countrymen (cf. 6, 56, 13; 37, 9; 38, 5). But in their analysis the moderns penetrate deeper into the springs of

intellect, feeling, and will; and they select as the best field for the evaluation of Hellenic genius that period when the vital qualities of the race had met with no impairment through the surrender of that individual liberty in and through which Hellenic nationality found its completest expression.

To us the Hellene is a unique combination of psychic forces; gifted with the rare endowment of a high spirit united with an intellect agile yet profound; gifted with the power to see things as they are and in the light of their essential characteristics, with a sense of proportion and of hostility to extravagance: inimical to all formulas;¹ animated by joyous self-confidence, a proud reliance upon his own powers, and a consciousness of his own superiority that divided the world into Greek and barbarian; possessed of an unerring taste and sensitiveness to form (which plays in the refinements of expression a larger rôle than does the intellect); progressive and a creator wherever he worked, yet conservative and bound to the past not only through the sanctities of his faith (which found fixed form in the earliest and the best of his books), but also by a realization of the continuity of the development of the arts; a lover of knowledge, not a lover of wealth; shaping his large curiosity to the purposes of the scientific spirit, and thus impelled to discover the causes of things and to fathom the mysteries of the world in which he lived; an apostle of intellectual freedom, not of mere utilitarianism; endowed with a genius for clear thinking in forms of beauty; a lover of truth in the veil of beauty; his ideal of human nature the harmonious development of man's faculties, a combination of the beautiful in outward form with inner worth.

Equally mobile with his intellect was his emotion. His

¹ But in the later development of philosophy disloyalty to the letter of Epicurean tenets was the equivalent of impiety in the opinion of the faithful.

emotional qualities were not repressed by insistence on the virtues of impassiveness. To lament was not unworthy of a manly nature, and sympathy was not unattended by tears. Susceptibility to feeling vitiated the course of justice, as it damned Phrynichus' play. When art depicted the agony of the body, it did not fail to hold the mirror up to nature: Philoctetes' screams filled the theatre. But at his highest, in literature as in life, the Greek submits his emotion to the control of his intellect; he argues while he feels; his dialectic is discerned through the veil of his emotion. As no other people, the Hellenes enjoy that rare possession—the union of keenness of feeling with the sacred passion for science. By temperament (which is constituted by emotion and will in their mutual relations) the Greeks were excitable and impulsive, and thus stand nearer to those peoples which live in and for the world about them than to those which withdraw into themselves; yet in a higher degree than other nations they combined the qualities resulting from the surrender to the world and the abnegation of the world.

The intellect of the Hellenic is stronger than his moral energy. The diabolical ingenuity of Iago would have awakened less repulsion in him than the *ἄνοια* of Othello. The conception of virtue as a means shows that at bottom the Greek is hostile to, or incredulous of, absolute moral truth. Metaphysics rather than ethics is the Greek sphere. It was a half-Oriental who made moral good everything, the rest nothing.

Greek character is marked by lack of stability, of sustained endeavor, of indomitable will, of seriousness, of gravity, of patience under discipline.¹ Romanus (not

¹ Contrast the relatively few words in Greek with the many words in Latin that indicate the quality of persistence in effort: *sedulus, assiduus, industrius, diligens, laboriosus, strenuus*. There are comparatively few words in Greek for earnest, grave, dignified; many for insolent (to the Latin the "unusual" man), shameless: *c. g.* *θρασύς, ἀσελγής, βδελνρός, ἰταμός, αὐθάδης, ὑβριστής*. The difference between the two peoples is seen in the frequent use of *virtus, consilium, ratio*.

Graecus) sedendo vincit. Gusts of passion sweep the Athenian from the moorings of reason; and he returns to his better self only when he sees the shipwreck he has wrought. The possession of the empire of the intellect did not confer upon the Hellene that power to withstand the blows of fortune which in the Roman moved the admiration of Polybius. In the cries of character he often reverts to the elemental creature whose veneer was his delight in the art of Sophocles. The complacent Ionian was the victim of the palsied will; indeed defective will-power lies at the root of much of the defect of Greek character. If the senses of the Greek gave buoyancy to the movement of his intellect and rarely descended to the baser uses of appetite, his mobility often degenerated into loquacity, his acumen to quibbling and disputatiousness, his love of rhetoric to pretentious frivolity. Markedly individual in his personality, his self-love made him belittle the success of others and made him a stranger to the finer forms of sympathy.

Such is the normal type of the Greek. But the race is not homogeneous. The Dorian is almost an alien intrusion, and between him and the other Greeks there is a discrepancy of kind (not merely of culture) that I would explain on the ground of ethnological difference. In the northwest originally dwelt only half-Hellenic tribes that were to become factors in the later life of the nation. The Dorian is the Roman on Greek soil, and, like the language of the Romans, Doric is marked by parsimony and inability to form compounds.

Diversity and individuality, a wide range of capacity, a just balance of faculties, characterize the Hellene. Such as he was he remained the same in his intellectual physiognomy from first to last. If resistance to centralization stimulated his energies, it worked his political ruin. A world-empire was indeed secured at the price of national inde-

pendence and of national ideals, the loss of which destroyed the national consciousness of the possession by the Hellenic stock of a common language, religion, and customs. Yet the essential Hellenic qualities remain essentially unimpaired even in later periods of Greek life, when Hellenism, in its excessive individualism, displayed an increasing detachment between the mass and the few who still preserved the old ideals.

But the lineaments of a national type, be they never so well defined, must of necessity lose the precision of their outlines when the phenomena of language are to serve as the material of illustration. The minuter differentiae of racial psychology resist transference to vocabulary, syntax, and style. It is only the larger lines of Greek speech that mark the general psychological qualities of the Greeks. Like the people that used it, the language is characterized by elegance and delicacy. It is marked by an indescribable air of distinction; by facility of resource and suppleness; by transparency and lucidity of structure; by a reconciliation of intellectual vigor and emotion. Inexhaustible in its native power, it reproduces Greek naturalness, vividness, mobility of temperament, plasticity of mind. Its exuberance is tempered by continence; form and matter are welded to harmony by a sense of proportion. The genius of logic is native to it; as the mirror of the reflective processes of the mind it is both subtle and precise; as an artistic product it combines freedom with strength and grace. Direct and concrete, it lends itself to the happy inventions of fancy and follows the shifting mood with dramatic liveliness. Like the national hero, it is marked by *ποικιλία*. It wears the folds of a royal mantle (as Lamartine said of another language); and with all its alterations it retained a certain youthful vigor and creative energy; it did not become senile by crystallizing into rigidity. The language of Homer remained a national possession to the last.

An analysis of the distinctive qualities of the language in relation to the national psychology demands a detailed study of phonetics, word-form, vocabulary, word-meaning, syntax, and the general aspects of style. Such a study can at best only note the preponderance of this or that psychological factor, and in the survey of the few points that I can attempt here it is impossible to disengage the operation of the intellectual from the emotional faculties: thought and feeling are closely woven in forming the web of the inner life of language.

Sounds.

The study of sounds as an index of the difference between Greek and other peoples is a province of investigation much neglected, not merely by reason of the elusiveness in the doctrine of phonetic symbolism as first enunciated by Humboldt, but also because of absolute and inevitable gaps in our knowledge; furthermore research in the modern languages has not been carried far with the help of scientific instruments, such as Rousselot's.

The euphonic quality of language is not to be measured solely by the proportion of vowels and consonants. It is the character of the initial and final sounds, or rather the character and the position of the sounds in *all* the parts of a word (as studied by Pott), that marks the phonetic differentiation of one language from another.

In comparison with Latin, Greek is richer, more harmonious, but less majestic. It has υ , and ζ , and the aspirates, but is unfriendly to the spirants.¹ It is rich in vocalic color, the wealth of which is due in large measure to the retention of the original sounds and, in the case of the diphthongs, in part to the disappearance of intervocalic spirants. The relative frequency of vowels and consonants

¹ The loss of the spirants, says Bergk, gives to Greek an impression of stammering in comparison to other languages.

in Greek, as contrasted with other tongues, has not been studied with any completeness. An examination of six consecutive hexameters from the Iliad shows 94 vowels, 106 consonants; from the Odyssey, 96 vowels and 105 consonants; from Virgil the figures are 99 and 107; from Horace 98 and 114; from Platen 92 and 174.¹

It will be observed that while Greek has a greater variety of vowel sounds, the absolute number necessary to carry the consonants is not materially different in Greek and in Latin. The dialects differ, and Ionic shows greater variety in vowel sounds than Aeolic or Doric.

Consonantal alliteration is a mark of strength rather than of beauty, and Latin affects such alliteration much more than does Greek; Greek has, too, few stereotyped alliterative phrases such as *ῥᾶον μωμεῖσθαι ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ἧτοι κρίνον ἢ κολοκύντην, κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ψόν*, whereas these are common in Latin (*salvus sanus, si sis sanus aut sapias satis, purus putus*), though the speech of the Romans is much inferior to that of the moderns in the abundance of alliterative expressions.

Studious as Greek is of euphony, it is noticeable the language manages with each such initial sounds as *πν, γν, τμ, δμ, βδ, γδ, στλ, σκν* and some others forbidden to Classical Latin. Initial *γμ, χμ, σχλ, σχρ, σχν, σF* it does not allow. On the other hand the *os rotundum* of the Greeks is most exclusive as regards final consonants; yet it does not shrink from *σφιγξ, Φάλαγξ, Ἰυγξ*. (*ἄλς* and *μάκαρς* have no parallels.)

The modern languages, particularly those of Germanic stock, largely through the breakdown of the suffixal elements, are incomparably richer and incomparably more cacophonous as regards final sounds. One effect of the limited range of Greek in this respect is the almost utter

¹ The consonants normally exceed the vowels in frequency. But in archaic inscriptions (as those of Elis), a single consonant is often written for two consonants.

absence of pregnant rhyming phrases such as sing-song, pell-mell, last not least, haste and waste, songe mensonge, lug und trug, träume schäume. We find *παθήματα μαθήματα* and a few other phrases. At best Greek could rhyme with two consonants only in combinations of sigma; for example with *ϕ* in *ἄϕ, μάϕ*, or with *ξ*.

Clashing of consonants, which marked the austere style, was gradually avoided in literature; while the dialect inscriptions showing phonetic spelling record an attention to euphony which is surprising to the student of the literature. Apart from Elean and Late Spartan with their rhotacism the dialects display no fondness for the *littera canina* that is so common in Latin. Nu is a favorite consonant, yet the Greek equivalents of septem and densus avoid the dental nasal. Sonant *r* is avoided as is also sonant *l*. The sound of *s* had its detractors, such as Lasus; but his asigmatic ode was a mere *tour de force*. The Marathonian oath in the Oration on the Crown shows 50 sigmas in 67 words, and sigma is the commonest consonant. The sound of iota (*ἔσχατον δὲ πάντων τὸ ι* says Dionysius of Halicarnassus) was much more frequent in Latin than in Greek; and Hermogenes, who remarks that the diphthongs lend solemnity,¹ adds that this is not the case with *ει* (that is *i*) and *ι*.

To get an approximate idea of the relative frequency of the sounds of the language I have taken about 1000 consecutive sounds from 38 verses of the *Prometheus* (631-667), and from a part of Thuc. 2, 4. These sounds are distributed as follows (*η* is placed under *η*, *ω* under *ω*; *a* includes *ᾱ* and *ᾰ*.)

	Aesch.		Thuc.			Aesch.		Thuc.			Aesch.		Thuc.	
1	σ	129	ν	99	6	τ	62	α	71	11	λ	37	ω	38
2	α	77	ε	89	7	ρ	52	λ	65	12	ω	33	ι	33
3	ν	73	τ	87	8	π	48	π	40	13	δ	31	μ	32
4	ε	70	σ	82	9	η	42	η	39	14	ι	31	αι	30
5	ο	66	ο	72	10	μ	39	κ	38	15	θ	28	ρ	30

¹The sound of *ω* had a certain solemnity (Plato, *Phædrus*, 244 D.)

	Aesch.		Thuc.			Aesch.		Thuc.			Aesch.		Thuc.			
16	υ	26	ου	24		21	γ	19	ει	14		26	ξ	6		8
17	αι	25	δ	22		22	ει	19	θ	13		27	β	5	ξ	5
18	κ	24	οι	22		23	χ	17	χ	11		28	αυ	3	ευ	2
19	ου	24	ν	19		24	φ	10	αυ	8		29	ζ	3	ψ	2
20	οι	21	γ	16		25	ευ	6		8		30	ψ	1	ζ	0

Aeschylus: vowel sounds, 443, consonants, 584. Thucydides: vowel sounds, 461, consonants, 558. The order of frequency of the vowels is ϵ (ϵ and η), $ο$ ($ο$ and ω), $α$, ι , υ , of the consonants, the dentals greatly exceed either the palatals or the labials; the mutes are thrice as numerous as the mediae or the aspiratae. Further investigation is of course necessary to arrive at greater certainty. A rough tabulation of the frequency of initial letters by the pages of Liddell and Scott's Lexicon shows the following approximate results:

1	α	269	9	τ	71	17	ν	26
2	π	249	10	υ	58	18	γ	22
3	ε	231	11	φ	54	19	η	19
4	σ	152	12	χ	45	20	ρ	16
5	κ	150	13	λ	43	21	ω	12
6	ο	83	14	θ	31	22	ψ	11
7	δ	79	15	ι	28	23	ζ	6
8	μ	77	16	β	27	24	ξ	5

Summing up we may say that the phonetical apparatus of the Greeks seems to stand midway between the consonantal languages of Europe, such as Germanic and Slavic (especially Polish and Russian), and the essentially vocalic tongues, such as Italian, the musical character of which, due largely to its vocalic endings, has been gained at the cost, as Pott has remarked, of the intellectual character of the language. The point to which I desire to call attention in connection with the question I have in hand is that in general the vocalic languages are spoken by peoples

which attach more importance to form than to matter, and are sanguine and nervous, whereas the consonantal languages are the property of those peoples that emphasize matter over form and are melancholic or phlegmatic.

Accent

Accent, too, has its psychological value. Between the free play of the accent of the Veda and the rigidity of Latin, Greek here again has a middle range. The range of Indo-European accent has, indeed, been restricted, but the restriction has been to the advantage of euphony and symmetry. Thus, for bháramānas, bháramānasya and ádik-śamahi, ádikśadhvam, Greek has *φερόμενος*, **φερομένοιο* and *ἐδεῖξάμεθα*, *ἐδεῖξασθε*. The freedom of Greek accentuation goes hand in hand with its rich vowel system and its power of semasiological differentiation through difference of form. Cf. *Φόρος*, *Φορός*; *τέρπεσθαι*, *ταρπῆναι*; *φερεσυχής*, *σαχεςΦόρος*; *τιμή*, *ἄτιμος*; *ἦθος*, *εὐθες*. It may not be an unjustified deduction to infer that peoples whose language is chronic in its accent are often those which attach greater importance to form; while matter is more emphasized by those which, like Latin, stress the penult or antepenult; or the radical syllable, as the Germanic tongues, which thereby obliterate the suffixal elements.

The act of speaking is both physical and psychological. Only the professional psychologist can answer the inquiry of the philologist whether energy of emphasis is due to predominance of emotion or of will. Certainly temperament must largely determine emphasis and speed of utterance. The rate of pronunciation must be an unknown quantity: certainly it cannot necessarily be inferred from speed of thought; even if it is true, as Steinthal maintained, that the moderns think quicker than the ancients, this is not a

sure guide to the rate of speed of Greek speech.¹ Certain inferences point, however, to the probability of a quick tempo: the abundance of short vowels, the large number of short monosyllables and dissyllables, especially particles (contrast *γέ* with *quidem*, *δέ* with *autem*, *vero*),² the avoidance of hiatus, of which Latin, unlike its descendant French, is careless. We may not err in thinking Attic as spoken with ease and rapidity. Nonnus, 37, 319, says *ταχύμυθος Ἀτθίς Φωνή*. Latin may have been uttered more slowly but with greater energy than Attic, though the law of iambic shortening points to some rapidity. The Dorians spoke with deliberation.

Form

The varied gifts of the Greeks are reflected by the varied formal means of expression at their command. The abundance of formative suffixes, the extent of the verbal system,³ the limitless possibilities of composition, mark the exceeding richness of Greek on the purely formal side. The elasticity of the language gives play to the subtler affinities of personality. Sanskrit is equally rich, if not richer, in form; but it stiffened into rigidity: both language and literature are deficient in dramatic quality, in personality. A unity to which everything is sacrificed is a dead uniformity. In Greek ossification was prevented in part by the vigorous life of the dialects, many of which, not one merely, were

¹ Rapidity of Greek thought is indicated by syntactical attraction and assimilation which compress the separate members of a sentence; by the swift transition from direct to indirect discourse and the reverse; by the frequency of ellipsis, as of the substantive verb, or when a sentence begins with the impetuous *ἀλλά*; by the frequent omission of either the protasis or the apodosis; by the use of brachylogy; by the construction *πρὸς τὸ σημαίνόμενον*; by the innumerable forms of anacoluthon; by the use of various figures of speech such as aposiopesis; by diverse locutions, such as *αἰσθ' ὃ δράσον*.

² Cf. Demosth. 18, 179, *οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγραφα δέ οὐδ' ἔγραφα μὲν οὐκ ἐπέσβεσσα δέ, οὐδ' ἐπρίσβεσσα μὲν οὐκ ἔπεισα δέ* Θεβαίωνς, with Quint. 9, 3, 55, *non enim dixi quidem sed non scripsi, nec scripsi quidem sed non obli legationem, nec obli quidem sed non persuasi Thebanis*.

³ In Greek 507 verbal forms are possible, in Latin 143, in Sanskrit 891; though as regards the number of forms actually in constant use Sanskrit is not superior to Greek.

irradiated by the genius of poetry. The formal resources of Greek are applied with a distinctness that is widely at variance with the indiscriminateness of uninflected languages, such as English, which may use the same word as noun, verb, and interjection, as in the case of *hollo*. Regularity in Greek coexists with wealth of form, with freedom of differentiation and of analogy. The larger use of writing, the development of literature, restricted to some extent the manifold variety of the earlier language; but that restriction too gave regularity and normality, which are apt to be absent in languages which, like Latin, live for centuries without the restraining and corrective influence of literary art, and thus degenerate into anomaly and irregularity. Some part, too, of the formal riches of Greek were abandoned by the action of the law of least effort and by the conscious operation of the intellect.

Allusion can be made to only a few points of interest. The multiplicity of the so-called irregular verbs proceeds from a nice sense of distinction between various kinds of action ('point'-action, continuative, terminative, perfective, etc.), which is due to the difference of the formative elements and to the meaning of the several roots which combine into a system. Lucidity marks the formation of derivative words, especially the compound abstracts, which, as a rule, show at once their connection with the primitives; whereas in English and the "dead Romance languages," as Fichte called them in contrast to German, abstract words are frequently borrowed and thus stand in no living relation with common speech.

Greek, as German, shows more color in making neuters of its diminutives, whereas in Latin difference in size is not marked by difference in gender. So, too, in other forms: Latin contents itself with *amans* for $\Phi\iota\lambda\omega\nu$, $\Phi\iota\lambdaο\delta\sigma\alpha$, $\Phi\iota\lambdaο\delta\upsilon$. Many words form plurals that are impossible in

the modern languages: in Greek such plurals often manifest the operation of an intellectual activity, in Latin they usually display strength of feeling.

But the originality of the language is nowhere more patent externally than in its ability to form compounds. Here appears the flexibility of the Greek mind, its fertility of resource, its innate artistic capacity, its power of welding with pregnant force the various characteristics of an object; here the distinctive virtues of individuality have free room to make themselves felt. Take, for example, such compounds as ἐξελυθεροστομέω, καταστερισμός, τελέομνος, and the elastic αὐτόχρη. In lucidity and precision Greek may vie with Sanskrit, but the sense of proportion rejects the *sesquipedalia verba* of that tongue.¹ In plasticity Greek has a possible rival in German alone.² Latin³ and the Romance⁴ languages are immeasurably inferior in every

¹ Examples of long words are ἀπαγνωσιμαχήσαντες, στωμυλιοσυλλεκτάδης.

² Aristophanes may for the moment rear towering compounds, but normal Greek rarely can vie with German herein. German, too, excels in the construction of such words as "Anundfürsichsein"; and outdoes even itself in "Auch-nichtsein und auch anders seinkönnen." English reaches its maximum in "transubstantiationableness" and "proantitransubstantiationist." Grimm's *Wörterbuch* gives 617 words compounded with "kunst" and almost as many with "krieg" and "hand." It should be observed that, though German is like Greek as regards the freedom with which it forms compounds, the quality of German compounds is in many respects different from that of Greek, and especially as regards sensuous epithets. The influence of Greek in the eighteenth century is seen in the increased frequency of such compounds as "heidgetroffen" (Goethe), "donnergesplittert" (Klopstock). Compounds with the past participle are rare in O. H. G. and M. H. G. German admits also the present participle, as in "liebeglühendes Herz" (Körner) and "völkerwimmelnde Stadt" (Schiller).

³ Confessions by the Romans of the poverty of their speech in the formation of compounds is frequent. Cf. Lucr. 1, 830, Livy 27, 11, 5, Cic. *De Fin.* 3, 4, 15, Gellius, *N. A.* 11, 16, 1, Latin has very few compounds with two prepositions (cf. ἐναπολαμβάνω, ἐπικαταβάλλω), and the constitution of such compounds is evident only after scrutiny (abscondo, consurgo).

⁴ The inability of the Romance languages to grapple with the compounds of Greek may be illustrated by the following translations, by Desrousseaux and Da Festa respectively, of Bacchylides, 11, 37-46:

νῦν δ' Ἀρτεμις ἀγροτέρα | χρυσάλακος λιπαρὰν | ἡμέρα τοξόκλυτος νίκαν ἔδωκε, | τὰ ποτ' Ἀβαντιάδας | βωμὸν κατένασσε πολὺν | λίστον εὐπεπλοῖ τε κούραι | τὰς δ' ἐξ ἐρατῶν ἐφόβησε | παγκρατῆς Ἥρα μελάρων | Προΐτου, παραπλήγι φρίνας | καρτερὰ ζεύξας ἀνάγκη.

Mais Artémis aujourd'hui, chasseresse au sceptre d'or, calme déesse, illustre par son arc, lui donne une victoire éclatante. A Artémis jadis un autel où s'empresment les prières fut bâti par le fils d'Abas et ses filles au beau péoplos, que la toute-puissante Héra chassa de l'aimable palais de Proetos, l'esprit subjugué par la dure nécessité de l'égarement.

Ma ecco che ora già ha dato una splendida vittoria la cacciatrice Artemis dall' aurea conocchia, la mite inclita arclera. A cui un giorno eresse un molto supplicato altare l'Abantiade e le sue vergini figlie vestite di bei peploi; poiché

respect. Doric alone of the dialects lacks the power to form compounds readily.

Like German, Greek has the power of giving a peculiar shading of expression by its substantival compounds, which have a different value than the analytical disposition of the members of the thought.

The relative brevity of the compounds of Greek enables the poet to view concretely an object or a quality from more points of vision than is possible to most other Indo-European languages: extension of the thought is not purchased by undue extension of mere word-form. The images are, so to speak, phonetically condensed. Cf. *ἀστυνόμοι ὀργαί*, "disposition for ordered life in cities."

No term-stone can be set to the possibility of shaping new compounds in Greek, or, indeed, to the character of their formation. Innovations, such as *Φιλαπεχθήμων*, are continually coming in view. The poets display the same delight in the delicately chiseled workmanship of their *τορευτὰ ἄπη* as Cellini took in each new creation of his art. The lately discovered lyrics of Bacchylides showed nearly one hundred compounds either used for the first time or unattested in any other writer.

The study of Greek compounds has been unduly neglected from at least one point of view. Since sense-epithets are preëminently a mark of personality, we have need of an investigation, especially of the compounds of a sensuous character. Such a study should include an examination of the range of each poet from Homer on, together with the determination of the sensuous sphere from which each

fuori dalle amabili case di Proitos le aveva tratte spaventate la possente Hera, con le menti avvinte da una fiera, fatal insania.

The translation of the passage by Jurenka does less violence to the native quality of German: Doch jetzt hat die Jägerin Artemis, die goldspindlige, kundige Schützin, die Sänftigerin, den glänzenden Sieg dir verliehen. Ihr siedelte einst der Abantiade an einen vielumflecten Altar mit seinen schöngewandigen Töchtern, die aus den anmuthigen Hallen die hochmächtige Hera gescheucht des Proitos, da den Geist in des Wahnsinns schreckliche Noth sie geschrret.

epithet is drawn, and a separation of the imitations from the fresh and living picture. Research work of this sort would prove a valuable contribution to the study of the psychology of the Greek people.

Word-Meaning

Words are the shorthand of thoughts. We pack into them the total impression of the thing or the quality they denote. The etymological signification is merely the seed from which is developed the full-grown plant. The Greeks, like other Indo-European peoples, put their national subjective impressions into words derived from roots equally the possession of other members of the same linguistic family; and with results that display their individual attitude towards the world of things and of ideas.

For the elucidation of the mind of a people semasiology is far more significant than the study of external form. For the psychologist the investigation of Greek word-meaning offers, with all the limitations incidental to an ancient language, the advantage of materials of a literature enormous in extent¹ and admitting of a more definite limitation than any modern literature.

Yet it is surprising how little has been done in this field of research. Buttmann we have, and his unequal successor, Goebel. Here and there we find work of a special character, like Bechtel's *Ueber die Bezeichnungen der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen in den indogermanischen Sprachen*, Schrader's *Die Psychologie des älteren griechischen Epos*; or discussions of the subject from the general point of view, such as Hecht's *Die griechische Bedeutungslehre*. Pezzi's *Espressione metaforica di concetti psicologici* stands alone in its kind, and it does not profess to be more than a regis-

¹ If we take the period ending with the birth of Christ, there are extant about 125,000 verses and over 22,000 (Teubner) pages of prose.

ter. Synonyms deal with only a single aspect of semasiology, and of modern books there is but one. There has been no gleaner in Greek fields like the incomparable Grimm.

Comparatively semasiology is the surest guide to national distinctions of thought. *Φίλος* is rendered by friend, ami, Freund; *ἀρετή* by virtue, vertu, virtue, Tugend: and yet on closer inspection that which seems nearest akin is separated by wide gulfs of difference. *Φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν* differ from "diligere," a word that well indicates the cautious and prudent Roman (cf. Catullus, 72, 1), to whom "loving" was a process of wise selection. Each tongue has its own voice, and here Danish outdoes all other languages with its distinction between "kjaerlighed," man's love for woman, and "Elskov," the ideal inspiration for all that is lovely which is awakened in man by his love for woman. (See Abel. "Ueber den Begriff der Liebe in einigen alten und neuen Sprachen," in his *Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, p. 47.)

Degrees of national social development are likewise indicated by the contrast between "guest," *ξένος*, and "hostis," in Old Latin "stranger," in Classical Latin "foreigner."

The shifting of signification within the limits of the same language reflects many aspects of national life, and especially national morals; as when foul thoughts are glossed by fair words and fair words lose thereby their innocence.

The unequalled resources at his command enabled the Greek at will to employ synonyms at every hand; and this is nowhere more noticeable than in the expressions for "good" and "bad."

The astonishing wealth of synonyms in Homer, one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of any language, denotes the concentration of the linguistic sense

upon the things of prime interest to the Homeric man.¹ With the destruction of national sentiment synonyms are used without distinction, abstract and vague expressions grow apace, the finer shading of thought is blurred in its outline through the adoption of general terms, or words properly expressive of delicate relations of ideas dissipate their vitality as they enlarge the range of their signification, plicable to nothing in particular" (*ὀλοσχερής* in Polybius); inanimate things and animate persons are persecuted by the adjectives are "applied to everything because they are ap-
poets, who worry them with epithets.

Greek semasiology has a twofold task: to set forth, on a psychological basis, the history of words according to their content, from Homer to the end of Greek literature; to discover the processes of thought by which words pass from one signification to another. The determination of the etymology and the chronology is the duty of the philologist; the determination of the laws that operate in the movement of signification from age to age is the task of the empirical psychologist.

To illustrate the psychological and the chronological determination, I select a few examples, first of the development of words from a primitive sensuous sphere to an intellectual or non-sensuous sphere, and, secondly, of the transference of words from one kind of sensuous meaning to another. Thus, *πρέπειν*, originally applied to the sense of sight (though it is also used of smell and sound), passes through the delimitation which restricts it to that which appeals favorably to the sense of sight, and yields the common Attic meaning. *πράττειν*, originally "to voyage through," "to pass over a space," acquires the force of "complete" in Homer (who retains also the primitive mean-

¹For "battle" Homer has 6 words; for "helmet" 5; for "hunter" 4; for "sea" 7; for "beggar" 7. He has seven words to mark different kinds of herdsmen, besides four words of a general character.

ing), and finally that of "act," "do" without regard to the attainment of the goal (first in Xenophanes). *συμβάλλειν* in Homer still means "to bring together," in Heraclitus it means "to compare," in Pindar "to recognize." *τέρπειν* shows a tendency to differentiate the forms with *a* (*ταρπῆναι*) with the meaning "satisfy," "sate" (a meaning which disappears with the *a*-forms) from the forms with *e*, which have the force of "rejoice."

The range of a many-sided language like Greek is enlarged by those ideas that appeal to the wider commonalty of the consciousness of the entire race. So it is with the sense of sight and the appearance of light which awakens a train of associative images. Image reacts upon image. *δμμα* is not only the eye but that which is seen by the eye, the capacity of insight, the effluence of the thing seen (cf. Plato, *Meno*, 76 D). Various aspects of thought are presented by many words of like character, such as *αὐγή*, *αὐγάζειν*, *λάμπειν*, *λαμπρός*, *Φῶς*, *Φέγγος*, and their opposites. So with *δεδορκεῖναι*=*ζῆν*. In the language of Greek poetry concrete censuous images, as *Φοιτὰς*, *νόσος*, "intermittent pain," may be subtilized by the reflective process.

An inviting field of investigation is a study of certain forms of comparison as the expression of the mental habits of the Greeks. How far does Greek apply a quantitative standard where the modern languages employ other expressions of degree? *πολύς* and *μέγας* have a wide range, like *multus* and *magnus*. The Greek used *πολύς* of *γέλως*, *ὑπνος*, *αἰδώς*, *ἀνάγκη*, *νόξ*; *μέγας*, of *Φίλος*, *Φωνή*, *λόγος*, *καιροί*. The animal world offers the standard of comparison in *ἑπποσέλιον*, *ἑππόκλημνος*, *βοόγλωσσος*. Diminutives are common where emotion is readily or strongly expressed. Italian has many, English few, diminutives; South German has more than North German. Very common in Latin, they evince the tendency of the Romans to express their feel-

ings strongly when they express them at all. In Greek they play an important rôle in popular speech and in those forms of literary art which are nearest akin to the language of the people. Thus Aristophanes has *βαλλάντιον*, *γαστρίδιον*, *ιματίδιον*, *μελίπτιον*, *ὀφθαλμίδιον*. Epic poetry, choral lyric, and tragedy avoid the diminutive, though in some words occurring in these classes of literature the diminutive force has been lost, as in *μηρίον*, *τεχίον*; whereas *ἡνία* seems to be a primitive. The elective affinities of literature show that there was a difference between the speech of the cultivated class and that of the common people, though that difference was probably less than that which distinguishes German and French dialects from the coyer literature.

But the investigation we desiderate has much more to do than to open up the polarities of comparison. Above all is needed a study of expressions for love, admiration, tenderness, hate, anger, sternness, coldness, astonishment, etc., and of the utilization or rejection of opportunities to set forth these emotions. How far is the Greek naïve, how far does he restrain himself from baring his soul, how far does he express gradations of his psychic state?

The emotional faculties of the Greeks were keenly sensitive. Excitability, intensity, passion, mark their personality. The driving impulses of pleasure and pain express themselves in a surprising wealth of interjections. The Roman, whose boast is "et facere et pati fortia" (Mucius Scaevola in Livy 2, 12, 10), borrows most of his exclamations of joy from the Greek (io, evoe, eu, euge, eia), while his exclamations of sorrow are his own. Greek abounds in words for joy; witness only *χαίρειν* (with the incomparable salutation *χαῖρε*), *τέρπεσθαι*, *εὐφραίνεσθαι*, *ἡδέσθαι*.

In common with the Roman, the Greek refuses in general to delineate his mental state with the nicety of discrimination and accuracy of psychological detail characterizing all

languages that bear the impress of romanticism; and in restricting the delineation of emotion to the larger outlines of human feelings, the classical languages seem pallid in contrast to the many-colored richness of modern literature. It can be shown, I believe, that the Greeks affect a certain undifferentiated intensity of expression: thus στείνειν is less than "groan," δακρύειν is "to be moved to tears"; αἵματόεν ρέθος is Deianeira's "flushed cheek." But this stress of emotional effect is much less pervasive among the Greeks than the Latins, who employ expressions indicative of great strength of feeling, expressions which do not admit (without qualification) of alternatives of lesser pathos. The Roman constantly says "flentes," "lacrimantes," "multis cum lacrimis." When once moved, he had no hesitation in using the strongest words at his command. Hence the vogue of the superlative in Latin is more marked than in Greek. Pliny (*Epist.* 2, 9, 3) uses four superlatives in immediate succession.

I have singled out a study of the expression of the emotions as an approach to the characteristics of the national mind of the Hellenes. But there are innumerable others of the same sort. Take, for example, the expressions of the idea of duty: duty to God, to one's self, to our neighbors, to our friends and foes. Only by these and similar studies can we gain an approach to the psychology of that people whose combination of intellect, imagination, fancy, and artistic sense we rank so high; and this, methinks, is infinite riches, in comparison to which much of the output of our dissertation-factories is poverty indeed.

The student of Hellenic thought has here stretched out before him fresh fields that are well-nigh untrodden: the olives of Athens have not yet all been gleaned.

Vocabulary

It is possible to exaggerate the significance of national vocabulary. Some, indeed, have said that were every external manifestation of national achievement in the mechanical and other arts to be destroyed, it would yet be possible to restore the entire state of a nation's civilization by the aid of its vocabulary alone. But vocabulary, though it may be called the mirror of national mind, the pulse of national life, cannot alone reproduce the inner coloring of thought, the subtle play of light and shadowy, that resides in the combination of words; and it is in the combination of words that the national soul most subtly expresses itself. Vocabulary is then, after all, a sketch, not an exact reproduction of nationality. Its wealth is regulated by the intensity of interests that a people brings to bear upon the outer world of things and the inner world of thought. The national capacity of the Greeks for expression is not to be measured along the periphery by mere wealth of words marking sensuous or even intellectual ideas; abundance of concrete words is not a gauge of intellectual vitality (the fourteen words for the parts of the Homeric ship do not in themselves differentiate the Hellene from the Phœnician); it must be measured at the centre too, by the definiteness with which intellectual and sensuous ideas are expressed, by the inner significance attributed to these ideas.

The Greeks were impelled by a propension to create, and their language responded to this impulse without hesitation. New words were born at inventive crises. Each new thought found for itself adequate expression in a speech of marvelous copiousness and plasticity. Every advance of civilization enriched the language with new conceptions and infused new life into words already in use. *οὐσία* acquires the meaning of "substance" from that of

"property," "possession"; *ρίζωμα* "root," in Empedocles becomes "element"; *κατηγορία*, "accusation," becomes "category"; *Φύσις* "natural constitution," is used for "nature"; *γύαλα* the "convex swelling of the cuirass," for the "vault of heaven." On the formal side the vitality of the language is seen in the construction of new compounds rather than in the formation of derivatives from single stems. It is but seldom that two words have the same form but different meanings.

I cannot attempt to set forth the achievements of the Greeks in the construction of technical terminology. From the chaos of mere words Aristotle and the Stoics brought forth order and laid the foundations of the language of grammar. The Hindus, indeed, possessed a like degree of acumen in this field, but it was the fortune of Dionysius the Thracian and not of Pānini, to compose the book which, next to the Bible, has had (as Delbrück says) a larger influence on the thought of Europe than any other single volume.

Every language is defective from the angle of vision of those of its users whose range extends over other languages, and who, therefore, borrow to supply their own deficiencies. Vocabulary has to follow trade and an increasing acquaintance with nature. The national debt of Greek presents a most instructive commentary on the character of Greek thought and national consciousness, especially when compared with other languages. Latin was an enormous borrower; when the language was saturated with Hellenisms it was a mere affectation of purism on the part of Tiberius to apologize for his use of "monopolium." A Chinese emperor in 1771 displaced over 5000 Chinese words in favor of a like number of Manchu origin. Of all the tongues of Europe, which have the past as well as their contemporaries to draw from, French is the coyest to adopt new

words. English is said to show 13,230 Teutonic, 29,853 "classical" words; but as English is a composite language, the preponderance of non-Teutonic words is not altogether due to mere borrowing. Russian is said to form new words readily from its own resources.

The pronounced hostility of Greek to borrowed words is one of the most remarkable features of that language, and the more remarkable because it was spoken from the Black Sea to the Pillars of Hercules, and because Greece itself was the home of thousands of barbarian slaves. Chauvinism in a language may seem venial when a language like Greek is possessed of a practically inexhaustible mine from which to quarry the materials of thought. "Lingua mater," we may say, "nova miracula suis ex viceribus numquam emittere cessabit." But the ability of a language to meet all demands upon it for the expression of its ideas is not an index of national resistance to acquisitions from abroad. German, with all its splendid capacity for compounding new words, would not repudiate many of the loan-words (said to be at least 14,000) that were acquired during the peculiar phases of its history.

Apart from proper names, the number of borrowed words in Greek for appellatives (for these only are borrowed) is much disputed, but is, on any theory, small. The trend of opinion at present is that A. Müller, Muss-Arnolt, and Lewy have exaggerated the amount of the debt to the Semitic languages. I hold no brief for Leo Meyer's *Wörterbuch*, which in many respects is a most unsatisfactory work; but at all events it is not inclined to dogmatism about the words in doubt. Down to the time of Aristotle, if my reading of the book is accurate, Meyer accepts as certainly foreign only about 100 words, while the origin of perhaps as many more which wear a foreign look he cautiously classes as obscure. As the domain of natural science was enlarged

there was a constant increase in the vocabulary, chiefly through the activity of the Peripatetics; and Aristotle and Theophrastus (and later Dioscorides) show a considerable number of foreign words for animals, minerals, and plants. Most of the loan-words of Greek are taken from the animal, the mineral, and (chiefly) the vegetable kingdom; besides these, there are, especially, names for materials of wearing apparel, woven goods, arms, measures, and musical instruments. Scientific terms and words for the arts the Greeks created for themselves.

But I do not so much wish to call attention to the refusal of the Greeks to adopt words of other languages as to emphasize their attitude towards certain objects seen by them for the first time. When an unknown object with a strange name becomes known to most peoples the name is usually transferred mechanically (sometimes with a certain amount of resistance) into their own speech. Sometimes the foreign word is retained for a time and later a designation of native manufacture is substituted for it. Of this latter process there is no sure example in Greek.

It is hard to discover the source of importations because more than any other people the Greeks regarded a new object from the point of view of its essential characteristic and found a name for it by recourse to their own tongue.¹ Thus in many instances they expanded or modified the current conception of a word already existing; as in the case of *δορκάς*, gazelle, *τροχός*, potter's wheel, *Διὸς βάλανος*, the sweet chestnut, *μέγας στροῦθος*, ostrich, *Περσικόν (μῆλον)*, peach, *Κυδώνιον (μῆλον)*, quince, *Φασιανός (ἔρνις)*, pheasant. Sometimes derivatives were formed, as *βαίνα* hyena (for which *γλάνος* was another name), *ιχνεύμων*, ichneumon (because it seeks out the eggs of the crocodile), *κράνεια* cornel-tree,

¹ This occurs of course in other languages; cf. French *sanglier* from *singularis* instead of a name derived from *verres* or *aper*.

κερατια, St. John's bread. Finally it was common to construct compounds, such as *ρίνóκερως*, *στρεφίκερως*, *πύγαργος*, *κατωβλέπων*, *χερκοπέθηχος*, and *ρύδóδενοδρον*.¹ Even the Phœnician names of the letters of the alphabet have been transformed and often made to end in alpha. This capacity of the Greeks to create names would seem to hold true in the case of objects which they themselves saw in foreign countries; and the process thus described may well have co-existed with the adoption of foreign names for things actually imported, or the knowledge of which (notably of animals, plants, and minerals) was imported by the Phœnicians before the Greeks displaced that people as the traders of the Mediterranean. Examples are *πάνθηρ* from Sanskrit *pundikaras*, *πάρδος* from *prdākus*; *μύρρον*, *νάρδος*, *πέπερι*, *άλόη*; *σάπΦειρος*, *ΐασπις*, *σμάραγδος*.

The cases of folk-etymology are perhaps less common than in other languages; as *Μείλιχος*, "the mild (Zeus)" is Phœnician Melech or Moloch; the date, *δάχτυλος*, is Aramaic *dikela*, palm; in *σνχόμορος*, sycamore, we seem to hear *σῶχον* and *μόρος*, though the word is derived from Hebrew *schikmim*.

A marked feature of the language, even its later history, is its proud refusal to adopt Latinisms. Strabo finds Greek equivalents for procurator, legatus, aquaeductus, sinus. Literature seems only then to have adopted Latin words when they had been enfranchised in the language of the people, which was not often the case. Plutarch was weak in Latin; Libanius was ignorant of it. Not till the fourth century was Latin better known because of the Latin rhetors in the Eastern Empire. Cestius and Argentarius seem to have been the first to make addresses in Latin. The influence of Latin syntax is indeed seen in Philodemus

¹ See Weise, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, 13 (1881-82), 233 ff. To this article (and the same author's *Charakteristik der lateinischen Sprache*) I am much indebted.

to a considerable extent, but Philodemus was himself Latinized.

Various other aspects of Greek vocabulary open up interesting points of approach. The play of fancy, the poetical envisagement of an object are seen in many of the names for animals, fishes, plants, etc. Thus *κερδῶ*, fox *Φερέουκος*, snail, *ψυχή*, butterfly, *ῥέττης*, cicada, *βασιλίσκος*, golden-crested wren; *βάχκος*, *κύβιον*, are names of fishes *νυμφαία* is the water-lily. It is noteworthy that the same word often designates a plant and a fish, a bird and a fish. Sometimes the same animal has many names, which are due to popular recognition of diverse qualities.

Greek names for persons are one of the finest achievements of the genius of the Indo-European languages; and the principle of name-giving inherited by all the Indo-European peoples nowhere attained such splendid results as in Greece. The common names of the Greeks have an element of distinction, an idealistic and poetic tone that echoes the national spirit as the names of no other land. *κλέος* is the most prolific single element, and its frequency recalls the remark of Pliny (*N. H.* 3, 42): *Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum*. The stateliness and dignity of the names in *εὖ-*, *ἀριστο-*, *καλλι-*, *καλο-*, *ἀγορα-*, *δημο-*, *-μαχο-*, *ἵππο-*, *θεο-*, *κρατο-*, etc., evince at once the national ideals and the contrast to the lowliness and poverty of the Roman names, which often express intellectual or physical defects (Cato, Verres, Cicero, Catilina; Brutus; Flaccus, Plancus, Sulla, Naso). In Latin there are at most only thirty *prænomina*. Success in war was not to the Greeks a proper source of name-giving, and not till the Macedonian age do we meet with such names as Demetrius Poliorcetes, Seleucus Nicator; whereas the addition of designations like Africanus and Numidicus is proper to the genius of the Roman people. The Greek found in names for persons the

nomen et omen, a religious significance rather than an opportunity for mere word-play or jest such as marks the attitude of Cicero in his correspondence and even in his speeches. But the well-nigh universal refusal of the Romans to name their children after their gods evinces a deeper religious feeling than the Greek custom, which, with few exceptions, draws on the entire pantheon (for example, Ἀπολλώνιος, Ποσειδώνιος). In fact, while the names of the Greeks mirror the high spirit of the cavalier, the Roman names utterly fail to reflect the dignity of Roman national life.

Another difference between Greek and Latin is the individualization by the Greek of his mountains, springs, and other features of natural scenery. All of these bear definite names, and some are relics of the primitive "Carian" civilization, such as Ἐρύμανθος, Ἀράχυνθος.¹ So rich is the vocabulary of Greek places that we may almost use the words of Lucan in speaking of the district about Troy: "nullum sine nomine saxum."

Conscious of the wealth of the vocabulary at his command, the Greek does not scruple to repeat a word already used; while the anxiety of the Roman to vary his words is an effort to hide by artifice the poverty of his resources. Poetry has its own vocabulary, but the proprieties of prose demand a limitation of the material used by the poet; yet no such strict bounds were set by the Greeks as by the Latins. Under the impulse of a controlling emotion the writer of prose in Greece feels free to rise to the region of poetry and to borrow from the loftier language of his fellow craftsmen the means to awaken emotion in others.

The deficiencies of Greek vocabulary are also instructive. Words for color are more numerous than in Latin, the poverty of which in contrast to the abundance of Greek

¹ Probably "Carian" are also ἀσάμινθος, τερέβινθος.

is lamented by Favorinus (Gellius, *N. A.* 2, 26, 5). Their infrequency in Greek, however, in comparison to modern languages is an indication of indifference, not to the charm of color, but to the minutiae of shading. French is said to have five times as many color-words as English, but we are not therefore insensible to the play of color effects; and English differentiates *auburn*, *hazel* and *bay*, *rose* and *pink* where German has only *braun* and *rosa*. Greek words for color often suggest more than they mean, as in the case of *χλωράγχην* used of a woman.

Both Greek and Latin have a highly developed system of names for family relationship, but a point of difference between the two languages may be noticed in the "conjuges liberique" of the Roman in contrast to the *παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες* of the Greek. The relation of the slave to his master in Greece (*παῖς*, *οἰκέτης*, *ἀνδράποδον*, and the colorless *δοῦλος*) is much less individualized than in Rome, where an ampler system of names indicates a wider aspect of the position occupied by the slave in regard to the family and the state (*puer*, *famulus*, *verna*, *minister*, *ancilla*, *servus*, *mancipium*).

Syntax

To syntax so much attention is devoted to-day that we almost lose sight of other aspects of the study of language. Greek syntax, too, displays the obvious and the subtler operations of the national mind. The Roman loves concinnity, subordination; the Greek loves variation, independence, the largest amount of freedom under the sovereignty of law. To fixed forms of thought, to rigidity and uniformity of expression, the Greek mind is hostile. The acuteness of his logical faculty loves to unbend;—an entasis disturbs the level line of thought only to yield a higher beauty than that of mere evenness. Greek speech is acutely

MENTAL EDUCATION OF A GREEK YOUTH

Hand-painted Photogravure from the Painting by Otto Knille

Greek youths were carefully trained by educators who gave equal attention to the physical and the mental needs of their charges, severity of ordeal being characteristic of both. The picture opposite is the reproduction of a section of a frieze painted by Knille for the library of the Berlin University, in which by a series of four pictures the artist very admirably depicted the prime features that distinguish the process of Greek education.



sensitive to the psychological processes of assimilation, attraction, and the varied forms of analogy; all of which give evidence of liveliness and rapidity of comprehension. A passion for precision of outline is voiced in the delight in antithesis. Antithesis is sometimes developed within antithesis; and readily finds expression even when it does not point a contrast in the thought. Greek is the language of "buts": we might almost say of it what Goethe said in another connection: "jedes gesprochene Wort erregt den Widerspruch." Independence of the members of a sentence is gained by $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ and $\delta\epsilon$, even when syntactical subordination is effected by conjunctions. A further testimony to the antithetical form of thought are the many polar expressions, as when one member of a pair is logically insignificant (Σ 315-316, *Alcman*, 4, 43-44); or where a doublet takes the place of a general expression (Sophocles, *Antig.* 1108-09; cf. $\acute{\alpha}\Phi\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\ \tau\epsilon\ \Phi\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\ \tau\epsilon$); or when opposites are associated the latter of the two is added solely to explain a general idea already expressed (δ 719-20). I cannot pause to remark on the many shades of finesse, on the blending of the intellectual and artistic qualities, on the power to chase the fleeting shadows of the associative analogies of thought, that are apparent to every observer of the syntactical usages of the language. We think of the mental agility demanded by the Greek of his hearers and readers; the sudden shifts of construction, as when an independent clause takes up a relative clause; the striking ellipses, especially in proverbs; the power of minute distinction noticeable in the use of the subjunctive and optative moods with or without $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, or of the future and subjunctive with or without $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$; the blending of the active and the middle with the subtle distinctions of the latter voice; the distinction between the active, reflexive, and middle; the articular infinitive, a late addition to the

resources of the language, but rich in possibilities; the wide range of the adverb as an attributive (*οἱ ἀεὶ ἄρχοντες*), a usage forbidden even to German and approached only by English, as in "an out-of-the-way corner." Greek affects active, personal constructions, is poor in impersonals in comparison with Latin; Greek prefers the direct reproduction of the words of another, whereas Latin allows greater range to oratio obliqua. The *Symposium* of Plato is herein a *tour de force*.

The power of the participle gives variety to the sentence and reduces to a brief compass a thought that otherwise might be expressed in dragging subordinate clauses. (The addition of *ῶν*, *φέρων*, *ἄγων*, etc., that appears to us superfluous, gives vividness by sketching a situation.) Greek, Latin, and English are here nearer akin, though Greek has a far wider range than either Latin or English; while German lacks the use of the transitive participle, as it does that of the Greek verbal adjective. In Greek the participle is readily substantivised, and is sometimes petrified, as in *γέρον*, *θεράπων*. In German this is rarely the case, as in Wind, that is, *der wehende*.

Greek emphasizes the character of an action within the free range of the tense-system, but in comparison to some languages, and especially Latin, it is often careless of some of the exact distinctions of time-relation; nor, it may be added, though not as a corollary, did the Greeks, until the time of Timæus and Polybius, that is, long after the period of their most marked individualism, develop the essential virtue of the historian,—the passion for exact chronology.

The double tense-forms are not linguistic luxuries, though an original differentiation may be relaxed, either momentarily, or absolutely, as in a later stage of the language. Ordinary cases, such as *ἔξω* and *σχήσω*, will occur to every one; let me call attention to the differences of the

dialects; e. g. ἀνέγνωσα alongside of ἀνέγνων, the former having in Ionic the meaning "persuaded." From the point of view of other languages Greek does seem to possess several linguistic luxuries, as the future, βουλήσομαι, with the infinitive, where βούλομαι would suffice. Many such delicacies of expression fell out of use in course of time. But outworn distinctions may well survive in a language that is subtle, as the evanescent distinction between the present and future infinitive in the periphrastic construction with μέλλω as a verb of thinking.

One delicate syntactical usage that has heretofore been regarded as the distinct property of Latin has latterly been shown to exist in Greek. The epistolary imperfect indicating the time of the reading of a letter by its recipient is now known to occur in a Greek letter of the fourth century B. C., so that this use in Latin, like the word epistula, is in all probability borrowed from Greek. See Wilhelm, *Der älteste griechische Brief*, in the *Jahreshefte d. oester. arch. Inst.*, 1904, pp. 94 ff.

Order of Words

A good arrangement of words marks the organic expression of thought, and pleases the ear. The order of words in Greek illustrates the spontaneity and mobility of the genius of the Hellenic race. This is not due solely to the fact that, in proportion as the inflections of a language are well developed, the arrangement of the words is freer and the need of emphasis on logical relations is therefore less pronounced. There is, too, the national quality of mind.

Thus it may not be overbold to discover in the rigid arrangement of subject, object, and predicate in French an aspect of the Gallic mind, which here, as elsewhere, is controlled by the centralizing tendency of society, by convention, by linguistic etiquette, and above all by its insistence

on absolute perspicuity. "La clarté est la base éternelle de notre langue," says Rivarol; and Condillac remarks that French is perhaps the only language which has no synonyms, signifying thereby words absolutely identical in meaning. Above all other tongues the Gallo-Roman demands elegance, propriety, and mathematical exactness. This absolute precision is indeed foreign to the Greek, who gives freer play to his fancy, to his personality, and thus reproduces the shifting charm of nature. Greek does not recognize such rigid distinctions in meaning as appear in Latin *carmen malum* and *malum carmen*, *partus secundae* and *secundae partus*, *homo urbanus* and *urbanus homo*. Nor does the imperiousness of logic dominate Greek as it dominates Latin.

When Greek prose had attained perfection it fell into a strange captivity that marks the peril of supersensitiveness to form. The moderns can have no adequate understanding of the passion to avoid hiatus in prose and to modify the free movement of prose by the rhythms of poetry. Held in check, as in Demosthenes, the opposition to hiatus evinces the delicacy of Greek perception; autocratic in its demands, as in Polybius, it reduced art to the bondage of the letter. So long as both tendencies remained under control they indeed limited the free disposition of the members of clauses and sentences; but that limitation the Greek was willing to accept in order to gain a more finished utterance.

Metaphors

Metaphors are the sparks of the mind; metaphors illuminate the recesses of feeling. The attitude of a man to life, his external activity, his innermost thought, the attractions and repulsions of his personality, are embodied in the figurative language he naturally employs. Many metaphors are purely personal; and yet it is possible to dis-

cover affinities which pass beyond the sphere of the individual and indicate unconsciously the national mind and character. Change in metaphor is a capital index to change in social conditions and in morals. Every language marks its progress by the creation of new modes of figurative thought. Every age brings its contribution to metaphorical expression: those of the distant past we often find difficult to understand; those of recent times, drawn mostly from trade, science, art, we comprehend, as a rule, with ease. So rapid, however, is the change in social conditions that a metaphor less than a century old now may need its interpreter. Who grasps at first the meaning of "to burke a parliamentary question"? So the ancients must have been sore distressed to comprehend *τελενικίσαι* "to make empty," from the Seriphian beggar Telenicus.

Greek figurative language is not so ample a record of civilization as are the metaphors of modern times. Invention and discovery are infrequently a source of the metaphorical language of the Greeks, possibly because of a difference of attitude in comparison with any modern people, but more certainly because invention and discovery constituted a mark of civilization less effectively in ancient times than they do at present. Some expressions of the sort do exist, however, as *καινοτομεῖν*, "to make innovations in the state," from opening up a new vein in mining.

It is well-nigh impossible to discover mint-marks of nationality in the "petrified metaphor," which permeates every language and is seen especially in the expression of intellectual conceptions. If we confine our observation to the pure metaphor and the simile, we shall find that they record to no slight degree national activities and especially occupations. Latin shows at every hand the Roman soldier, the agriculturist, the spectator at the gladiatorial games. With the Greeks the sea is the most prolific source of meta-

phors that bespeak the national thought. The figurative uses of *ἐρέσσω*, *ἀντλέω*, *γαληνίζω*, *ὀξέλλω*, *ἀνακρούω*, *σαλεύω*, *κατοννρίζω*, *ἔρμα* ballast, *ὄρμος* haven, etc., are constant. The Greek says *λιμὴν ἀτνχίας* "a harbor of misery"; *εἰς πέλαγος αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖς γὰρ πραγμάτων* is the warning of Menander (65, 6) to a man about to marry. Aristophanes says of the bride *πλενστέον ἐπὶ τὸν νυμφίον*. The sea is the type of animation (*πέλαγος ἢ πόλις ἐστίν*), of peevishness, inconstancy; whereas we speak of the uncertainty of the weather. The audience in the theatre is the *θάλαττα κοίλη*. The palæstra yields an abundance of figurative usages: *αἶρω*, *ἀποστλεγγίζω*, *κλιμακίζω*, *δοιοσκελίζω*, *σκιαμαχία*, *περὶ στάσεως ἀγωνίζομαι*, may serve as common examples. The contests in court recall those in the gymnasium. *ἀγών*, *αἰρέω*, *διώκω*, *Φεύγω*, *παρέρχομαι*, *προκαλέομαι*, etc., in their figurative senses are all drawn from the same source. Most metaphors from riding deal with racing.

Music yields *παραπαίω*, *παραχορδίζω*, *πλημμελέω*, etc., and *αὐτὸς αὐτὸν αὐλεῖ*. Roman gravity reprehended dicing: *impudicus et vorax et aleo*, says Catullus, 29, 2. The Greeks had easier consciences on this score. Witness the use of *κυβέω* for *κινδυνεύω*. *ἀναρρίπτω κίνδυνον* is borrowed from *ἀναρρίπτω κύβον*. From the occupation of weaving are drawn the figurative uses of *διχορραΐζω*, *ἐπικλώθω*, *σπαθάω*, the phrases *ἀμήρυτοι λόγοι*, *ράπτω ἐπιβύβλας*; fishing yields *δελεάζω*, *ἐκκαλαμάομαι*; the statuary's art, *πλάττω κακόν*, *ἀπὸ καναβευμάτων*. The life of the farmer supplied the figurative use of *ἀροῦν*, to "procreate," and *πόντος ἡρόθη δορί*, and of *ἀλοάω* "thresh" and "thrash." Metaphors from war are not so common in Greek as in Latin; hence the range of the figurative uses of *πολεμέω* and *μάχομαι* is more restricted than is that of the corresponding Latin words. Comedy is far less free than tragedy in its recourse to metaphors from arming. There are of course many differences between Greek and modern metaphors. The ass is not always the stupid beast, and the

goose is not foolish to the Greek. The dog is not always the faithful companion of man. If there be virtue in heredity, the character of the modern Greek dog has not changed from that of his classical ancestor which justified the phrase *παλλαχὴ κυνῶπις* of Aspasia.

Blümner calls attention to one advantage possessed by the form of metaphor in Greek and Latin. We might say, "Each one of you, like the fox, gets his bribe," or "The fox gets his bribe," but we cannot say, "Each one of you, a fox, gets his bribe;" as the Greek does in proverbial sayings with pregnant force, *ὕμῶν εἷς μὲν ἔχαστος ἀλώπηξ δωροδοχεῖται* (Cratinus, 128).

Proverbs

Metaphors often find a place in proverbs, and a word may be said of the character of the Greek proverb. The Greeks did not sharply distinguish between *παροιμία* and *γνώμη*. They often included under proverbs expressions that are merely metaphorical, as *συχίνῃ ἐπικουρία*; famous words of the poets or other writers, as *ἄμμες ποτ' ἦμες*, an abbreviation of *ἄμμες ποτ' ἦμες ἄλλιμοι νεανῖαι*; word-plays; comparisons, as *ὀργιλώτερος τῶν κυνιδίων*. Many, perhaps most proverbs, disclose no truth that is the specific property of any people. Form, shading of expression, manner of pointing the moral, may vary with different peoples, but the content is usually common property. Proverbs set forth the wisdom of an age rather than of a nation as distinct from any other nation. In Greek, in comparison to the mass of "literary" proverbs in the collections there are relatively few handed down orally and drawn from the mouth of the common people ("ex vulgi faece," as Erasmus has it). Greek literature, even Greek philosophy, stood nearer to the life of the common people than is the case in modern times. The Greek poets and philosophers drew on popular

wisdom for their axioms of sound sense and good morals with a frequency that would be indecorous in their fellow craftsmen of to-day. Still much proverbial wit smacks of the soil whence it springs. Goethe has well expressed it:

Sprichwort bezeichnet Nationen
Muss aber erst unter ihnen wohnen.

“Opera met oleum perdidit,” says the Roman; “Da ist Hopfen und Malz verloren,” says the German. Many Greek proverbs, especially those in Aristophanes, take their point from Attic life or history; others, as those drawn from the sea, epitomize national sentiment. Such are ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἀγκύραιν ὀρμεῖν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς (ἀγκύρας) ὀρμεῖν, δεύτερος πλοῦς, and the less common ἀπὸ κόπης ἐπὶ βῆμα ἄλας ἄγων καθεύδεις, πρὸς κώρυκον γυμνάζεσθαι, ἀλιεὺς πηγήεις νοῦν οἷσει, Ἀττικὸς εἰς λιμένα, κέρδους ἔκατι καὶ ἐπὶ ριπὸς πλέοι. The pithy *sententiae* of the Spartan mark his sturdy and homely character; the wit of the keen Sicilian is barbed (ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου κλωὸς γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ θεός).

So the principles that are a guide to life are set down in the homely language of peasant and merchant. Nor are there indications lacking that in Greece too there were those “whose whole wisdom lies in a collection of proverbs.” Innumerable are the proverbs taken from the close intimacy of men with animals and their observation of the life of birds.

Versification

The rhythms in which the poet’s thought gains an utterance embody the national genius. Nowhere is this the case with greater certainty than in Greece. The versatility of the Greek mind is expressed in the countless rhythms of their manifold lyric; their subtle sense of the connection between form and content finds opportunity for expression in a wealth of rhythms incomparably superior to that pos-

sessed by any other civilized people. If we regard only the dactylic hexameter as the national meter, the spontaneity, grace, and mobility of the Hellenes is mirrored in the movement of the verse; while the Saturnian, as has often been pointed out, reflects the stately and dignified Roman.

National Style

If style is regulated by the movement of thought itself it may not be hazardous to speak of a national style voicing national endowment in poetry or prose or in both. Thus the national style of the Romans is prose, which is suited to the gravity of the national manners and character, to the logical character of the national mind. With all the majesty of Virgil and the vehemence of Juvenal, the Roman character is not essentially poetic. As the Latins came under the influence of the Greeks they lost something of their stiffness, sharpness, and homely hard sense. But in that department of the poet's art which is most individual, in lyric, the Roman failed, with all his dependence on his Greek models, to acquire the power of the wing. The Romans had a distinct genius for prose, as have the French, the creators of modern prose style. (Boccaccio and Cervantes, I am told, still latinized.) French lyric that is not due to the influence of Provençal or English lacks in power when measured in comparison with German, English, or Greek. The intellectual and emotional qualities of the Hellenic race endowed it equally with a genius for poetry and for prose; though poetry rather than prose is perhaps truly national in its scope. The sovereignty of Greek style exacted submission in the form of imitation among all nations and at every time. The creative quality of the Greek spirit transfused its imitators so that they gained the power of originality, of passing through imitation to creation.

Bossuet read Homer whenever he had to compose a funeral oration.

One salient difference between the classic tongues (and especially Greek) in comparison with modern languages is their greater precision and lucidity. We pack such an infinite deal into our words that exactness and clearness of thinking often disappear. The Greeks developed their thought in order to be clear. Their connectives focus attention on the logical evolution of their thought.

Aristotle says that a foreigner could be recognized by his avoidance of certain particles. The particles are logical; but they are also lyric and emotional. They indicate personality, opinion, hope, doubt; though they reproduce the Greek dialectical keenness, they have less of that reflective character that marks our ponderous and meticulous "I believe," "I assume," "I daresay." The intellectual quality of Greek speech does no violence to its poetic quality. Feeling holds its own when the reason is most at work. The language of the Greeks is a diaphanous robe of finely spun texture which allows each delicate contour of the thought to display its just proportions.

BEGINNINGS AND PROGRESS OF ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

BY PAUL MEYER

(Translated from the French by Prof. T. Atkinson Jenkins, University of Chicago.)

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THE first Universal Exposition of which I have any recollection is that of Paris, in 1855. It was called an *Exposition universelle de l'Industrie et des Beaux Arts*, and the building constructed for it in the Champs-Élysées was named the *Palais de l'Industrie*. In those days only tangible and visible things were exhibited. As the products of the mind could not be set forth in material forms, no opportunity was given them of appearing among the exhibits.

In 1873, at the third universal exposition at Paris, the idea of providing for purely intellectual productions was carried out. The method, commonly adopted since, was that of congresses and conferences, and those of 1878, while not including all branches of knowledge, comprised some widely different fields of thought. This innovation was at first not very successful: the congresses of 1878 were few in number and poorly attended. I confess that I for one did not even know of their existence. But in 1889 the germ had developed. At the exposition of that year there were not less than sixty-nine congresses; at that of 1900

they numbered one hundred and twenty-seven. Among these, however, there was none for philology nor for the history of literatures. I remember that several persons expressed to me their surprise that no one at Paris had thought of forming a congress which should bring together the many scholars of all nations who were pursuing the scientific study of the Romance languages. I can hardly claim to have offered these persons a very satisfactory explanation. The real reason was that the congresses were to be held, as at St. Louis, during the vacation period, and the gentlemen upon whom the duty would have fallen of planning a meeting of "Romanists" had the weakness to prefer, at that time of year, the country or the seaside to all the congresses in the world. Now, however, I cannot help regretting our indolence. A congress for Romance philology in all probability would have been presided over by the man who was then rightly looked upon as the foremost of French Romance scholars, Gaston Paris, and we should have expected from him an address full of ideas and facts concerning the history and the future of the science to whose advancement he had so liberally contributed.

Forty years ago, when G. Paris and I were merely hopeful young men, it was still possible for a single person to cover the whole range of Romance studies, but to-day the field has become so extended that such an achievement is no longer a possibility. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to sketch in outline the progress of a science whose limits seem to recede in proportion as one attempts to attain them.

If I were asked who was the first in the Latin world to take an interest in the languages of Latin origin, I should not hesitate to reply, Dante. The great Florentine in fact possessed a fairly correct knowledge of French and of Provençal—of the *Langue d'Oil* and the *Langue d'Oc*, to use

his own expressions. He had carefully considered the linguistic variety of Italy, and had proposed for the dialects of the peninsula a system of classification which is yet in a large measure acceptable. But the object he had in view, which was the creation of a general language which should receive contributions from all the Italian dialects, was chimerical, and several centuries were to elapse before linguists began to study languages as they are, with no other idea than to describe them accurately and to write the history of their inevitable changes.

The Italian philologists, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, devoted a good deal of labor to the study of their language. Among these, a few had enough of the historical sense to be curious as to its origins, and some of them by intuition even reached the truth on some important points. Maffei, for example, saw in Italian the continuation of the Vulgar Latin of the Romans. But none of them embraced in one view all the Latin idioms, or made any effort to point out the relations which connect them with each other and with their common source. Still more remote in the minds of these scholars was the idea that it would be interesting to include in their researches idioms which had not been made illustrious by literary achievements.

A somewhat wider conception of the science of language appeared in 1821, when Raynouard published his *Grammaire comparée des langues de l'Europe latine dans leurs rapports avec la langue des troubadours*. But the very title of this book shows that the work was intended to be the demonstration of a preconceived idea; all its conclusions were necessarily vitiated because they were subordinated to an erroneous theory. In fact, Raynouard's leading idea was that between Latin and the various Neo-Latin tongues there had existed an intermediate stage;

this he called, using the term in a special sense, the *langue romane*. According to his theory, this language had developed in close succession to Latin all over Latin Europe; but, while it was preserved by a miraculous exception in the south of France, everywhere else it had undergone the special modifications which led to the formation of French, Italian, Spanish, etc..

The point of departure for this conception, which after all is not so radically false as it may seem, is an unfortunate interpretation of the expression *Romana lingua*, which, in Latin writings of the ninth and tenth centuries and even later, is used to designate a language quite different from the Classic Latin, but one whose relationship to the ancient Roman idiom was clearly understood at the time. By *lingua romana*, or *lingua rustica romana*, people understood in every Romance country nothing more nor less than the vulgar speech as opposed to literary or grammatical Latin. The use of the same expression in different countries did not in the least imply that the *lingua romana* was everywhere the same. People of that time cared little for such a question. Raynouard, finding that the poets of the south of France often gave the name *romanz*, or *lenga romana*, to the language they employed, argued that the name being the same, the language must be the same, and persuaded himself that during a period of some length the people of the Latin West had spoken the language of Provence, his native region.

Herein lay his error. On the other hand, we cannot doubt that there was a stage between the Classic Latin and the Romance languages: this is a fact long since recognized. But the intermediate stage, generally designated as Vulgar Latin, had no closer connection with the Romance of South France than with that of other regions. A good many years were to elapse before the study of

Vulgar Latin—I mean of that small part of it that we can ever really know—was undertaken in a methodical way.

Nevertheless, Raynouard's work, in spite of its fundamental error and in spite of a thousand mistakes and confusions in matters of detail, was by no means useless, for its author may be termed in a certain sense the precursor of Diez, and to Diez belongs incontestably the honor of having founded the comparative grammar of the Romance languages.

Diez, as one may conclude from his writings, and as he appeared to me forty years ago when I visited him in Bonn, was a modest and cautious man not given to generalities, a sagacious observer attentive to details, a linguist skilled in grouping facts and in deducing their consequences, carefully avoiding hazardous theories, and preferring to treat only those problems whose solution he believed he had found. His *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen*, first published in 1836-43, thoroughly revised in the second edition (1856-60), and again improved in the third (1869-72), has been the foundation both of the general and of the special study of the Romance languages. Standing at the entrance of the main avenues of Romance philology, this work has been, to all those who have aimed to deal thoroughly with any part of this science, the reliable guide who starts you upon the right path, and who, if he does not accompany you to the end of your journey, at least travels long enough at your side to prevent you from going astray. Of course one cannot say that Diez found a guide of this sort in Raynouard, but it is not a bold supposition that the idea of a grammar of the Romance languages was suggested to Diez by the essay—imperfect as it is—of his predecessor. This conjecture finds additional support in the fact that Diez's earlier works dealt chiefly with Provençal literature, and, in those days, the almost unique source

of Provençal studies was the *Choir des poésies originales des troubadours*, the sixth and last volume of which contained the *Grammaire comparée des langues de l'Europe latine*. Moreover, Diez took pleasure in saying that he considered himself the pupil of Raynouard. This was putting it rather strongly, for to write successfully a grammar of the Romance language, as Diez understood the task, the author must needs be familiar with ideas and methods which as yet were unknown outside of the small circle of German philologists in which they had originated. In this case other influences than those of Raynouard were needed, and, although the subject was of special interest to the Latin peoples, it was only in Germany that a work of this kind could have been planned and executed. Comparative grammar is a science of German origin, and one which remained for a long time the property of German scholars. It was in 1816 that Bopp had given us the first sketch of a work of this kind in his treatise on the Sanskrit conjugation system as compared with that of the Greek, Latin, Persian and Germanic languages. The first edition of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European languages, upon which in a way Diez's work depended, had begun to appear in 1833. Grimm's German grammar, in which, for the first time, the phonology of a group of related idioms was treated, dates from 1819.

These works were little known outside of Germany. In France there had been created in 1852, at the Paris Faculty of Letters, a course in comparative grammar which was placed in charge of an elderly Hellenist of German extraction. This course, which I myself followed in 1858 and 1859, was indeed wretchedly poor. It consisted in a treatment of general grammar as the subject was understood in the eighteenth century. It was only in 1865 that comparative grammar was properly taught at Paris. In that

year, Minister Duruy transferred to the Collège de France the chair which had existed, more in name than in fact, at the Sorbonne, and intrusted it to Mr. Bréal, who had studied in Germany under Bopp and under Albrecht Weber, and who still occupies this chair.¹ In England and in Italy, the teaching of comparative grammar dates from about the same time, being inaugurated in those countries by two men equally eminent, but widely different in qualities and methods,—Max Müller and Prof. Ascoli.

Diez seems to have felt Bopp's influence only indirectly, but Grimm's grammar acted upon his ideas in a decisive way. He was in fact a "Germanist" before becoming a "Romanist." At the University of Bonn he taught mostly Germanic philology. His courses in Romance philology were slimly attended and were subordinate. The general principles which he was to apply to the comparative study of the Latin tongues were ready to hand in the grammar of the Germanic languages, which was already founded upon a scientific basis. The statement of this fact in no way operates to diminish Diez's merit. The difficulties which he had to overcome were enormous. The laws of phonology and of inflections are much more complicated and less apparent in the Romance languages than in the Germanic languages, and, on the other hand, the materials which Diez had to make use of in his work were far more defective and less reliable than those upon which Jakob Grimm had worked. In the case of Old French and Old Provençal, whose monuments go back to the ninth and tenth centuries, he was compelled to compose his grammar from texts few in number and in a majority of cases poorly edited. For the popular idioms, the *patois* texts were in most cases not to be had. It need occasion no surprise,

¹ He has just resigned. His successor is Prof. Meillet, well known for his various essays on Slavonian and Armenian languages. (Dec. 1905.)

therefore, if at this distance we discover numerous gaps in his work; we must rather admire the sagacity which enabled him to use to such wonderful advantage the defective materials with which he was forced to be satisfied.

The first edition of Diez's grammar was little known outside of Germany. In France, a man of keen intelligence and unusual breadth of view, but a man of letters rather than a linguist, J. J. Ampère, was the first to use it, in 1841. In writing a rather superficial book on the history of the formation of the French language,¹ he condensed into one chapter all that he found concerning the French language in the first volume of Diez's grammar. The result was far from satisfactory. Ampère knew very little about Old French, and took no pains to assimilate the rigorous method of his model. The personal observations which he inserted here and there in his often inaccurate abridgment of Diez's doctrine were well calculated to deter his readers from referring to the original. Under such circumstances we can hardly be surprised that the value of the grammar was underestimated in France. French scholars continued, therefore, to publish books on the origins and history of the French language in which the same general questions were brought up time after time,—no one apparently having an inkling of the right way to approach such questions,—and works in which a learning, in some cases very sound but ill directed, exerted its energies without leading to any definite results. Among these were the *Essai philosophique sur la formation de la langue française* by Edélestand du Méril (1852), and the three volumes on the *Origines et formation de la langue française* (1854-57) by Albin de Chevallet, books which were still-born, little read in their day, and without influence. At the same

¹ *Historie de la formation de la langue française*, 8vo, 1 vol. In 1869 appeared a second edition, to which I was persuaded to add a number of footnotes in which I endeavored to correct the more obvious mistakes.

time the only two chairs of French philology that existed in France—those of the Collège de France (founded 1852) and of the École des Chartes (1847)—were held by professors who knew no German. Littré himself, who contributed so much by his articles in the *Journal des Savants* and by his dictionary to the progress of French philology, and who had not the excuse of not knowing German, as he translated several German books into French,—even Littré seems never to have used Diez's grammar. He had some acquaintance with the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Romanischen Sprachen*, which he drew upon liberally for his dictionary, as the Belgian scholar, Auguste Scheler, had done before him in a *Dictionnaire étymologique du française* (first edition, 1862). The methodical study of the Romance languages in France was destined not to begin until after the publication of the second edition of Diez's grammar, about 1860. The appearance in 1862 of Gaston Paris's book, *Sur le rôle de l'accent latin dans la langue française* (his thesis at the École des Chartes), marks the beginning of a new epoch.

In Italy, the application of the methods received from Germany was made a little later than in France; the first works of Professor Ascoli employed them with signal success. In Portugal, F. A. Coelho introduced the same methods in the study of his native tongue (1872). Spain also entered the same path, only much later.

We must not imagine that even in Germany the movement toward the scientific study of the Romance languages, so brilliantly begun by Diez, made rapid progress immediately. For many years Diez was the sole representative not only of Romance philology as a whole but also of that branch of it which he had specially studied,—Provençal philology. One by one, however, professors of Germanic languages—Adalbert von Keller, W. L. Holland, Konrad

Hofmann, Karl Bartsch—offered courses in Old French and Old Provençal. On the other hand, the teaching of English philology was often coupled with that of Romance philology, with the result that in 1859 a magazine was founded by Ferdinand Wolf and Adolf Ebert “für englische und romanische Litteratur.”

It may be noted further that in Germany the study of literature was decidedly more popular than the study of language. The example of Diez was followed rather slowly. As regards Old French literature, for example, an influential initiative was that of L. Uhland, who, in 1812, in an essay now famous, directed attention to the French epic poems (*chansons de geste*).¹ Acquaintance with the Old French epics and with the romances of the Round Table was soon recognized as indispensable to any one who intended to study thoroughly German medieval poetry.

The second edition of Diez's grammar showed that great progress had been made since the first, but it owed little to works published after the date of this edition. The various changes and additions made by the author were the fruits of his own researches: what others had discovered was comparatively little. The third edition, which appeared from 1869 to 1872, is less personal. In the period between 1860 and 1870, centres for Romance studies had been formed in Germany and elsewhere; works of value had appeared, and the utmost the master could do, enfeebled as he was by age, was to introduce into this third edition a portion of the results obtained by his successors, all of whom might have called themselves his pupils, although few of them had been actually present at his lectures.

If, in the year 1904, nearly half a century after the second edition and thirty-five years after the third, we examine Diez's grammar from the heights now reached in

¹ In Fouqué's *Musen*, first year.

our knowledge of the Romance languages, there are two facts which will strike every impartial observer. The first is that the rules established by Diez are still for the most part valid; his doctrine remains practically whole and sound. The second is that there are serious deficiencies in the work. Certain very important questions of a general character are not dealt with at all; various Romance territories are incompletely explored; the geographical extension of linguistic phenomena is not indicated with precision; the notation of sounds is often too vague, and the history of their changes is at times neglected.

To pass these deficiencies in review is to realize the fact that the greater part of them could hardly have been avoided half a century ago, and also to appreciate the immense progress which has been accomplished in the last thirty or forty years in working the domain which the master had so brilliantly explored.

The Romance languages are nothing else than Latin modified differently according to times and places. But to what Latin do we refer? To the Vulgar Latin, assuredly, to Raynourad's *langue romane*, which was at first almost homogeneous throughout the Roman Empire. Diez was convinced of this fact, and all that he says on the subject in the first part of his grammar is very sensible; it is evident, however, that he had the lexicographical elements more in view than matters of grammatical structure. But he deliberately refrained from any attempt to tell us how and under what circumstances the local changes occurred which have transformed Vulgar Latin into the infinite variety of the Romance idioms. Here was a question which had been much debated, and one to which various solutions had already been proposed. Some believed that Latin had undergone profound changes through contact with Germanic or Slavic language at the period of the in-

vasions in the fifth century, and comparisons with chemical compounds were made which conveniently veiled the weakness of the historical and linguistic arguments invoked. This was the opinion put forward by Muratori and upheld by Littré, forty or fifty years ago. Others held, with greater probability, that the local variations of Latin must have existed in an even more remote period, and that we must attribute the first changes to the linguistic habits of the Celts, Iberians, Ligurians, etc., of Gaul, Spain, and Italy,—habits of which these populations had not been able to rid themselves in learning to speak Latin. This is the theory once defended, with more energy than weight of proof, by Fauriel. It has since been revived and supported with more definite arguments by eminent linguists, among whom it is sufficient to name Prof. Ascoli. But Diez was concerned with facts that could be proved; he had no great liking for questions whose answers involved too large a proportion of the hypothetical. Rather than to continue debating these doubtful questions, what was needed, if the historical method was to be employed, was to reduce as much as possible the space still vacant between Latin as it was known in the classic authors—that is, written Latin, which had not greatly changed since the first century—and the Romance languages, which did not make their appearance before the ninth or tenth centuries. In this vacant space there was the Vulgar Latin, about which very little was known.

On still other subjects Diez had left work for his successors. History and geography touch philology on several sides; these sciences mutually aid and support one another. At first this was not well understood. To what boundaries did the Roman conquest carry with it the use of Latin as the every-day speech? And, within these limits, in which countries was the language of the con-

querors the only language in use at the fall of the Empire? In what regions did the aboriginal language persist, and to what extent?

Again, taking our stand at the present day, let us draw a map of the Romance world of Europe. Let us determine the frontiers which separate it from Germanic, Slavic, and other languages. This can certainly be done, as we are working with living idioms. But when these limits are once drawn, in which countries may we say that Latin has developed there *in situ*? In which territories has Romance gained ground, and what circumstances have determined this gain? What ground outside of these boundaries has been lost? For certain territories, notably for those of the Roumanian language, these investigations meet with serious difficulties; thanks to recent works, however, these obstacles are in process of removal.

These are some of the questions which Diez's grammar left unsettled and which have been studied during the last forty years, usually with success. We shall now take up these problems and see what has been accomplished toward their solution.

A knowledge of Vulgar Latin, the common source of the Romance idioms, is of the greatest importance for Romance studies. But how difficult it is to get together any certain facts about this unsettled language, which differed less according to locality than according to the persons speaking it! We are compelled to scrutinize the testimony—often obscure—of the Latin grammarians, of the inscriptions, and of the writings of the early Middle Ages—public and private records, written laws of the Germanic invaders, formularies, etc. There is no doubt that these texts contain numerous traces of the vulgar tongue, but it is not an easy task to disentangle them. Among the frequent barbarisms and solecisms met with, there are many which are

due only to the ignorance or inattention of the copyists, and from which we can conclude nothing as to the vulgar tongue of the period. The criterion by which we distinguish among these errors those which are to be attributed to vulgar usage is of course furnished us, on the one hand, by our knowledge of Classic Latin, and, on the other, by what we know of Romance from the early texts (and they are few!) of the ninth and tenth centuries. But when we have assembled all that such documents can tell us about Vulgar Latin, we note many gaps (for example, as to the conjugation system), and these we are powerless to fill with anything but more or less probable conjectures.

This difficult study was first prosecuted with signal success by a scholar then very young, but who more than any one else was qualified to undertake it both by his scientific training (he was a pupil of Diez and Ritschl) and by the rare sagacity with which he was endowed. The work of Hugo Schuchardt on the *Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins* (1866-68) is perhaps the work most original in plan and most fruitful in results that has appeared since Diez's grammar. The extent of the author's researches was far greater than the title promises, for one may find in these three volumes not a few facts and views which deal not only with the vowels but also with the consonants, and even with certain general characteristics of the Romance languages. This is not apparent at first, for the work is extremely rich in content and the exposition is at times intricate. The result is that more than once ideas have been put forward as new that one may find presented at some length in this work. The necessity of referring constantly to the third volume, which is the complement of the first two, is burdensome. These unimportant defects might easily be removed in a second edition, a revision which has been awaited for a long time, but which the author, absorbed in linguistic ex-

plorations of the widest range, seems very little inclined to give us. Since the publication of the *Vokalismus*, various essays on Vulgar Latin have appeared, and the materials which enable us to study this intermediate phase between Classic Latin and the Romance languages have accumulated. It is a question, however, whether many well-demonstrated facts have been added to those which Prof. Schuchardt collected some forty years ago.

Our present knowledge enables us to be clear on at least one point, namely, that we find in rudiment in Vulgar Latin most of the main features which distinguish the Romance languages from the Classic Latin: the simplification of the declensions and conjugations, the almost complete suppression of the neuter gender, the tendency to drop the first post-tonic vowel in certain proparoxytones, the extension of various forms by analogy, the generalization of several suffixes, various new combinations of words, the simplification of the syntax, the impoverishment of the vocabulary, the development of new sounds, etc. One result of these facts is that the hypothesis according to which the greatest changes occurred at the time of the invasions of the fifth century falls to the ground. We may readily concede that changes are oftenest observable at that period, but they were in existence long before. In fact, many years before Schuchardt, August Fuchs, a philologist who died prematurely in 1867, had demonstrated in the clearest manner that the formation of the Romance languages was in no way the result of accident, but that between them and Latin there was no solution of continuity, and that the transition was supplied by the Vulgar Latin of which they are the continuation. These ideas are now of course commonplace. It has been known for a long time that while the barbarian invasion introduced into the Romance vocabulary a large number of foreign terms, it exercised no appreciable influ-

ence on Romance grammar. It was only by notably weakening classic culture that the invasions hastened the arrival of the vulgar idioms to the dignity of written languages.

The question as to within what limits and to what degree the Roman Empire was Latinized probably will never be answered in a complete and entirely satisfactory way. The fact itself, which we must needs accept as certain, is apparently paradoxical. People who were by no means uncivilized, the Celts, for example, and especially the Etruscans, were brought in three or four centuries to the point of giving up their own language and adopting that of their conquerors. How is this to be explained? In our day, the substitution of one language for another seems not to take place so rapidly. But the fact is undeniable nevertheless. The problem attracted the attention of various scholars, among whom we may note Budinszky¹ and Jung,² who examined and arranged the all too scanty evidence handed down to us by the ancient authors. But another question immediately arises. It is beyond doubt that the barbarian invasions greatly reduced the Latin-speaking territory, notably in northern Africa, on the eastern and northern shores of the Adriatic, in Switzerland, along the Rhine, and perhaps in England. But in other directions Romance—for it would no longer be correct to say Latin—recovered a part of the lost territory, and even spread over regions where Latin had never before penetrated. During this period of propagation and differentiation of the Romance idioms, numerous events occurred, both in medieval and in modern times, whose investigation offers many difficulties to the philologist and to the historian.

On the other hand, it is relatively easy to determine the

¹ *Die Ausbreitung der lateinischen Sprache über Italien und die Provinzen des römischen Reiches.* Berlin, 1881.

² *Die romanischen Landschaften des römischen Reiches.* Innsbruck, 1881. See G. Paris's review of Budinszky's and Jung's books, in *Romania*, xi, 599.

boundaries of the present Romance-speaking world. For the past thirty years, various scholars have devoted themselves to this task, and, thanks to the researches of Messrs. Kurth,¹ Kiepert,² This,³ Horning,⁴ Zimmerli,⁵ and Ascoli,⁶ the boundaries of the large Romance group of Western Europe have been accurately fixed. In some cases, these investigators have discovered varieties of Romance speech in process of extinction, and even some which are but recently extinct. An instance in point is the Ladin, or Friulan, a former prolongation of which has been noted in Istria and the neighboring territory, in localities where at present the vernacular is Italian or a Slavic dialect.⁷ A few years ago, M. Bartoli, an Austrian subject, revealed the former existence in northern Dalmatia of an idiom, now quite extinct, which seems to have been the connecting link between the Friulan and the Roumanian.⁸ For the Roumanian groups north and south of the Danube, the search for linguistic boundaries, like that for ethnic origins, is complicated and obstructed by political prejudice. But even in this case precise information is accumulating, thanks to the zeal of learned explorers, among whom we should mention in the first rank G. Weigand, editor of the *Jahresbericht des Instituts für rumänische Sprache*.

Thus on various subjects relating to the history if not to the formation of the Romance languages—subjects which Diez had scarcely touched upon—the works of scholars con-

¹ *La frontière linguistique en-Belgique et dans nord de la France*. Bruxelles, 1895.

² *Völker-und-Sprachenkarte von Deutschland und den Nachbarländern im Jahre 1866*. Berlin, 1866. (Reprinted several times.) *Special-Karte der deutsch-französischen Sprachgrenze*. Berlin, 1871.

³ *Die Deutsch-französische Sprachgrenze in Lothringen*. Strassburg, 1887-88.

⁴ *Die ostfranzösischen Grenzdialekte zwischen Metz und Belfort*, in *Französische Studien*, vol. v.

⁵ *Die Deutsch-Französische Sprachgrenze in der Schweiz*. Bâle, 1891-99.

⁶ *Archivio glottologico italiano*, vol. i, 1873.

⁷ See Ascoli, in *Archivio glottologico*, x, 447; Cavalli, *ibid.* xii, 255.

⁸ *Ueber eine Studienreise zur Erforschung des Altromanischen Dalmatien*. Wien 1896.

tinue to multiply. The time has come now to ask how and in what spirit the labors of the master have been taken up and continued. But the laborers have been so numerous that it is hardly possible in this place to give each one his proper mention.

It was during the period from 1860 to 1870 that were formed the principal university centres where the new doctrine was to be sifted and completed. Germany, with its elastic university organization, soon took the lead as to the number of chairs. In 1870 Romance philology was taught in Germany by perhaps a dozen professors or *privat-docenten*. Quite a number of these, to be sure, were required to give a part of their time to teaching English or Germanic languages and literatures. Since then, all the universities one by one have been provided with special professors for the Romance group. In France, the *Ecole des Hautes Études*, founded in 1867 by Minister Duruy, had from the beginning a chair of Romance philology, which was entrusted to Gaston Paris. Soon after this (1869), G. Paris, at first temporarily and then permanently (1872), replaced his father in the chair of Early French language and literature at the *Collège de France*. The teaching of G. Paris in these two institutions attained from the start a high degree of efficiency, and exercised a most favorable influence on the progress of Romance studies. Many teachers of Romance languages and literatures in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Roumania, and even in the United States, are proud to be counted among his pupils. G. Paris, while guiding the history of literature into new channels, had at the same time assigned himself the task of rewriting, in the greatest detail, the historical phonology of the French language. The edition of the French versions of the *Vie de Saint-Alexis* (1872), the essential parts of which are his personal work, shows how

far he was then in advance of his contemporaries in his knowledge of Old French. But he was never satisfied with this work of his youth. For many years he treated in great detail the subject of French phonology at the Collège de France. The fragments of these lectures which he published in *Romania* and elsewhere (on the "close" *o* in French, on the development of Latin *c*, etc.), are sufficient evidence as to the depths of his researches on this difficult subject. I know that certain portions of the great work that he planned on Old French grammar were ready to print at the time of his death (1903); perhaps it will be possible some day to publish them. We recognize the impress of the master's method in the works of several of his pupils. I shall only cite, because they are among the earliest, the book of Charles Joret on Latin *c* in the Romance languages (1874), and that of Arsène Darmesteter, a scholar prematurely lost to science, on the formation of compound words in the French language (1875). These are works which completely replace the corresponding chapters of Diez's grammar, but which nevertheless cannot be considered definitive, so abundant is the material ready to the hand of him who has eyes to see it. When M. Joret's book appeared, with more than four hundred pages of close print devoted to a subject which in Diez's work occupies a few pages, it might have been supposed that the material was exhausted. Not so; more recent researches have developed and completed in various directions the work of M. Joret.

In Italy, the establishment of Romance studies on a scientific basis dates from the foundation of Prof. Ascoli's *Archivio glottologico italiano* (1873). It was a rare piece of good fortune that these studies were then undertaken by a scholar who was a veteran in linguistic research, who was entirely at home in the various fields of Indo-European philology, and who moreover was endowed with a breadth

of view and a power of expression which would have placed him in the first rank in any other field of human knowledge. Prof. Ascoli's *Saggi ladini*, which occupy the first volume of the *Archivio glottologico* and overflow into later volumes, are a model description of an idiom whose infinite varieties cover a considerable territory and which has left traces in regions where to-day it is extinct. It may be said that in this section of Romance philology, aside from a few useful remarks by Diez, nothing had been done. The limits of the language spoken to-day by the populations of the southern parts of the Grisons, of the Tyrol, and of northeastern Italy, had not been determined; still less was there any suspicion of the existence of a former wider extension of these dialects, whose territory is now greatly contracted by the pressure of German from the north and of Italian from the south. Printed texts exist for only a part of this Ladin territory; for other regions it was necessary to obtain specimens and to outline the grammar of each valley, so to speak, before proceeding to a general account. This great work was the starting-point for a whole series of special duties of smaller scope, local grammars, texts, etc., with the result that the Ladin dialects are now among the best known in the whole field of the Romance languages. In Prof. Ascoli's severe school have been trained a Pleiades of philologists, among whom it is enough to name Count Nigra, Messrs. D'Ovidio, Rajna, Ive, De Lollis, Guarnerio, Parodi, Salvioni, and Pieri, scholars who will soon complete for us the work of describing in detail the various spoken dialects of Italy.

If time permitted, I might show how the study of the literary language of Italy, the Tuscan, has been revived and renewed by the introduction of the new methods. But as I am forced to confine myself to indicating the salient features of the successive phases in the history of Romance

philology, I shall now review in a few words what the generation which followed Diez has accomplished for the study of the folk-idioms, the *patois*. What I have just said about the *Archivio glottologico* brings me naturally to this subject.

The first philologists who made the Romance languages their study gave their attention almost exclusively to the languages which we may term official, to those which now serve as the organs of literature and of government. Raynouard, for example, treated only Old Provençal, the language of the troubadours. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the folk-speech of southern France, or, in particular, the *patois* of Provence, which was the every-day language of his youth, might be worthy of study. Even in Diez's grammar the treatment of the *patois* is superficial and incomplete. And yet there is no reason why the grammatical peculiarities of a literary language should possess more interest than those of an unwritten one. Time brought a change of attitude on this subject, as was to be expected, and for some thirty years past several experienced linguists have turned their attention to the once-neglected *patois*. The study of a living tongue has one notable advantage over that of a written language—the possibility of a greater degree of precision. Only in a living tongue is it possible to distinguish those fine shades of sounds of which writing gives us no hint. We are all aware that the Latin alphabet, even when improved by additional signs, is powerless to represent the vast variety of sounds used in Romance speech. We know that most of the letters of the alphabet have, as we say, several pronunciations—they often express very different sounds. As long ago as the thirteenth century, a Provençal grammarian attributed to the *e*, *a*, and *o* two distinct sounds, for which he used the terms “wide,” or “open” (*larc*) and “narrow,” or “close” (*estreit*). The

same differences are found in nearly all the Romance idioms; they are distinguished with more or less uniformity in modern orthography, but not so in the ancient documents. Diez, who had studied phonology from the written texts, paid little attention to these differences. He always speaks of the letters as if the signs which we employ to represent pronunciation, unsatisfactory as they are, oftener than not, had a constant and well-determined value. The study of *patois* has accustomed philologists to trust to the ear more than to the eye, and to note variations which formerly were passed over. To this new method of investigation and to the study of the *patois* themselves we owe an immense progress in the study of languages in their early periods. We have become more exacting in the definition of phonological facts. We are no longer satisfied with the often vague and uncertain information furnished by the spelling, but try to determine as accurately as possible the sounds that the spelling aimed to represent. Very frequently the answers to such inquiries are to be found in the *patois*, while as to the vocabulary, it is the *patois* alone which enable us to fix the meaning of a great many words. Moreover, we have gained from this method a more correct estimate of the enormous variety of Romance speech. In many regions the local idiom has never been written down, or, at least, it is inaccessible in its earlier forms because of lack of documents. This statement applies to a large part of Romance Switzerland and to important regions in Italy, France, and the Spanish peninsula, without mentioning the Roumanians of Macedonia. In a word, the specimens of ancient Romance supplied us by the texts are few and far between. The stages intermediate between different varieties are missing, and, as a whole, the older forms of Romance are accessible to us in only a fragmentary way. The *patois* alone enable us to fill these gaps. Of course some

discretion is needed here, and we must not imagine, as some philologists of our day have fancied, that all the phonetic facts observed in the *patois* are of equally ancient date. Quite to the contrary, a large number of these phenomena are modern: new facts appear with each generation, and it is the function of criticism to distinguish the old from the new. Here is a great field of research in need of exploration, and the need is all the more urgent in the case of the *patois* because they are subject to rapid change and are gradually disappearing under the pressure of the official languages.

In Italy this branch of study has been pushed farther than elsewhere, not only because, for historical reasons, the Italian *patois* have shown a remarkable vitality, and hence lend themselves more readily to investigation, but also because there was at Milan a scholar who gave this kind of linguistic research a vigorous impulse—I mean Prof. Ascoli. I need not repeat what I have already said of him. In Switzerland—that is, in Romance Switzerland, for in German Switzerland the work is already nearly completed—the exploration of the local dialects is going on methodically and persistently under the direction of competent men.¹ In Belgium the same labor is well under way.² In Spain, and especially in Portugal, there are some active workers, but they are few in number.³ In France laborers are not wanting: it has been a long time since we began to collect information on the folk-dialects. The earliest *patois* dictionaries date from the eighteenth century, but many of these works exhibit more zeal than method. Too much

¹ See the annual reports (1899 and following years) of the committee appointed to compile a glossary of the *patois* of Romance-speaking Switzerland, and the *Bulletin du glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande*, edited by the members (Messrs. Gauchat, Jeanjaquet, Tappolet) of that committee.

² The *Société liégeoise de littérature wallonne* is preparing a dictionary of the Wallonian dialect.

³ Gonçalves Viana, author of several essays on Portuguese phonetics, and Leite de Vasconcellos, the editor of the *Revista Lusitana*, deserve special mention.

time was lost in etymological researches which were premature, and in the pursuit of imaginary dialectic boundaries, instead of concentrating effort upon the collection and exact notation of linguistic facts. However, progress has been made in the last twelve years. Some excellent works have been published, among which it will be sufficient to cite those of M. Joret on the Norman *patois*, of Abbeé Devaux on those of northern Dauphiné, of Abbé Rousselot on a *patois* of the Charente, of M. Gilliéron on the *patois* of France in general.¹ This branch of Romance studies has grown some offshoots even beyond the Atlantic: we have not forgotten the work of Prof. A. Marshall Elliott, of Johns Hopkins University, on Canadian French. Only recently a society was founded at Quebec to promote the same studies.

Sciences originally foreign to each other often have unforeseen points of contact, and may at times exercise a mutually favorable influence by lending each other their particular methods. Thus it is that the branch of Romance philology which deals with the *patois* has greatly profited, and will profit still more in the future, by the progress made in a science somewhat new,—general phonology or general phonetics,—a science which in America as well as in Europe has zealous advocates. Here it will be enough to mention the names of A. Melville Bell in America, Prof. Sweet in England, Profs. Sievers and Viëtor in Germany, Abbé Rousselot and M. Paul Passy in France. The phonologist or phonetician differs from the linguist in that he does not concern himself either with the origin of languages or with their history: he works with the idiom spoken at the present day. He borrows processes of investigation from physiology and from acoustics and examines closely the mechanism

¹ See the *Bibliographie des patois gallo-romans*, by Behrens, 2d ed. Berlin, 1893.

of the voice; he analyzes sounds and determines the conditions under which they are produced; also, he inquires into the best ways of denoting these sounds to the eye. Wherever it proves useful, he takes advantage of the phonograph, and he will use this instrument more and more as it is brought nearer perfection. Thanks to the researches of the phoneticians, we may learn how one sound passes over into another, changes which the linguist observes but does not explain. In particular, we see that in the transmission of language from one individual to another—for example, from parents to children—the likelihood of change is very great, for we know that it is only after innumerable corrections that children finally are taught to speak like those with whom they are in daily contact; and this observation throws a clear light upon the origin of the present variety in Romance speech. More and more, linguists must train themselves to utilize the delicate and ingenious methods of the phonetician.

Real scholars are disinterested persons. As a rule, they pursue no purely practical ends, and consider themselves sufficiently paid for their pains when they have succeeded in increasing the sum of acquired knowledge. They act upon the axiom which is found at the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All men have a natural desire for knowledge." I am quite sure that most of those who carried Romance philology to the heights it has now attained never thought that their discoveries would have practical applications for the modern languages; and yet there is no doubt that many of the results obtained through the efforts of the philologists will not remain mere scientific curiosities, but will have some influence on the teaching of the Romance languages and upon the way these languages are written. As to teaching, we can easily understand that the introduction of historical matter into grammars, even those of elemen-

tary grade, will supply the explanation of many an apparent anomaly, and will make the subject less dry. Grammar will become more interesting, because an appeal will be made to the intelligence rather than to the memory. As to orthography, the benefit will be no less real. Everybody has been struck by the irregularities which are so numerous in the most widespread languages, in French as well as in English. The fact is that the official spelling is a mixture of notations introduced at very different periods and in an absolutely unsystematic way. Some spellings aim to represent the prevailing pronunciation; others—and these are in the majority—reproduce an antiquated pronunciation; finally, some pretend to indicate the etymology. Many propositions have been made to do away with these inconsistencies, or, at least, to reduce their number by means of a general revision, but the advocates of change have always encountered the same time-honored objections from those who held sway, or thought they held sway, over these matters of language. But the opposition is weakening, and will weaken more and more in proportion as sane ideas on the relations of the spoken tongue to the written language shall become familiar to the public, and it is to be hoped that some day each of what we may call the national languages will be provided with an improved system of spelling. I do not say that these systems need be strictly phonetic, like that proposed for English by A. Melville Bell, in which each sound, simple or compound, is denoted by a single symbol: this is neither practicable nor really useful. But the improved spelling should be logical, the same sound should not be expressed in three or four different ways, and the same symbol should not be applied to different sounds. When that time comes it will be possible, thanks to a branch of teaching which at present does not exist,—orthoëpy,—it will then be possible I do not say to fix the language once for

all, but at least to retard its tendencies to change. Philologists have in fact ceased to look upon language as a living being which develops according to its own laws. We must not be deceived by metaphors which at times may be used to clothe an idea with an outward form. It is now perceived that the will of man often interferes, intentionally and arbitrarily, with the transmission of language, especially in those countries and periods where literary culture has become a common possession. The complete knowledge of a language, whether we are speaking of the vocabulary, the forms, the syntax, or the sound-system, is no longer gained solely by unconscious imitations of others speaking, as is true in the case of languages which are not cultivated: this knowledge is obtained through the instruction given in the schools, and as regards the sound-system (that is, the pronunciation) this instruction up to this time has not had a solid foundation, because an irregular and inconsistent notation of sounds cannot serve as a guide for pronunciation. I might cite a large number of French words in which the pronunciation has been vitiated by the ambiguity of the spelling. For example, some pronounce *anguille*, *camomille*, and often *oscille*, *scintille*, *vocille*, with the palatal *l* as in *fille*, while the true pronunciation is *anguile*, *camomile*, *oscile*, *scintile*, *vocile*, with the ordinary *l* as in *file*. These are mistakes due to the double value of the group *ille* in the French official spelling: not having been corrected by school-teachers, they have become, or threaten to become general. This is one example out of a thousand which show that the teaching of pronunciation is possible only in countries which possess a perfectly regular and definite system of orthography.

Nothing is born from nothing, *nihil ex nihilo*, said the ancient sage. The sciences fructify each other and furnish the elements of new sciences which in this age of world-wide

activities come into existence, one may almost say, every day. Romance philology came into being under the influence of the works of Bopp and of Grimm, who gave comparatively little thought to the Romance languages; in its turn, Romance philology aids in the formation of new branches of science and helps to satisfy new needs.

THE RELATION OF GERMAN LINGUISTICS TO INDO-GERMANIC LINGUISTICS AND TO GERMAN PHILOLOGY

BY EDUARD SIEVERS

(Translated from the German by Rudolph Tombo, Jr., Columbia
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IF we wish to understand and estimate properly the present and future problems with which a given scientific discipline may at any time be confronted, it is advisable to turn at the very outset from the present to the past, for a correct estimate of what has been accomplished in a certain field and proper directions for future efforts can be acquired only by means of a critical examination of the historical development of the science in question. Moreover, this historical method seems to be demanded especially where we have to deal with the determination of the reciprocal relations of two or more branches of science, which, in spite of possible differences in problem, viewpoint, and method, are nevertheless in the very nature of things constrained to aid each other, according as one is at any given time in advance of the other.

German linguistic science, which we are to consider to-day, maintains such reciprocal relations more particularly

in two directions. In the same way that the German language is a member of the Germanic family and also of the great Indo-Germanic group of languages, so, too, German or Germanic linguistic science constitutes an integral part of comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. On the other hand, German linguistics is not the less closely interwoven with German philology,—using the word in the customary German sense,—whether we lay the chief stress upon the criticism of form or that of matter. German linguistics is intimately associated with still other fields of knowledge, but the limited time at my disposal will not allow me to discuss such wider relations.

The sciences of Indo-Germanic linguistics, German philology, and Germanic linguistics arose practically at the same time, leaving out of consideration, of course, early sporadic and uncertain efforts that were more or less amateurish. In the year 1816, Franz Bopp, with his *System of Conjugation in Sanscrit compared with those in Greek, Latin, Persian, and Germanic*, laid the foundation for the science of Indo-Germanic linguistics, which since then has assumed such splendid proportions. In the same year appeared Karl Lachmann's famous treatise on *The Original Form of the Poem of the Fall of the Nibelungs*, which was followed in rapid succession by his editions of the *Nibelungenlied*, of Hartmann's *von Aue Iwein* of the poems of Walther von der Vogelweide and of the works of Wolfram von Eschenbach, editions that were to serve for many years as unexcelled models for the critical treatment of Middle High German works of poetry. And finally, in 1819 and 1822, respectively, there were published the first and second editions of the first volume of Jakob Grimm's immortal German grammar, the monumental work upon which all Germanic linguistic science rests, and whose rich treasures, in spite of the most zealous efforts, have not been exhausted even at the present day.

The intellectual talents of the three scholars mentioned were as dissimilar as the fields in which they labored. Of the three, Jakob Grimm and Franz Bopp possess the greatest similarity. In both we admire an equal wealth of fancy and native intuition, which enabled them to make use of even the most minute details and to discover an intellectual or historical bond for facts apparently unrelated. On the other hand, Lachmann appears as the incarnation of a carefully discriminating critic, and as the master of restrained and methodical thought. These qualities he exhibited in his efforts to reconstruct a poorly preserved text by supplying all the delicate touches of the author, as well as in attempts to establish literary-historical relations or to clear up the historical genesis of the text and its contents.

From both the positive and the negative standpoints, Jakob Grimm's activity and personal position were for a long time representative and authoritative on the question of the relation of German linguistic science to Indo-Germanic linguistics, on one hand, and to German philology on the other. The older grammar of the East in accordance with its "philological" leanings had pursued linguistics only as a means to an end. In the pursuit of semi-antiquarian interests it had concerned itself with the collection and publication of linguistic peculiarities and eccentricities, while it endeavored at the same time to establish a standard of usage for literature and the conversation of the educated classes. With the advent of Bopp and Grimm, however, investigations of the linguistic elements were conducted for their own sake. Henceforth the question no longer turned solely on the "Is" and the "Shall," but new and more important questions arose, as for example, "How are we to apprehend existing forms, where are we to seek their origin, and how has the individual element been developed from the original forms which we must

establish?" It was this new range of questions that raised the old descriptive "grammar" with its normalizing tendencies to the rank of a "science of language."

This series of questions also contains the germ of the elements which constitute the similarity as well as the dissimilarity between Grimm and Bopp. The latter, from the first, boldly attacked the ultimate questions which linguistic science felt permitted to put. First, he turned his attention to the explanation of Indo-Germanic linguistic forms and sought to establish these by the comparative-speculative method on the basis of the great variety of forms found in individual dialects. Jacob Grimm, however, advanced with greater caution and more distinctly along the lines of historical development. To be sure, he also occasionally grappled with general glottological problems, yet his main interest was directed to the narrower field of Germanic, and accordingly he concerned himself more directly with the accurate determination of linguistic resemblances and differences and their historical development. In Grimm's work, too, considerable prominence is given to the philological element, as is clearly demonstrated by his extensive collection of authentic and historically arranged material taken directly from the preserved linguistic sources. Bopp had turned his attention first to the Indo-Germanic system of conjugation, and when, in 1819, Grimm appeared on the scene with the first part of his German grammar, he also dealt only with inflections, although he approached the question from an essentially different standpoint. Only three years later, however, in 1822, he adopted a new course, which brought in its train far-reaching results, for in the new edition of the first volume of his grammar he prefaced the consideration of Germanic inflections with a complete and systematic investigation of the conditions of Germanic phonetics. This, indeed, was the first sys-

tematic attempt in the history of grammar and of the science of language to introduce the new discipline of historical-comparative phonetics, which is now the basis for all formal studies in comparative linguistics, since without its aid a systematic comparison of inflectional forms is impossible.

The science of comparative linguistics has been drawing steadily away from Bopp's goal and from his method of explaining what he termed the "organism of the Indo-Germanic languages," for it has come to recognize in ever-increasing measure the futility of attempting to solve the problem with the insufficient means at its disposal. To be sure, we owe Bopp an everlasting debt of gratitude for having by his comparisons established definitely and for all time the relationship of the individual Indo-Germanic languages, which had previously been only darkly suspected. And yet if we consider the actual mode of comparison, we shall find the historical method as applied by Grimm to be of far greater significance for future research than Bopp's divinatory mode of procedure, which caused him to advance by leaps and bounds. To whatever extent Grimm's method may have been displaced by stricter present-day requirements in individual instances, we must not forget that it was preëminently he who gave the initial impulse in a number of important points. It was Jakob Grimm who first insisted upon the strictest historical control of all related material, and upon the most complete induction as prerequisite for the comparison of less intimately associated linguistic forms and for the consequent reconstruction of primitive Indo-Germanic forms, which is indispensable even at the present day. It is to him we owe the conviction that no material should be compared in a wider circle, unless its history within the individual languages and families of languages has been carefully and unques-

tionably determined beforehand. It is to him, again, that we are indebted for the gradual development of Indo-Germanic linguistics into a history of the individual families of languages and their subdivisions.

For a long time the influence of Indo-Germanic linguistics upon Germanic linguistics was not so prominent as the impulse given by Jakob Grimm to the development of Indo-Germanic linguistics itself, an impulse that in reality goes back to Bopp. In those days, as in the case of Jakob Grimm, Germanic linguistics contributed more than it received in return. To be sure, Grimm was familiar with the investigations of Bopp and his successors in the general Indo-Germanic field, yet he employed their results with a certain reserve, which ended by isolating Germanic grammar, as it were, from comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. The first generation of Germanic scholars after Grimm and Lachmann seldom overstepped the narrow bounds of their limited subject. This may be attributed, in part at least, to the circumstance that the structure of Germanic grammar as erected by Jacob Grimm seemed to be so firmly established that no necessity was felt for securing additional support from a great distance. The most important consideration, however, was that the pupils of both Grimm and Lachmann were interested in philology rather than in the actual science of grammar or linguistics, their attitude being influenced partly by personal inclination and endowment and partly by the strict discipline of Lachmann's school.

The earliest attempt to establish an *entente cordiale* between the fields of linguistics and philology dates from the end of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century. On the literary side the movement was introduced in Germany by Wilhelm Scherer in his *History of the German Language* (*Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*—1868),

with its wealth of ideas and imagination. The book was hailed with outspoken admiration by some, and met with determined opposition by others. This latter attitude may be attributed in part to the fact that in the field of comparative linguistics—particularly under the leadership of August Schlichter and George Curtius, who were joined as far as methodology is concerned by William Dwight Whitney—a more sober mode of observation had begun to make itself felt, which left less room for the kind of free speculation to which Scherer was so partial. On the other hand, it was not without significance that the interest in linguistic matters in general, which was spreading rapidly at that time, had attracted a number of rising Germanic scholars, especially at Leipzig, to the school of comparative linguistics, scholars who had not yet fallen under the influence of Scherer's book and his mode of thought, but who, like those of their contemporaries that devoted themselves more exclusively to linguistics, were guided rather by the cool and clear precision of their teacher Curtius.

Through the common labors of this Leipzig group of young linguists and Germanic scholars, there arose during the seventies the school of Young Grammarians (*Junggrammatiker*), so-called from a casual jest made by Zarncke. The most pronounced characteristic of this school is the strong emphasis it lays upon methodology and the doctrine of principles, thus furnishing a striking contrast to the often desultory method adopted by Scherer. It is hardly fair to the Young Grammarians to look upon their efforts, in the light of the many heated controversies into which they were drawn, as being expended mainly in outside disputes. The real characteristics of this circle, on the contrary, must be sought in their attempts to free themselves from a certain narrowness of doctrine represented in their own teacher, Georg Curtius. It was this

identical circumstance that led finally to a scientific estrangement between Curtius and his pupils—an estrangement really no less remarkable than the contrast between the tendencies of the Young Grammarians and those of the newly arising linguistic science, which were, almost simultaneously, connected with Johannes Schmidt and August Fick.

If from the generally accepted standpoint of today we look back at the linguistic methods of research more or less universally current in the sixties and early seventies, we must admit the existence of certain pedantry in the field at that time. A considerable number of old doctrines—of which some had been established *a priori* in a period when language-research tended to be philosophical and speculative, and of which others can be traced back to exaggerated conceptions of the antiquity of the Aryan languages, especially of Sanskrit, and to the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of the old Indian grammarians—were accepted at their face-value and transmitted without investigation from generation to generation. (As examples I need only cite the doctrine of the priority of the *a*-sound over the *e*- and *o*-sounds, or of all explosives over spirants; the doctrine of *guna*; or the theory of the distribution of the Indo-Germanic languages on the basis of a genealogical tree, etc.) Above everything else, however, these investigations were based solely on the written word, which was duly “analyzed” and with the aid of all manner of little strokes divided and subdivided into roots and the most varied forms of derivative and inflectional suffixes, etc. But no attention whatever was paid to the psychology of language, which unites the smaller particles into the finished word, nor to the psychic processes which control the transmission and transformation of human speech. Moreover, no one attempted seriously to throw light on the

phonetic aspects of linguistic changes established on paper by calling into requisition an aid of the utmost importance, that is, the comparative study of the phonetic phenomena of living languages.

It was naturally not to be expected that a sudden improvement could be made in these conditions. Long conflicts have been necessary before the new ideas and methods, which have been so widely promulgated, especially since the seventies, could become adjusted and secure more universal recognition. But at the present time scarcely any essential difference in methods exists, and it is probable that all language-investigators to-day employ in practice the methods first adopted by the Young Grammarians, even though a certain antipathy may be felt here and there for the name of the movement and although in theory opposition against certain of their principles still exists.

To this transformation in linguistic conceptions and methods Germanic linguistics, as we should expect, has contributed its due share. While the older science of language had concerned itself primarily with the written forms of the earlier and most ancient language-periods, the Germanists, like the Romanists and Slavists, by reason of the fact that their linguistic sources reach directly into the present, have from the very beginning been concerned also with the study of living languages and dialects. Hence, necessarily, their attention has also been directed to the psychological side of language-structure and language-development, which can be investigated successfully only on the basis of the living language. We cannot, accordingly, attribute to mere chance the circumstance that the two most important principles in modern linguistics as opposed to the older science were first emphatically announced by those scholars who were investigating living dialects. I refer in the first place to the doctrine of the regularity of

sound-correspondence and sound-development in that portion of language the transmission of which is purely mnemonic, in other words, to what has been called—the choice of terms is not a particularly happy one—the doctrine of the absolute constancy of sound-laws. In the second place I refer to the doctrine of the complete equality of those new linguistic forms which are created in the absence of purely mnemonic transmission by means of definite psychological processes of assimilation, that is, what we call formation by analogy, or through association, or explain as form-transferences, leveling, etc. Nor should we forget that the demand for a strictly phonetic treatment of problems of sound-development was first made and carried out in practice by the Germanists. Comparative linguistics is indebted especially to the Germanic and Slavic scholar Karl Verner for his important incorporation of the doctrine of accent in the history of sound-development. And finally, comparative language-study is indebted to Germanic linguistics for the one systematic treatise on the methodology of language-investigation which is recognized as the complete expression of the ideas now generally accepted. I speak of the methods proclaimed by Hermann Paul in his *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, and it is these methods which, unconscious as the act may be, in practice helped to regulate the research even of those language-investigators, who, opposed to the theoretical discussion of general principles, prefer to base their methods, as it were, on the foundation of individual instances.

From all that has been said, we see that the history of comparative and Germanic linguistics furnishes an excellent illustration of a mutual borrowing of methods and ideas, and the more active this interchange became, the more bountiful was the harvest of the joint intellectual labors.

If we next turn our attention to the relation between Germanic linguistics and critical German philology, we shall find that the conditions are very similar, except that the mutual diffusion of the two sets of ideas has not been so complete and productive as in the case of German linguistics and comparative linguistics. This circumstance is readily explained on general as well as on historical grounds.

The representatives of Germanic and of comparative linguistics are inherently brought into more intimate contact by the common tendency and the common goal of their labors: the only difference lies in the breadth, the number, and the peculiar character of the subjects treated. Both strive to throw light on the history of language, and both employ the historical-comparative method. Language-history on the whole is really synonymous with language differentiation, and it is furthermore characteristic of this language differentiation that only a limited portion of common language property resting on the older basis of greater unity is ever handed down to the younger, more strongly specialized linguistic divisions.

Again, it is self-evident that conditions possessed in common, even in later periods, are prerequisite for drawing conclusions about earlier forms. The language-investigator conducting his researches along historical lines must from the nature of things begin in every case with the common element and determine its originality. Not until this preliminary investigation has been completed can he turn with the expectation of ultimate reward to the comparative examination of differences in form and structure and their history. The fact that both activities must frequently be combined in practical detail work, the more so the more delicate and detailed the form the problems take, has nothing to do with the matter in hand. Moreover, the student

of language seeks to recognize common elements in forms which have been proved not to be original, and to differ from one another, by drawing conclusions from the similarity of changes about the similarity of the processes—mainly psychical—that have produced the changes. Going still another step further, from the similarity of those processes he can draw conclusions as to the normalcy of the changes under consideration—a matter which depends upon the similarity of the psychical organization of the various peoples and speakers. It is this latter similarity, finally, which alone can give to the investigator of linguistic conditions the necessary faith in the correctness of his views and explanations. This much is therefore established, that the scholar who approaches the study of language from the historical-comparative standpoint is compelled to work chiefly with that portion of the language which we may designate as the collective attainment, or, at least, as the collective possession of the speaking masses. It is entirely different with the critical philologist, for whom language represents primarily only that fraction of the general conception of language which has been preserved as literature—literature in the widest sense of the term. In one respect, therefore, he conceives of language as the means of expression for certain thoughts and contents which he investigates. On the other hand, so far as he takes any interest whatever in form, he regards language partly as the foundation upon which the various artistic forms of human speech are erected, partly as a means of differentiation between individuals or between stages of art. Disregarding the question of content, this is equivalent to the statement that the philologist must be attracted in language primarily by the production of the individual, just as the student of language should be attracted by the collective production of the masses.

Of course the philologist must also occasionally resort to comparisons, at least whenever he wishes to individualize artistically; and if his comparisons are to be correct, he, too, must follow the historical method. But the historical conclusions drawn from his sources and the differences established, no matter whether they be differences of individuals or groups, do not, as in the case of the student of language, serve him primarily in the determination of connections,—even if only in the general psychology of language change,—but, conversely, they aid him in his separation of elements, and in detaching the individual from the general. Or if he be attracted more directly to the general, he will turn rather to fields of language-æsthetics than to those of language-psychology.

An exaggerated conception of this tendency is of course fraught with manifold dangers. The one-sided philologist, particularly, who does not know how to profit by the viewpoint and the methods of the language-investigator, will neglect a series of methods which would aid him in his researches, and moreover he will be apt to regard observed facts in a false light, because they appear to him as unconnected dots and not as links in a definite chain of development.

The corresponding dangers which confront the one-sided linguist lie in the opposite direction. Without the necessary philological control, he is apt to regard separate elements as too closely related and to see connections and possibilities, the acceptance of which would be absolutely prohibited by philological determinations. Moreover, inasmuch as his whole method of investigation leads him first of all to the search for direct courses of development, such as are furnished in rich measure by the natural speech of every-day life, it will not always be easy for him to follow the zigzag path of development produced by the influence

of individual forces and by the intentionally artistic development of the written language.

It has been amply demonstrated that a mutual *rapprochement* and an interchange of ideas and methods is absolutely essential to the satisfactory progress of both philology and linguistics. While the philologist needs the science of language for the broadening of his horizon in general linguistic matters, the linguist, conversely, cannot get along without philological criticism in the arrangement and accurate determination of his material of comparison.

The general recognition of the necessity for this union, evident as it would seem to be in theory, has been slow to gain ground in practice. The linguists have made the earliest and most vigorous efforts in this direction. To be sure many sins may still be committed here by the individual; in principle, however, the modern science of language does demand that all its representatives be philologists, at least to the extent of employing only such material as can endure the test of philological criticism. Philology, the older and prouder sister-science, has on the whole been less eager to comply with the demands which linguistic investigation was forced to establish, and even at this day the number of philologists who, to their own detriment, renounce the employment of linguistic aids, or who on general principles—regarding it as incompatible with their dignity—refuse to come to an agreement with the science of language, is not insignificant. Yet in this respect, also, the last few years have witnessed a decided improvement, especially in the field of German philology.

As we know, German philology rests on the shoulders of Karl Lachmann just as German linguistics rests upon those of Jakob Grimm. For the former, therefore, so far at least as Lachmann's influence reaches, his conceptions of linguistic matters have remained authoritative. This is

more particularly true of the estimate of the German language and its development from the Middle High German period to the present day, that is, of those very periods of the German language which by reason of their youth and the secondary character of their idioms were of relatively less interest for linguistics.

Having begun as a disciple of the school of classical philology, Lachmann naturally took it for granted that in the classical works of Middle High German poetry we have an artistic language, which, produced as it was for a definite purpose in a limited circle of the highly cultured, differed essentially from the ordinary language of the common people. Interested in this higher artistic language alone, Lachmann applied the whole force of his incomparable sagacity to its restoration in its original purity and to giving each and every individual Middle High German poet his due. The dialects of the common people had no attraction for him nor for many others: they were regarded as ordinary and crude, and wherever they cropped out occasionally in literature, they were looked upon as disturbing intruders.

It is scarcely astonishing that in the light of such an attitude the scientific study of German dialects of the middle as well as of the modern period should have been neglected so long, in spite of the brilliant labors with which Johann Andreas Schmeller inaugurated this discipline at an early time. The reaction, however, was bound to come, and it did come, even before Lachmann's death, from the philological side. For it was discovered that in the poetic literature from Middle German territory, to which but little attention had formerly been paid, dialectical material plays an entirely different *rôle* from the one it plays in the classical poetic productions of Upper Germany upon which Lachmann based his theories. His doctrine of the unity

of the Middle High German language, at least in its strict interpretation, thereby received its deathblow, and it could be saved only in somewhat modified form for a portion of Middle High German literature, to be sure, however, the most valuable part. But here again contradiction soon set in, plainly influenced by the higher value that linguistics ascribed to the dialects as such, since these very dialects furnished more suitable and accordingly more valuable material for their special purposes of investigation. Thus Hermann Paul taught that in the middle period of German there was no artistic language of poetry differing in principle from the dialects. He stated that no poet hesitated to make use of his own dialect, and claimed that the small number of differentiated dialectical forms to be found in the classical poetry of Upper Germany, or more especially in the rimes of the poets, was due to the fact that the separation into dialects in Upper Germany had not at that time advanced far enough to leave plain traces behind in the technique of rime.

Thus another extreme view was established and occasion furnished for a lively and protracted controversy between the two camps, of which one exaggerated the philological and the other the linguistic elements.

In the end neither of the extreme views was accepted in its entirety, but, as in so many other cases, the truth was found on middle ground. The partial agreement that has been secured in this important question is the happy consummation of the satisfactory settlement reached between philology and linguistics, especially through the model labors of Carl Kraus and Konrad Zwierzina. Both of these investigators proceeded, to be sure, from the strictly philological side, but, on the other hand, in explaining complicated conditions, they have not disdained the aid given by modern dialectology. We may, therefore, now regard it as certain,

that the Middle High German poets of the classical period were really no mere naturalists so far as their language was concerned. Their idioms were real artistic dialects, only in a different sense from that of Lachmann. Nor can we any longer speak of a ruling unity, but only of more or less striking resemblances; and the degree of these resemblances depends primarily upon the relationship of those dialects to which the various poets belong. The languages employed by the poets, accordingly, also rest upon the dialects, but the poets do not present these dialects in their entire purity, inasmuch as they are prone to omit all forms that would appear too strange to the auditor speaking another dialect. The artistic character of the languages employed by the various Middle High German poets is therefore mainly negative, consisting rather in the avoidance of what is not regarded as generally accepted than in the inclusion of linguistic forms from another dialect for the sake of unity. It cannot, of course, be denied that there is a certain tendency toward generalization even under these conditions, which beside the knowledge of neighboring idioms presupposes also a conscious regard for the linguistic sense of foreign individualities. Indeed, in some respects a positive departure from the every-day speech of the home must be admitted especially in the regulation of the vowels of unaccented syllables, upon the study of which sufficient stress has not been laid in the past. At all events, we are dealing not with a definitely established attempt at adjustment, but rather with one that was actively at work in Middle High German times and that has not ceased even in our day, although for centuries, in conscious struggle against the constantly outcropping dialects, unceasing efforts have been directed towards the real unification of the new artistic language, which we have come to call the New High German literary language.

My present task does not call for a more detailed description of this infinitely complicated process. I must content myself with having indicated, by the aid of an example selected at random, how philology and linguistics have had to learn, one from the other, in order to clear up the historical development of a considerable province of the German language, namely, the subsidiary forms employed in literature. On the whole, the philological viewpoint has unquestionably vindicated itself, as is readily understood if we recollect that we are dealing with the history of more or less artificially developed idioms. But there are reasonable grounds for doubting whether without the opposition of German linguistics—which demanded a new and thorough investigation of the entire problem—German philology would have succeeded in freeing itself so quickly and so completely from the ban of the old inherited doctrines that were accepted without the slightest attempt to establish their correctness. In this regard German philology, therefore, owes a debt of gratitude to German linguistics, just as the latter is indebted to the former for the impulse given in the struggle to correct its conceptions about language-development in general.

We may admit that the service which linguistics has rendered philology in the solution of the problem of the literary language has been in part rather indirect or negative in character. Nevertheless, positive assistance has been rendered at this point just as it has in the influence of linguistics in other places, which I cannot discuss here, and we may anticipate a continuation of this attitude in the future. Indeed, unless I am greatly mistaken, linguistics will be called upon to place at the disposal of philology in one of its most special fields of activity, that of critical separation, new aids of fairly sweeping importance.

The assimilation of the ideas which Karl Verner's

pioneer investigations of Germanic word-accent had brought to linguistics, has claimed the attention of students of language for a considerable period, and thereby turned their attention more or less away from a similarly energetic investigation of sentence-accent, which is no less important. Only in recent times have more determined efforts been made to solve the problems of sentence-rhythm and of sentence-melody, or, to be even more general, of language-rhythm and language-melody. Although we may not have advanced beyond the initial stages in this particular field, it at least seems certain that the key to the understanding of these language-phenomena has been discovered.

All this, to be sure, most directly concerns linguistics. Yet these more recent investigations of accent assume added significance when we recall that the individual speaker—especially if he be an author, and no matter whether he be writing in verse or prose—is under the ban of certain rhythmic-melodic conceptions, which unconsciously influence his choice of expressions. This influence is so strong that an author's individual production, often even his entire work, assumes a more or less plain, yet easily recognizable characteristic rhythmic-melodic impress. In language-melody especially, the personal peculiarity of the individual author usually finds clear and definite expression, and it therefore becomes an important factor in the separation of unrelated portions of a preserved text. Personal observation conducted along these lines for several years convinces me that there is no phase of philological criticism which may not receive new light from this source, whether we are dealing with the selection of different versions of a text and the accurate determination of linguistic and metrical forms or with the most complicated problems of higher criticism. The methods to be employed in the in-

vestigation and application of the individual rhythmic-melodic standards are difficult indeed and have been determined only in small measure. Years will no doubt pass by before empirical proof of the validity of this thesis can be established in detail. Yet even at this day we may express the fond hope that the evidence will be forthcoming, thus proving anew that philology and linguistics will attain the best results only if they advance faithfully hand in hand towards the solution of common problems.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER SUBJECTS.

BY OTTO JESPERSEN

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No single human individual ever lived completely isolated from his fellow beings; no nation was ever entirely cut off from other nations; and no contact between individuals and nations ever took place without leaving traces in their coming lives. Language is inconceivable without such contact, and nothing is more contagious than modes of speech. From the manner in which a man talks, one can always tell what sort of people he has had most intercourse with and what sort of influences, intellectual and moral, he has been chiefly subject to in the whole of his life. This is true of nations too; a complete survey of the English language would, therefore, show to the initiated the whole of the life of the English nation from the oldest times till the present day.

Let us for a moment imagine that all human records, all books, documents, inscriptions, letters, etc., were lost, with the single exception of a number of texts written in English at various dates, and let us imagine a body of men buckling down to the task of writing the history of the English language with that material only. They would be able, of

course, to find out a great many things, but however highly gifted we imagine them to be, there would always remain to them an immense number of riddles which no amount of sagacity would enable them to solve, and which now, to us, are no riddles at all. In the old texts they would encounter a great many words whose meanings could be gathered with more or less certainty from the context; but a vast number of other words would remain unintelligible to them, which are now made perfectly clear to us by their similarity with words in cognate languages. How much should we understand now of *Beowulf*, if we had not Gothic, German, Norse, etc., to compare the words with? And then the forms of the words, their inflections and modifications: our supposed philologists would be at a loss to explain such phenomena as vowel-mutation (umlaut) or to understand the use and formation of the different cases, etc. Similarly, when they saw a great many of the old words disappear and give way to others that were hitherto totally unknown, they would not be in possession of the key we now have in Scandinavian, in French, in Latin and Greek: much of what is now self-evident would under these circumstances strike everybody with amazement, as falling down from heaven without any apparent reason.

A scientific treatment of the English language must, then, presuppose the scientific treatment of a great many other languages as well, and the linguistic historian cannot possibly fulfill his task without a wide outlook to other fields. Not only must he have some acquaintance with the cognate languages, the Arian (or Indo-European) family and more especially the Germanic (or Teutonic) branch of it, but the English have in course of time come into contact with so many other nations and have been so willing to learn foreign words from people of every clime, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that whoever would really and thoroughly

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fathom the English language would have to study half the languages spoken on the earth.

More than to any other branch of science the investigators of English are indebted to Arian and Germanic philology. They have continually to consult such works as Brugmann's and Delbrück's *Vergleichende Grammatik und Syntax*, Streitberg's *Urgermanische Grammatik*, Kluge's, Uhlenbeck's, and Franck's etymological dictionaries, not to mention the other dictionaries of German, Dutch, etc., in which etymology plays only a subordinate part; further periodicals like *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, *Journal of Germanic Philology*, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*,—it would be an easy thing to lengthen the list. In classes of Old English recourse must continually be had to Verner's law in order to explain the relation between *wæs* (Mod. E. *was*) and *wæron* (Mod. *were*), or between *risan* (Mod. *rise*) and *ræran* (Mod. *rear*). To understand the rudimentary passive in *hatte* ("is called," cf. Spencer's *hight*), we must go to Gothic, Sanskrit, and Greek, as indeed we must to comprehend the whole of the inflectional system. The force of the prefix *ge-* in *gehieran*, *gewinnan*, *gedon*, and innumerable other verbs is made intelligible by a reference to Latin *con-* in *conficio*, etc., and to the different tense aspects (*aktionsarten*) of Slavonic and other cognate languages. All this is too obvious to call for further comment or illustration.

I must, however, mention here especially one language of paramount importance for the study of Oldest English, namely Frisian. The Frisians were the neighbors on the Continent of the tribes that invaded Britannia; so much the more must we regret that no very old monuments exist to show us the state of the Frisian language at the time of the invasion or shortly afterwards. But even those monuments

we have, from the thirteenth century on, have not been studied by philologists with the care we might expect, considering their importance for the history of English. In fact, Frisian has been the stepchild among Germanic tongues. Now, however, this seems to be in a fair way of becoming otherwise, and Anglists—to borrow that very convenient name for “students of English”—should heartily welcome the endeavors of Dr. Wilhelm Heuser, who has in a very handy little volume made the Old Frisian language readily accessible to everybody, and who has there and elsewhere called attention to some very important conclusions that can be drawn from Frisian phonology with regard to Old English dialects.¹ It is to be hoped that this line of research will in future receive all the attention it deserves.

As already hinted above, English philology has to deal very largely with loan-words from various sources. Celtic philology, however, is not so important to the Anglist as might appear likely at first, because there are really very few Celtic words in English, a fact which is easily accounted for by the theory of speech-mixtures put forward lately by the eminent Celtologist Windisch.² This question is largely mixed up with another question which has been much discussed of late years, namely, what language did the Angles and Saxons find generally spoken on their arrival in England? Had Latin supplanted Celtic, totally or partially? This, however, need not occupy us long here, as it really falls outside of the history of English proper.³

In whatever direction it may be finally settled, the fact remains that Latin loan-words are extremely numerous and

¹ Wilhelm Heuser, *Altfriesisches Lesebuch*. Heidelberg, 1903.—*Indo-germanische Forschungen*, Anzeiger XIV, p. 29.

² E. Windisch, *Zur theorie der mischsprachen und lehnwörter*. *Berichte über die verhandlungen der sächs. gesellschaft der wissenschaften*, XLIX (1897), p. 101 ff.

³ A. Pogatscher, *Zur lautlehre der griechischen, lateinischen und romanischen lehnworte im Altenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888.—J. Loth, *Les mots latins dans les langues brittoniques*. Paris, 1892.—Pogatscher, *Angelsachsen und Romanen*, *Englische Studien*, XIX (1894), p. 329 ff.

important in the English language. All educated people are well acquainted with those innumerable scientific, technical, and other Latin words which have been adopted during the last five centuries and which have stamped the English vocabulary in so peculiar a way. But this class of words,¹ together with the Greek words, which are inseparable from them, offer no serious difficulties to the philologist. They are book-words, taken over through the medium of writing in the form corresponding with that of the golden age of classical literature, and only a minority of them have in English cast off the literary imprint.

Much more philological interest is attached to the older strata of Latin loan-words, the oldest of which were adopted before the Angles and Saxons left the Continent. Here we have to do with an oral influence, and the forms of these words therefore reflect the pronunciation of the Latin-speaking communities with which the various Germanic tribes came into contact. The deviations from the classical forms found in the English shapes of these early loans must therefore be due partly to changes in the language from which they were borrowed, partly to the subsequent alterations they have undergone in the borrowing language. Rightly interpreted, they consequently shed light on the development of Latin into Romance as well as on that of Germanic into English, and inversely, in order to be rightly interpreted, they require familiarity with both languages on the part of the investigator. As contemporary monuments are totally wanting, at any rate for the borrowing language, the subject is extremely difficult of treatment; but most of the phonological difficulties have been surmounted in an important work by A. Pogatscher.¹ The cultural side of these early loans as well as of the somewhat younger loans due

¹ Pogatscher, *Zur lautlehre der griechischen, etc., lehnworte im Altenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888.

chiefly to the conversion to Christianity has been treated of by Kluge and others, especially MacGillivray.¹

The Danish and Norwegian vikings and especially those Scandinavians who settled in England for good, left a deeper mark on the English language than is very often supposed. It is evident, therefore, that the student of English should not neglect the Scandinavian languages, the less so as their close relationship with English and the early development in them of a literary style enable the scholar to clear up a great many points in English, even apart from those points where the protracted contact between the two nations has left its marks on either nation's language and civilization generally. Hitherto it has chiefly been Scandinavian scholars who have grappled with the numerous problems connected with this contact. The Dane Johannes Steenstrup has traced much of juridical importance back to Scandinavian institutions, his chief criterion being the loan-word test.² The Swede Erik Brate gave us the first account of the fates of Scandinavian sounds in Early Middle English,³ and lately his countryman Erik Björkman has given us a very full and extremely able treatment of the whole of the subject, in which both lexical and phonological points of view are done full justice to.⁴

The Scandinavians had scarcely had time to establish themselves, still less to complete their social and linguistic fusion with the native race, when the Norman Conquest brought in another element, which was to play a still greater part in the development of English life and English language—at any rate as far as outward appearance is con-

¹ F. Kluge, in Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen philologie*, i, 2d ed. Strassburg, 1899.—MacGillivray, *The Influence of Christianity on the Vocabulary of Old English*. Halle, 1902.

² Joh. Steenstrup, *Danelag, Normannerne*, vol. iv. Copenhagen, 1882.

³ Erik Brate, *Nordische lehnwörter im Ormulum*. Paul und Braune's Beiträge zur geschichte der deutschen sprache, x (1884).

⁴ Erik Björkman, *Scandinavian Loan-Words in Middle English*, i-ii. Halle, 1900-1902.

cerned, for if we were able to look beneath the surface and to take everything into consideration, it is not improbable that the Scandinavian influence would turn out to be the more important one of the two. As it is, French loan-words are more conspicuous than Scandinavian ones, just as the political revolution brought about by the Conquest is more in view than the subtler modifications of the social structure that may be due to the Danes and Norwegians. Among the historians who have written of the Conquest and its consequences and who have incidentally paid attention to linguistic facts and unearthed documents illustrative of the conflict of languages, Freeman deserves of course the foremost place, although he is perhaps a little apt to under-rate the rôle played by French. Some of his assertions have been put right in Johan Vising's excellent survey of the history of the French language in England.¹

As for the French loan-words themselves, more attention has been paid by English scholars to their place in the economy of the language, their intellectual power or emotional value as compared with the native synonyms, than to the relation to their French originals, although that side too offers no small interest. Their phonology is rather complicated on account of their coming from various dialects and being taken over at various dates, so that sometimes the same French word appears in English in two widely different forms, for instance *catch* and *chase*. The first scholar who treated French loans in English from this point of view with perfect knowledge of French as well as of English sound-history was Henry Nichol, whose article on the French language in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* gives much attention to English and is still well worth reading. Since then, the question has been treated in various places by that indefatigable veteran worker in all

¹ Johan Vising, *Franska språket i England*, I-III. Göteborg, 1900-1902.

branches of English etymology, Walter William Skeat,¹ and in Germany by Dietrich Behrens.²

With regard to the other languages, from which English has borrowed freely at various times, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, etc., it is to be regretted that no specialists have made these several influences subjects of monographs, as the very able chapters devoted to them in Skeat's *Principles of English Etymology* cannot be said to have exhausted the subject.

I have spoken hitherto of the direct use obtainable from the study of other languages for the history of English. But it is clear that indirectly, too, the scientific study of any subject, and more especially the scientific study of any language, may be of value for the student of English. The wider his outlook and the greater the number of languages he is able to compare with English, the more light will he be able to throw on his special study. His ideas ought not to be narrowed down to one particular type of linguistic structure. A broad horizon is the more necessary because the development of the English idiom has in a great many respects diverged very widely from the structural type characteristic of the older languages of the same family. The grammarian should be on his guard against applying indiscriminately the same categories and the same points of view to all languages, for no language can be rightly measured by the yard of any other language. This, however, is just what has been done to a very great extent, not only with regard to English, but more or less in describing and in judging all languages. Latin grammar was studied earlier than, and more extensively than any other grammar; Latin was considered *the* language, and any deviation in other languages from its rules was considered a deterioration. Even

¹W. W. Skeat, *Principles of English Etymology*. Second series. Oxford, 1891.—*Notes on English Etymology*. Oxford, 1901.

²Dietrich Behrens, *Beiträge zur geschichte der französischen sprache in England*. (*Französische Studien*, v. Band 2. heft.) Heilbronn, 1886.—*Französische elemente im Englischen*, in Paul's *Grundriss*, as above.

if this manner of looking at things grammatical has now been largely superseded, because an ever-increasing number of different languages have been scientifically investigated, there still remain not a few survivals of the Latin superstition, which it will be the work of future grammarians to root out completely. Grammatical terminology is still in the main based on Latin grammar. The student of English will find in his grammatical vocabulary expressions for whatever English has in common with Latin, but those grammatical categories and phenomena which are not found in Latin have either no names at all or else each author has his own names. The combination found in "he is reading" is by some called simply the periphrastic conjugation, by others the progressive form, or the present continuous, or the descriptive present or the definite present. Now, of course, names are not everything, and we may have very definite notions without definite names, or, at any rate, without definite names accepted by everybody. Still, the want of a fixed technical nomenclature is decidedly a drawback.

But there is another, and much more serious, drawback derived from the preponderance of Latin grammar. It is, in fact, a very difficult thing for anybody that has been from his earliest youth thoroughly drilled in that particular set of grammatical ideas, to liberate his mind from their vitiating influence when dealing with another language. His grammatical vision is too apt to be colored by the Latin spectacles he has worn so long. He will look in English for the same cases, the same tenses and moods as he is familiar with in Latin, and it is surprising how often he finds them in places where a man coming fresh to a grammatical investigation of English without a previous training in Latin would probably have described the actual phenomena in a totally different manner. I open one of the best-known English grammars and find the following state-

ment, namely, "The name of Cases is given to different forms which a noun (or pronoun) assumes to denote its relations to other words in a sentence. Five Cases may be distinguished in English, the Nominative, Objective, Dative, Possessive, Vocative." The author does not appear to have seen his own want of logic in making *form* the distinguishing feature of cases and yet establishing five cases in English, for in a note he goes on to add, quite unconcernedly, that "with the exception of the Possessive all these have long since lost their characteristic endings, but the use of the Case-names serves to mark the relations formerly indicated by them." In the grammar I quote, as well as in some other modern ones, such distinctions are referred not to Latin, but to Old English, but I think I am right when maintaining that they are really made in deference to Latin syntax rather than to Old English, as shown by the inclusion of the vocative on the one hand and by the exclusion of the instrumental on the other. Such grammars also classify as accusatives of description or of time, space, measure, or manner, a great many instances where Old English and other cognate languages have the dative or some other case. We should accustom ourselves in dealing with such questions to take each language, and each stage of each language—Modern English for instance—entirely on its own merits and look the real facts in the face, without any regard to how other languages express the same meanings. In a very able book on the absolute participle in English, the author says that it is right to parse the so-called nominative absolute as "a dative absolute in disguise." Now this amounts to very much the same thing as saying that a locomotive is a horse in disguise or—to remain within the sphere of language—to say that in "he likes pears" *he* is a dative in disguise, *likes* a plural in disguise, and *pears* the subject in disguise, because in Old English the sentence would run

"him *liciap perean*." It is unhistorical to treat Modern English as Latin or Old English or any other language in disguise.

It is often urged that we should in English distinguish a dative from an accusative on the strength of meaning only, but then we might with equal right say that the adjective is in three different cases in the sentences "my father is old; my father has grown old; my father is sick," for there is really a logical foundation for the distinction made here by Finnish: *isäni on vanha* (nominative); *isäni on jo tullut vanhaksi* (translative, indicating the state into which any one or anything passes); *isäni on sairaana* (essive, indicating the state in which anybody or anything is). The distinction is a real one in Finnish, because it is shown externally; but it is not a real one in English. In the same manner we should be justified in speaking of a dative case in English, if it had either a distinct form or manifested itself outwardly in some other manner, for example, by a fixed position. If the dative preceded invariably the accusative, we might recognize a positional dative, but it does not. In "I gave it him" there is nothing grammatical to show us which of the two words is the indirect object. It is true that when the direct object is a noun (not a pronoun) the indirect object is always placed before the direct object; but that is not enough to establish a separate case, unless indeed, we should be willing to apply the same designation of "dative case" to all the nouns placed first in each one of the following sentences:

I told the boy some stories.

I asked the boy a few questions.

I heard the boy his lessons.

I took the boy long walks.

I kissed the boy good-night.

[I painted the wall a different color.]

I called the boy bad names.

I called the boy a scoundrel.¹

If we are to speak of separate datives and accusatives in English, I for one do not know where in this list the dative goes out and the accusative comes in. (Note that in the second sentence Old English would have had two accusatives.) In the same manner I think it perfectly idle to inquire what case is employed in "he was tied *hand* and *foot*," "they were now *face* to *face*," "we shall go down *Harrow way this day week*," "I saw a man the *age* of my grandmother," etc. We have here various employments of the "kernel" or "crude form" of a noun, and nothing else. It is even more wrong to speak of phrases with *to* and *of* as datives and genitives, as is done, for instance, in articles on "Die Trennung eines Genitivs von seinem regierenden Worte durch andere Satztheile." What is meant is the order of two preposition (or adverbial) adjuncts, as in "the arrival at Cowes of the German Emperor." *Of the Emperor* is no more a genitive than *at Cowes* is an accusative or *from Cowes* an ablative. Whoever takes an interest in the purification of English grammar from such sham classifications as I have here instanced, will find great help in an excellent book by H. G. Wiwel,² in which the same kind of work has been done with regard to Danish and in which the growth of the traditional grammatical system is, moreover, elucidated in a masterly manner. As Danish resembles English more than any other language in grammatical structure we have here another instance of a research in one language being useful to students of a cognate tongue. But it should not be forgotten that in England one of the foremost scholars of our day has done excellent work in this respect, for Henry Sweet's ingenious essay *Words*,

¹ Some of these combinations may not be very frequent, but they all cover and all have to be analyzed.

² H. G. Wiwel, *Synspunkter for dansk sproglære*. Copenhagen, 1901.

Logic, and Grammar of 1873¹ really not only anticipates such works as Wiwel's but on some points even goes further in doing away radically with traditional notions and grammatical prejudices.

The exaggerated importance attached to Latin is also injurious to the study of English if it causes forms and constructions to be valued according to a Latin standard. Some authors, Milton and Dryden among them, have impaired their English prose by thinking too much of Latin syntax instead of trusting to their natural linguistic instinct, and similarly some grammarians are apt to despise such English idioms as are contrary to Latin rules. The omission of relative pronouns, a preposition placed at the end of a question or of a relative clause, the passive construction with a so-called dative turned into the subject, all these eminently English idioms have not been valued according to their merits. That the ordinary schoolmaster should persecute these things is perhaps only what might be expected so long as a rational course of modern linguistic science as applied to English does not enter into the ordinary school curriculum, but what concerns us more here is that the same underrating of a great number of pithy and expressive constructions is found even in works dealing with historical English grammar. In the same manner, instead of examining impartially the rise and spreading of the past indicative in conditional clauses ("if he was caught, he would be punished") and after such a verb as *wish* ("I wish he was dead"), many grammarians dispose of the use by simply branding it as careless or slipshod English, precluding themselves from the correct point of view by considering *came* in "if he came" as necessarily subjunctive. If people would not blink the fact that in modern English

¹ Henry Sweet, *Words, Logic, and Grammar*, in *Transactions of the Philological Society*. London, 1873.

“if he came” and “if we were” and “if I do” and a thousand other sentences are no longer either in the indicative or in the subjunctive, they would see how natural it is that the indicative should come to be used in the comparatively very rare instances in which the indicative and subjunctive forms are still distinct, and then we should, probably, soon see an investigation, which is now nowhere found, of the question, where does unsophisticated usage retain the subjunctive and where is the indicative employed naturally by everybody in England and America?

This leads up to another consideration. Up to quite recent times, the history of any language was chiefly studied through the means of written literature. But now it is more and more recognized that, indispensable as are written documents for the study of the older periods, they can never give everything, and that they will remain dead until vivified by the help of the study of the language as actually spoken nowadays by living men, women, and children. The study of language should always begin, like charity, at home; everybody should be trained in the investigation of his own, his family's, and his friend's every-day speech, before going on to deal with dead languages—and I take here the word “dead” in its strictest sense, including the language of Carlyle and of Emerson just as well as that of Chaucer or of Cynewulf, for they are all accessible to us through written and printed books only. The tendency towards a living language-study is strong everywhere, and the student of English should keep thoroughly abreast of the best work done in that direction with regard to other languages, German, French, Scandinavian, and so on. This is true of all branches of philology, not only of phonetics, where it has been recognized by everybody in theory if not always in practice, but also of such branches as syntax and semantics, where there is now in many countries a growing tendency

to take as a basis the observation of the actually spoken language.

The study of other languages will assist the Anglist in more ways than those enumerated hitherto. Let me finish this lecture by drawing attention to one of the most fundamental problems in the evolution of language. English is characterized by its large admixture of foreign words, and the history of the English-speaking race is in a large measure the history of its mixture with alien races. Now, English has gone farther than most cognate languages in simplifying its hereditary flexional system and wearing off most of the old endings. The problem naturally arises: what is the relation, or is there any relation, between these two things, race- or speech-mixture and simplification of structure?

The general assumption seems to be that foreign influence is the cause of that simplification, and this assumption is always stated in a purely dogmatic manner, no attempt being ever made to prove the assertion. Nor is it possible, so far as I see, either to prove or to disprove it on the strength of English alone, as the direct evidence afforded by contemporary documents is so scarce. The foreign influence to which the breaking down of the old grammatical system is ascribed is nearly always taken to be that due to the Norman Conquest. But as I have shown elsewhere¹ it is probable that the Scandinavian immigration exercised a much stronger influence on English grammar than the French. Both the mutual relations of the two languages, Scandinavian and English, and the greater rapidity of the structural change in the North, where Scandinavians settled in the greatest number, point decidedly in that direction, if we are to think of foreign influence at all. On the other hand, the chronology of some changes, for instance the early con-

¹ Otto Jespersen, *Progress in Language*, p. 173. London, 1894.

fusion of the old system of genders in some Northern monuments, as well as the gradual manner in which the leveling took place on many points, where we seem able to account phonologically and morphologically for each little step in a development which it took centuries to accomplish—all this makes it not unwarrantable to speak of the whole process as one which would have taken place in the same, or nearly the same manner, even had no foreign mixture entered into play.

As we are thus left unable to answer the question decidedly one way or the other from what we know about English itself, the idea naturally presents itself that an examination of parallel processes in other languages might perhaps assist us materially. For if we find everywhere else in other languages the two things, mixture of speech or of race and simplification of grammatical structure, going together, and if, on the other hand, pure languages are always conservative in their structure, the conclusion apparently is a safe one that the two phenomena are interdependent. The limited time at my disposal, and still more my limited knowledge, prevent me from doing here more than throwing out a few hints.

Among the Germanic languages, Danish is one of the simplest, as far as flectional structure is concerned,—and Danish has undergone a very strong foreign influence, a considerable part of its vocabulary being made up of Low German words. If we compare the different Danish dialects with one another, we see some differences in regard to the degree in which the simplification has been carried out, the dialect of West Jutland going farthest in that respect. There, for instance, the three grammatical genders have been merged together, final *-e* has disappeared, the definite article is one invariable prefixed *ø*, while in other dialects it is postfixed and varies according to number and according

to the two or, in other places, three genders still distinguished. Now, there does not seem to be a scrap of evidence to show that this part of the country has witnessed any stronger race-mixture than the others. It is worth noting that in the district nearest to German-speaking communities two genders are preserved. It is my impression that the most simplified dialect has no greater admixture of loan-words, than the more conservative ones, and this impression has been endorsed by the greatest authority on Jutland dialects, the Rev. Dr. H. F. Feilberg. The structural contrast to West Jutlandish among the Scandinavian languages is Icelandic, which has preserved the old endings and inflections with wonderful fidelity; this conservatism is combined with an extremely small number of loan-words, and no race-mixture has ever taken place.

We proceed to South Africa, where we find a language which has perhaps thrown off more of the old flecional complexity than any other Germanic language, English not even excepted, namely Cape Dutch or "Afrikaansch," "de Taal." The total absence of distinction of gender, the dropping of a great many endings, an extremely simple declension and conjugation, which has given up, for instance, any marks of different persons and numbers in the verbs, and other similar traits, distinguish this extremely interesting language from European Dutch. As for loan-words, the number of English words, which is now very considerable, can have nothing to do with the simplification, for the English did not come to the Cape till after the grammatical structure had undergone most of its changes. French loan-words are not so plentiful as might be expected from the number of Huguenots among the original stock of immigrants, but Malayo-Portuguese has contributed quite a considerable number of words. In the latest book on Cape Dutch the simplification is attributed, not to any particular

foreign tongue, but to the fact that the language has been largely spoken by people having originally had a different mother tongue, no matter what that tongue was in each individual case.¹

Among the Romance languages, Roumanian evidently is the one which has undergone the strongest foreign influence; it has a great many loan-words from various sources, and the people also is largely mixed with alien populations. But here, the structure of the language is rather less simple than that of the sister tongues; Roumanian has, for instance, preserved more of the old declension than other Romance languages. Its neighbor, Bulgarian, has in some respects the same position among Slavonic languages as Roumanian among Romance. The same causes have been at work among both populations and have produced racemixtures as well as a large proportion of loan-words from Turkish and other languages. But with regard to simplification, Bulgarian stands on a different footing from Roumanian, as it has given up very much of the old Slavonic complexity; the case-system has nearly disappeared, and prepositions are used very extensively instead of the old endings.

In the Balkans we meet with still another language which has to be considered here, namely, Modern Greek. The extremely artificial form in which this language is written does not concern us here, as it is an outcome of an entirely unnatural tendency to conceal the history and development of some two thousand years. Spoken Modern Greek presents a combination of the two phenomena, simplification of grammar and a great influx of foreign words.² So does Modern Persian too; its accident is extremely simple and

¹ H. Meyer, *Die sprache der Buren*. Göttingen, 1901.—Compare also D. C. Hesselning, *Het Afrikaansch*. Leiden, 1899.

² See on the relation between the two things especially K. Krumbacher, *Das problem der neugriechischen schriftsprache*. Festschrift in der kgl. bayr. akademie der wissenschaften in München. 1902.

in so many respects resembles English that Misteli consecrates the last sections of his great work to a comparison of the two languages in their present shapes.¹ Persian also in that respect resembles English, that it is full of loan-words, nearly all expressions for philosophical, abstract, and technical ideas being Arabic words. But just as most of the philosophical, abstract, and technical Latin and Greek words were adopted into English after the process of grammatical simplification had been carried very far, in the same manner Arabic influence in Persian follows, instead of preceding, the doing away with most of the old complexity of grammar. Pehlevi, or the language of the Sassanid period, before the Arabic conquest, is far simpler than Old Persian. If, then, the Persian simplicity is a consequence of speech-mixture, it must be one of earlier date, and perhaps the Aramaic influence on Pehlevi is strong enough to account for everything; that, however, must be left for specialists to decide.

In India, the old system of inflections has broken down in the modern languages, which are all more or less analytic in their structure. Hindi seems to have gained much in simplicity as early as the thirteenth century, although the modern system of auxiliary verbs and of postpositions was not then fully established, but the strong influx of Persian (with Arabic and Turkish) words did not begin till some centuries later. Hindustani is practically the same language as Hindi with still more foreignisms in it. Gujarati has preserved more of the old inflections than Hindi, but the Persian elements are rather more numerous here than in Hindi.

We should not leave the Arian (Indo-European) languages without mentioning the numerous varieties of Creole

¹ F. Misteli, *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten typen des sprachbaues*, Berlin, 1893.

languages that have sprung up in all those parts of the globe where Europeans have been in constant communication with native populations of different races. Grammatical simplicity has in all these languages been carried extremely far, and though the actual admixture of exotic words is very unequal and inconstant, varying as it does, according to circumstances and individuals, still it is always pretty considerable.¹

Outside the Indo-European languages, the nearest in kin are probably the Finno-Ugrian group. The absence of old documents makes it a difficult matter to speak of the history of these languages; still, we may say that Esthonian, which has undergone a strong German influence, shows a more worn-down state of the old grammar than Finnish, and that the same is the case with Livonian, which has been so strongly influenced by Lettic that nearly half of the vocabulary is borrowed from that language. As for Magyar, or Hungarian, its vocabulary presents a highly variegated appearance: Persian, Turkish, Slavonic, Latin, and German elements are freely mixed with the original stock. Phonetic development has worn down the forms of the words to a considerable extent, and many of the old grammatical forms have disappeared. The case-endings now used are quite modern developments and are joined to the words in a much looser way and also much more regularly than those of Finnish, for example; in fact, they can hardly be termed anything but postpositions. On the whole its grammatical structure seems to be really simpler than that of the other languages of the same group.²

In the Semitic group, Hebrew even in the oldest period known to us is much simpler in its grammatical structure than Arabic. Whether this is due to speech-mixture or not

¹ See H. Schuchardt, *Kreolische studien*, Wiener akademie, 1883 ff.

² With regard to the Finno-Ugrian languages, I am largely indebted to the lectures and writings of Vilhelm Thomsen.

is a question which I must leave to others to decide; but I am told that scholars are now beginning to recognize more and more Assyrian loan-words in Hebrew. Aramaic is still simpler, and here foreign influences seem to be much easier to trace.

Outside the three great families of languages which I have here spoken about, very little is known to me that might serve to clear up our question. Malayan has a very simple grammatical structure and a very great number of foreign words. Chinese is still less complicated in its structure, but is its vocabulary to any great extent made up of loan-words? On the other hand, are the American Indian languages, with their intricacies of grammar, completely free from foreign mixtures? It is surely permissible to entertain some doubt on both of these heads.

I am painfully conscious that what I have been able to do here is only a very imperfect sketch. I dare draw no definite conclusion from the somewhat conflicting evidence I have been able to adduce, but I have thought it might be well to throw out a few suggestions for a future work, which ought certainly to be done by some one possessed of a deeper knowledge of the languages I have mentioned, and, if possible, of all the other languages that might throw light on the subject. This scholar of a, let us hope, not too remote future, I should venture to recommend to pay especial attention to chronology,—for it is not enough to state mixture and simplicity, but it must be shown also for each individual case that the latter is subsequent in time to the former, if we are to believe in a cause and effect relation between them. And then he must, wherever possible, distinguish between speech-mixture and race-mixture and determine in each case whether one or the other or both have taken place. He will find some very useful generalizations on the relation between the two kinds of mixture in a paper

by the American scholar George Hempl,¹ whom I am happy to quote here at the close of my paper, for it would scarcely be possible to find a more apposite place than America in which to investigate the question I have alluded to. Here in America you have race-mixtures and speech-mixtures of every kind going on and readily accessible to observation every day. Here you see the greatest amalgamation that the world has ever witnessed of human beings into one great nation. The future of the English language is to a great extent in the hands of the Americans. It is gratifying, therefore, to see that the study of its past and of its present is taken up with such zeal and such energy by a great number of extremely able American scholars that we cannot fail to entertain the very best hopes for the future of English philology.

¹ G. Hempl. *Language-Rivalry and Speech-Differentiation in the case of Race-Mixture*. *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxix (1898), p. 35.

PRESENT PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

BY GEORGE LYMAN KITTREDGE

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My theme is Present Problems with regard to the English Language. I did not choose this theme myself, nor was it, I suppose, assigned me by a committee of philologists or linguistic students. Indeed, it is manifestly not altogether appropriate to the nature of the general subject, to the character of the material with which one deals in linguistic investigations, or to the present state of science in the department of learning which we are met to discuss. In natural science, in philosophy, in social questions, the specialist may no doubt survey the field at any given moment and pronounce categorically that this or that question (or group of questions) presses with peculiar insistence for solution, and that when the solution is arrived at, it will point the way to large discoveries, or to momentous advances in knowledge or enlightenment. In the investigation of a particular language, however, the case is different. There are problems enough, no doubt, and difficult problems; but who shall venture to say that we are now grappling with principles or theories on which depends either the whole future of our science or the amelioration of the human race?

Pray do not misunderstand me. It is by no means my purpose to criticise adversely the managers of this intel-

lectual enterprise. Nor do I intend to belittle the subject which calls us together, and to the study of which we are, each in his own way, so ardently devoted. Least of all would I be taken to mean that there is nothing to talk about. As I have already suggested, we have problems in abundance,—an abundance, indeed, which is fairly embarrassing. All I desire is to account for the omissions which you will severally detect in my discussion this afternoon. It is not to be expected that any brief treatment of so complicated a business should not overlook or ignore the pet puzzle of many an individual among this audience. For we are very multifarious in our interests. Look into your hearts, gentlemen, and judge. Some of us are worrying over “*u-umlaut*”; others pass sleepless nights in meditating on the Kenticisms in Chaucer; to not a few the dog’s letter, the snarling *littera canina* of the old grammarians, is a perpetual stimulus or an ever-puncturing thorn in the flesh. A select number find their refreshment (or dissipation) in unriddling runic puzzles. Others the Middle English dative charms elusively,—fleeing to the woods, but desirous first to be seen. For myself, I must confess that I give much thought to certain idioms containing (as I think) *for* and an adjective, but reducible, in the opinion of many, to compounds with the “intensive prefix,”—and that I should die happier if I felt sure of ever knowing the whole truth about the *kankedort* in which Troilus found himself when he heard Pandarus and Cressida whispering at the door.

These, then, and thousands like them, are all *present problems with regard to the English language*, and I might easily fill my allotted five and forty minutes by cataloguing them, and still leave the most immediate interests of some of you untouched. Because these are little things, the scoffer talks of pedantry, and the mousing philologist is

ridiculed as an operose trifler—a cavalier of empty thoughts. But we may leave the scoffer out of account. Our revenge on him is lordly and complete. As a learned friend of mine once said to some of his fellow students who were inclined to think that literary criticism was the whole of life,—it is exhilarating to observe the hungry eagerness with which the supercilious outsider picks up the crumbs that fall from the philologist's table. A correct analysis of *if you please*, or *you are welcome*, or *willy nilly*, or a demonstration of the common trick of substituting a glottal catch for a guttural, will hold an audience of literary enthusiasts as surely as the finest analysis of the æsthetician or the boldest flight of the critical aëronaut.

The minuter questions of English philology, such as those to which I have already adverted, are of course being settled one by one, and their solutions are gradually, though very slowly, finding their place in collective treatises. One of the larger problems that confronts us is the difficulty of getting collective treatises written in a competent way. To be sure, there is no reason for discouragement. As we compare the array of trustworthy manuals that the tyro now has at his disposal with the scanty and incorrect apparatus of the greatest scholars fifty years ago, we have much to be thankful for; but no one can deny that there is still an enormous amount of sifting and codification to be done, even in those departments of our subject which have received the most earnest and fruitful attention from philologists.

The earliest period of our language (call it Anglo-Saxon or Old English as you please; for this petty question of mere nomenclature I refuse to regard as a problem, though much ink has been shed in debating it) has been more minutely and successfully studied than any other. The reasons are obvious, and need not be recapitulated. One

of the most potent has been, of course, the fact that Anglo-Saxon is of vital importance to every Germanic philologist, to a degree that is not true of any later period of English. Hence we have enjoyed, in this field, the active coöperation of scholars of different nationalities well trained in philological method, some of whom have only a slight interest in the English language in its later, and much more significant, developments.

Yet our shelf of Anglo-Saxon works of reference is far from full, and some of the gaps occur in places to which we should oftenest have recourse if we did not know they were empty. The state of Anglo-Saxon lexicography, for example, is a disgrace to English-speaking scholars. Who will give us a halfway satisfactory Anglo-Saxon dictionary and free us from the thralldom of Bosworth-Toller? Grein's *Poetical Lexicon* is so marvelous a piece of work that, old as it is, one hesitates to suggest its revision. Yet everybody knows that a new Grein is a need that is sorely felt. A distinguished American scholar has long been giving his leisure hours to making collectanea for an exhaustive Anglo-Saxon dictionary; but I doubt if he has much expectation of finding a publisher. There are understood to be large materials at Oxford; but one despairs of ever seeing them put forth. Is there any hope except in international coöperation among a large number of scholars, financed by some institution of inexhaustible resources that feels no regard for profits, and directed by a specialist characterized by equal breadth and fineness of knowledge and by exceptional skill in the organization of materials and the management of collaborators? Instances of similar lexicographical enterprises now proceeding to a successful issue will at once occur to you. I need not mention them by name. Should we not all keep in mind as one of our first duties the furtherance of this great undertaking in every way in our power?

I will not dwell on the other deficiencies in our Anglo-Saxon equipment. On the whole, the material is so compact and manageable, the various desiderata are so well defined, and the number of trained workers is so great, that, without being unduly sanguine, we may hope to see most of our needs supplied as time goes on,—the great task of the dictionary excepted. There is still much to do in Anglo-Saxon dialectology; but the main lines of distinction are well recognized, and there are a number of distinguished monographs. Syntax, to be sure, is an almost untilled field; but to that subject we must recur in a moment. As to meter, there are still wide differences of opinion, and of late there has been manifested a tendency to question the soundness of some of the best-accredited results, or, at all events, to deny their utility for purposes of textual criticism. One thing, however, is clear: There are a large number of facts about the structure and movement of Anglo-Saxon verse that have been ascertained beyond the possibility of a doubt and that have been shown to admit of orderly classification. In all our discussions on points of theory, it is well to remember that these facts are *facts*, not *opinions*. *The verses do actually contain such and such syllables, arranged thus and so, and with certain quantities and accents in reasonably fixed positions.* All of these facts *may* be significant with regard to the meter; many of them must be significant. How far all or any part of them suffice to pluck out the heart of the mystery is a debatable question. The objection that an ancient *scop* cannot have had all these types and sub-types in his head when he took harp in hand is merely ludicrous. It is much as if one were to contend that the musician's crotchets and semiquavers are perverse nonentities because a boy can whistle a tune without ever having heard of them. It is about on a level with the child's inquiry as to how

Adam found out the animals' names. There may be—there probably is—a good deal about Anglo-Saxon meter that is not yet discovered; but that is no reason for rejecting the information which we have already acquired.

While this particular subject is under our eyes, and before you have had time to describe me in your own minds as either a philistine, or a partisan, or a shuffler, it may be well to say a word on the history of English meter in general,—of what we may call Modern English meter in distinction from that of pre-Conquest times. Here there are certainly problems enough. The whole matter is one enormous puzzle. We do not really know how far English meter is Germanic, how far it is Latin, and how far it is French. Individuals know: there are theorists in plenty who feel certain about the influence exerted on the native versification by the hymns of the church and the secular poetry of the foreign invader. But I am not speaking of the views of those who know because they have made up their minds, but of what can actually be proved to the satisfaction of an unbiased scholar. Again, the whole subject of quantity in modern English meter is as good as *terra incognita*. Of course quantity plays its part as well as accent. Our ears tell us that, and our common sense. Besides, we have the testimony of the poets themselves. But how great is the quantitative function, and what are its relations to accentual rhythm? Further, we are in no sort of agreement as to pauses in metrical writing. Most metricians tell us, for instance, that in Shakespeare's blank verse a pause may take the place of an unaccented syllable,—some even assert that it may stand for one that is accented. To me, however, such statements appear to have no meaning. They seem to belong to mathematics, not to poetry.

Again, we are at sword's points about ictus and rhetorical

accent. Everybody knows that the same verse may often be *singsonged* with five accents and *read* with three or four, and that it satisfies the ear when uttered in either way, though it appeals to the intellect in only one of its two renditions. What are we to make of this phenomenon? And what of pitch-accent and stress-accent? What of feet or measures? How far are they real divisions and how far mere fetches of scansion?

These are elementary questions. But no scholar in the world has yet answered them to anything like general assent. Heaven knows there are answers enough before the public! About once a year somebody puts forth a brand-new system of English meter, with novel symbols and a fresh nomenclature; and it is impossible even to conjecture the number of eager young spirits in our universities who are at this moment beginning to glow with the hope that they have at last put their fingers on the strings in the long-sought way. For my own part, I am not sanguine. We know the rough facts, and we can feel the finer ones as we read or chant the verses of the great poets. But whether we shall ever do much more is a question. The phoneticians are active, and if help comes from any quarter it must come from them. But—if one dare say it—some of the most advanced phoneticians have become so subtle and hair-splitting, and seem to have so little notion of what is worth doing and what is not, that they appear to an outsider (as well as to not a few of their more conservative brethren) to be doing little more than piling up rubbish. Some day there may be born a great psychologist with an innate feeling for verse as verse. When he has exhausted the subject of psychology, he may apply himself to literature, and when he is sufficiently at home in that field, he may perhaps find time to become an expert phonetician. He may then solace his declining

years by explaining for good and all the intricacies of English meter. I hardly expect to live to see the man. Let me add, by the way, two more qualifications: he should be modest, and a person of unusual common sense.

There are problems in plenty with regard to the history of English as a literary language, this side of the Anglo-Saxon period,—and many of them are of great moment to students of literature as well as to the special devotees of linguistic science. To some of the questions there is a generally accepted answer,—generally accepted, but not quite amply demonstrated. As to others, scholars take sides (and hold them) with commendable stiffness. Nearly all of the questions are pretty generally misconceived, in this or that way, by the educated public, including most writers of literary histories.

First among the problems that I have now in mind is the general question of French influence upon English. In its main outlines this matter is pretty well settled. We know (though it seems impossible for historians of literature to find out the facts) that the Norman dialect was familiar at the English court before the Conquest, so that it is conceivable that, even without the Battle of Hastings, it might have come to occupy a position similar to that of French at the Prussian court in the reign of Frederick the Great, or Cerman at the Danish court in the eighteenth century. We know also that the prevalence of Norman French as a court dialect after the Conquest had very little direct influence on English; that the dialect from which most of the Old French words came that made their way into the language of the island was Central French; that most of these words came in after 1300 (say between 1300 and 1400), and that many of them were in the first instance literary or society borrowings, like *prestige* or *fiancée* in modern times. But nobody has yet grappled victori-

ously with the details. The complicated linguistic situation in England in the early fourteenth century—the critical moment in this concern—is, in fact, appreciated by very few persons, if one may judge from what one hears or reads. One of the best of Middle English scholars—one of the small number to whom the English of that period is a living language—has gone so far as to declare that the French of Stratford-atte-Bowe was the language of the English court in Chaucer's time, and that that great poet and accomplished courtier thought as highly of it as of the French of Paris. Another good scholar appears to believe that the French of Gower came straight down from Anglo-Norman times. It is seldom recognized that there were in the fourteenth century, as there are now, great differences among the gentry and nobility of England in the purity with which they spoke the language of the polite nation, and that a Parisian accent was then, as now, a highly valued accomplishment. We shall never get these tangles straightened out until some Romance scholar whose native language is English and who has a philological as well as a practical command of it, gives us an authoritative book in which all the needed distinctions are made and the evidence that establishes them is marshaled. At present it cannot be denied that everything that has been written on the subject is superficial, or fragmentary, or honey-combed with error. I know—you all know—a philologist of the first rank, equally versed in Romance and in Germanic philology, who has such a book as we want in his head at this moment, and who merely needs to overcome his modesty, to lay aside the self-sacrificing work which he is constantly doing for others, and to abandon for the moment a modicum of his commendable caution, to perform an inestimable service to the history of the English language.

Another point of great importance is the rôle which is to be ascribed to Chaucer in the development of our standard idiom. Here one would think there might be agreement; but there is none. The old view that Chaucer made literary English by mixing French with corrupt Anglo-Saxon, throwing in final *e*'s at will, and polishing the conglomerate, was so absurd (though it is far from being exploded in outside circles) that it has, by a revulsion of feeling, prompted some to reduce his services to an infinitesimal quantity. These revolutionists seem to believe that Chaucer found the literary language ready made in the dialect of educated Londoners, and that the history of that literary language would have been the same if he had never lived. Between these extremes it is not hard to find the truth; but it *is* hard to prove it, hard even to get it accepted as a working hypothesis. What we should be careful to remember is that there is a vast amount of work still to be done before we can know exactly what happened in England, linguistically speaking, between 1350 and 1450. That work, too, does not consist merely in writing dissertations of the statutory length on the basis of a conventionally orthodox scheme of Middle English dialectology. For (may one dare to whisper it?) Middle English dialectology is not by any means reducible, in the present state of our knowledge, to any such hard and fast scheme as one might think from the confident little treatises that appear from time to time from aspirants for academic honors. There has been too much cocksureness in assigning this, that, or the other document to the southwest corner of the northeast Midland district, or in declaring that a writer must have been born five or six miles from Litchfield and passed some of his maturer years in the outskirts of Warwick, occasionally passing through Coleshill as he returned to his native town on a visit to his kinsfolk. Here again I

would not be misunderstood. Far be it from me to refuse recognition to the painstaking labors of those (great scholars and small) who have toiled in this field, whether in gathering materials or in ordering them and drawing inferences. What is meant is merely that there is a fictitious air of completeness and scientific certainty about the dialectology of Middle English as at present understood which will not stand the test of scrutiny on the part of one who asks for evidence and requires sometimes more than a medieval subservience to authority. What is purely an inductive inquiry has come to be too much a matter of deduction. It is incumbent on the younger generation of English scholars to reopen the case,—not in a hostile spirit, but with a determination to prove all things and hold fast only that which is good.

Hitherto, study of the Middle English dialects has been too much confined to their phonology,—partly, no doubt, because of its importance as a criterion, but partly also because of the somewhat disproportionate attention which this branch of linguistic science has received for so many years, and partly (alas!) from inertia. Here were certain schemes already drawn to fill up; here was a diagram; here was the line of least resistance. Many an American, in recent years, has become intensely interested in his own ancestors because he had come into possession of a genealogical chart and took a fancy for filling the blanks. Now, though admittedly there can be no investigation of dialects that is not based on sound phonology, it ought to be equally evident (though it seems not to have been found so) that, when the sound-chart of a dialect has been properly drawn up, our study is not at an end. We know very little about any dialect when all we know is its vocalic and consonantal behavior, and, indeed, when we add to that an acquaintance with some of its inflectional habits. With reference to

the great Middle English dialects,—each of which has an abundant literature and may lay claim to have been at some time a literary language of some pretensions,—we need to know its characteristic vocabulary, the special idiomatic phrases which distinguish it, its metrical system, and its syntax. If we are asked how far our present codified knowledge of the dialects in question meets these requirements, we shall have to hang our heads. This is a matter of some concern to the literary historian as well as to the linguist. It has been much the fashion to talk about “schools” or “groups” of Middle English poetry. The terms may be misleading, but we will not pause to quarrel with them. In the present state of our ignorance about some of the things just mentioned, there is constant danger of our confusing what belongs to a dialect with what belongs to a school. Nor is that all. Different works are not infrequently ascribed to the same writer on the ground of resemblances in style and language which, if they prove anything, prove only that the documents are written in the same dialect and employ a common stock of catchwords and catchphrases. The abuse of the argument from so-called parallel passages is largely due to our ignorance or neglect of all dialectic phenomena except those of sounds and forms. It is safe to say that arguments for identity of authorship in the Middle English field are every day based on collections of parallel passages of a kind that would call down Homeric laughter on the heads of their accumulators if they were dealing with documents and writers of our own day. Now much of this abuse comes from pure neglect of logic; but by far the larger part of it must be charged to ignorance, excusable and even unavoidable ignorance, perhaps, but still ignorance, pure and simple. The investigator simply does not know that the phrase or sentence or verse that he copies down on his

card is not the property of A or B or C, but of everybody who spoke or wrote that dialect, and that, accordingly, it was the inevitable form of words when that idea (itself a commonplace of experience or reflection) had to be expressed.

The "vocabulary test" is pretty nearly discredited by this time, so fantastic are the pranks which it has been forced to play in the face of an astonished world. But the "parallel passage test" is still in high favor. Yet we all know, it is to be presumed, that, for some purposes, the unit of expression is not the word, but the set group of words,—the phrase or sentence; and that consequently the test from parallel passages is often in no way distinguishable from that from community of vocabulary.

All this suggests one of the most serious desiderata of our science. We need to pass from the study and collection of *words* to the study and collection of *phrases*. Lexicographers deserve all honor. In the Middle English field, to be sure, we are still pretty badly off, but we ought to be thankful for what we have. Yet how little has been done towards the history of idioms and phrases in comparison with the labor that has been devoted to tracing the history of individual words! What I say applies as well to Modern as to Middle English. We need investigations of phraseology. There is no more fascinating pursuit for the linguist, none that will repay him more immediately or more abundantly for his time and trouble. The bearings of the subject are multifarious. Take the purely historical point of view. We know that a certain poem contains twenty per cent. of French and Latin words. Are we to infer that this measures the Romance element in its language? By no means. How far are the phrases French or Latin in their relations, even when the words are Germanic? Our habit of translating foreign phrases literally

and making them a part of our speech is well known and of very long standing. Many of our commonest idioms are naturalized citizens that have adopted the speech of their new country. It is notorious that the genealogist has much trouble when he gets into a region where immigrants have been in the way of translating their family names. We must remember, too, that there are what may be called literary idioms as well as popular idioms, and in these Middle English writers reveled with all the unrestraint of authors who wished to produce largely and rapidly and who had never conceived that it is a virtue to be original.

For some time we have been trembling on the verge of another huge group of problems, which I have mentioned two or three times, but without dwelling upon them. I refer, of course, to syntax.

The study of English syntax is in its infancy. The neglect of this department of philology has, indeed, been often commented on with reference to all the modern languages. It stands in the most startling contrast to the minute and almost passionate attention which has been devoted to the history of sounds and forms. Yet English syntax has the bad eminence of being perhaps more neglected than that of any other great language. A few brilliant scholars have coquetted with the subject. Several heavy and unilluminated persons have made unwieldy collections of material, usually overlooking the vital matters or stopping short as soon as they had reached a point at which they were in sight of something either difficult or significant. There are two or three manuals of substantial worth, and a number of distinguished monographs. But in general it must be admitted that English syntax has hardly been studied at all, except for practical purposes. I have learned, since these sessions began, that a thoroughly equipped and uncommonly keen-sighted scholar has in hand

a large work on this subject, from which we are justified in expecting the happiest results.

Perhaps it is worth while to survey the field for a moment,—to specify what one would like to have if wishes were horses,—to sketch, however tentatively, a kind of programme.

In the first place we desire to know thoroughly the Germanic foundations. For this, of course, a complete Anglo-Saxon syntax is necessary: not a mere list of verbs with the cases they govern, or an array of the different ways in which the numerals may be arranged, or a set of statistics comprehending the relative frequency of the weak adjective and the strong. These things are well enough, and we cannot get along without them. But what we must look forward to is something far less mechanical, a system of Anglo-Saxon constructions such as we already have for the classical tongues, discriminated as finely as the nature of the idiom will admit, arranged both logically and historically, complete both for the poetry and the prose, and supported at every point by exhaustive material. This, of course, is not the task of one man, or perhaps of one generation; but we are not talking about what can be accomplished to-morrow or next day. We are trying to face the problem of English syntax as it stands, probably the most stupendous problem of all those with which it is our business to grapple.

This ideal system of Anglo-Saxon syntax is needed, as we have seen, as a foundation for our whole structure. We must know how the syntax of our language stood when English was a purely Germanic speech, before we can reason with certainty as to what took place when our idiom was subjected to those extraordinarily complex forces which have made it unique among the languages of articulate-speaking men.

Here, at the very threshold, we are confronted by a difficulty of no small proportions. Since most of our Anglo-Saxon prose is translated from the Latin, we cannot trust its syntactic evidence without careful scrutiny. At every step, therefore, the possibility of foreign literary influence must be borne in mind. We must compare the constructions of poetry, and we must appeal constantly to the testimony of the other Germanic languages. Nor must we forget, in examining the poetical texts, the archaizing tendency of all expression in verse. Finally, we must bear in mind the probability of syntactic differences coincident with differences of dialect, and we must remember the special complications that have resulted from the partial transference of a large body of Anglo-Saxon poetry from one dialect, more or less completely, into another.

If we can do all this,—and we shall be forced to do it somehow and sometime,—we shall be in a position to study with intelligence the bewildering syntax of the Middle English period.

The most obvious question about Middle English syntax is: What did French do to it? This is not the only question; but it is so insistent that to many persons it plays the part of Aaron's rod with the other serpents: it swallows up all the rest. Very little has been accomplished in the investigation of Middle English syntax, and in part for this very reason. Some scholars appear to think that all one has to do is to discover a French construction (or a French phrase) that is identical with one in the English of this period, and then to infer that we have an example of the gradual Gallicizing of our language. The inference is far too easy. Take for example the matter of prepositions and cases. One often hears that the substitution of prepositional phrases for the inflected cases of nouns comes from unconscious imitation of the French. But we must be cau-

tious. As inflections decay, what is to replace them but prepositions? Imagine for the moment that there had been no Norman Conquest, but that inflectional decay had taken place in English as it has in Dutch and Danish, for example. Would not the spread of prepositional phrases have taken place then? There were already constructions enough of this kind in Anglo-Saxon to give the impulse to any number of analogies,—to any amount of growth. I am not taking sides. I am merely asking for a suspension of judgment until we have more facts in order; and this suggests a second article in our programme: We need to study carefully and exhaustively the syntax of the Transition Period, comparing it on the one hand with Anglo-Saxon and on the other with contemporary French, and checking all our conclusions by means of the development of the Germanic languages in general. Such a study, devoted to a period of English during which the direct influence of French in other respects (on the vocabulary, for instance) was almost *nil*, ought to give us some idea of the native tendencies which our language was bound to follow. *A priori*, it might reasonably be maintained that foreign syntax is not likely to be intensely operative so long as a language shows such an independence of outside influences as to keep its vocabulary pure. May it not be that, after all, the direct effect of French in modifying our syntax has been greatly exaggerated? We must all admit the possibility, but there is not a living scholar who has the right to dogmatize on the subject. For myself, I am inclined to think that we shall find out some day that in syntax, as in other respects, the chief linguistic result of the Norman Conquest for a couple of centuries was indirect, and came from breaking down the literary tradition of Anglo-Saxon, and so allowing our language to disintegrate (let us say rather, to advance) with more rapidity than would otherwise have been the

case. At all events, we must have a study of Transition syntax, and it must take especial heed of Late West Saxon, and in particular of those texts which are admittedly written in an artificial literary dialect, maintained with an effort long after it had ceased to accord with the speech of common life.

For the period of fully established Middle English,—in particular the fourteenth century,—we must *a priori* admit a great deal of French influence on our syntax. Here, however, the amount of work to be done is so great that it may well stagger the most sanguine. We must give steady heed to the great dialects, for what is true of one is not necessarily true of another. The poets of the so-called Chaucerian School—say from 1350 to 1450—will require and repay most careful scrutiny, since they are in the direct line which leads down to the standard syntax of our own day.

Next come the dark ages—dark, that is to say, to the philologist because scandalously neglected, with two or three brilliant exceptions. It is not in the matter of syntax alone that the long stretch from 1450 to 1550 is a No Man's Land. In almost every respect this vastly important lapse of time has been ignored by the linguistic scholar. The ordinary outfit of the Anglicist may be described as consisting of a knowledge of Anglo-Saxon, of the language of Chaucer, of Elizabethan English, and of the speech of the present day; and too often, especially in the case of foreigners, the last two items are omitted from the account. We take a leap from Chaucer to Queen Elizabeth. Yet the dark period from 1450 to 1550 is full of instruction. Many a phrase of idiom that one thinks of as Middle English turns up in the obscure writers of the sixteenth century, and we have also, in this period, the privilege of inspecting the beginnings of that great outburst of linguistic splendor which characterizes the Elizabethan Age. And the middle

period presents phenomena of its own. We see the French influence giving way to a tendency to that excessive Latinization which crowded the vocabulary of England with barbarous sesquipedalian words, not destined to maintain themselves. The neatness and simplicity of Chaucerian diction disappear, and the gorgeous licenses of Elizabethanism do not yet exist. In some writers, too, there is a good fund of colloquialisms,—of incalculable value to the investigator of our modern syntax. A forbidding period this to the æsthetician,—but full of lessons for the historical student of letters, as well as for the philologist. For the syntactician it abounds in prizes; some day he may awake to their whereabouts; at present, he seems hardly aware that they exist at all. Let it be added that a knowledge of Middle English by no means fits a man to read the works of this period intelligently. There is, unfortunately, a prevalent misconception on this point.

Of Elizabethan syntax—the next article in our programme—something has already been said by anticipation. We need not dwell upon it; for everybody knows the significance of the period. More or less work has been done here, but mostly on Shakespeare, and none of it in any way final.

We have now reached the Modern Period, in which, if we have few scientific investigations, we have at all events our own knowledge of the rules. Our programme, however, will be heinously incomplete if we pass over the eighteenth century—the age of prose and reason. For this time there are, of course, no treatises whatever (I mean, by modern investigators); for it has been tacitly assumed that there is nothing to treat. Since, however, there must be some means of getting from the license of the Elizabethans to the prim positiveness of the lore that our children learn at school, it behooves us to trace the establishment of the

somewhat rigid dogmas that hold sway nowadays, and we may expect to find what we are after in the age whose shibboleths were correctness and urbanity. Once more we shall recognize the potency of French and Latin, this time as regulating forces rather than as temptations to innovate.

Thus I have drawn up, roughly, to be sure, but with exactness enough for our purpose, a programme for that series of Syntactical Studies the lack of which is the greatest desideratum in the whole circle of English linguistics.

I forewarned you that three quarters of an hour would not be long enough even to enumerate all the problems with regard to the English language which we and our philological progeny may hope to settle within the next hundred years, and all the desiderata which we and they may undertake to supply. I have said nothing, for example, of the modern dialects, which, after serving as a parade-ground for harmless and sometimes useful amateurishness for a century or two, have just begun to attract scientific attention. Few of us have had the fortitude to spend our days and nights over the masterpiece of the chalcenic Ellis, but everybody can consult the *Dialect Dictionary*, and there is hope for the years to come. It is, to be sure, a bit depressing to find that the author of a very recent article in a journal of the highest class has apparently never heard of this conspicuous and indispensable book, and depends for his English material on the flimsy complications of Wright and Halliwell. But we are used to this kind of thing, and must not let our hearts be troubled overmuch. The dialects of our own country, too, are receiving some notice, and light is gradually being shed on the interesting and delicate subject of the English language in America. Unfortunately much energy is still wasted in polemics with regard to alleged Americanisms and counter-irritating Britishisms. But the fray is less noisy than it used to be.

To phonetics pure and simple I have referred only by the way—since the subject is apart, and presents its own set of problems, not specifically confined to the English language.

Word-order, formal stylistics, the limits of prose rhythm, the æsthetic value of vowel and consonant combinations, minor foreign influences, slang and technical jargon, the comparative vocabularies of different writers or schools or periods, sexual and social distinctions in phraseology, the complicated and delicate syntax of vulgar English as opposed to the idiom of the polite, artificial influences of every kind, the speech of children, the rise and spread of individualisms, brogues and broken English of all sorts,—such are some of the problems on which one would like to dwell, but which I must pass by with a bare mention.

It is impossible, however, to close without adverting to one or two questions of immediate practical interest. We are always tempted to regard philology as a thing apart, and we are of course quite justified in taking this attitude among ourselves. Linguistics as an independent discipline—philology for philology's sake—needs no defense or assertion in an assembly like the present. But we must not forget that, in one of its aspects, linguistic study may—nay must—be pursued as ancillary to the study and practice of literature and artistic expression. Applied Philology is not, strictly speaking, a part of my theme. Still, the interests of Pure Philology are too closely bound up with this to allow us to shut our eyes to the facts. If the student of literature, or the student of style, or the aspirant to the honors of writing or speaking, cannot command the services of good philology, he will have recourse to bad,—and the world is full of false brethren and redolent of science falsely so called. The study of language and the study of literature must go hand in hand. No doubt every one of

us will lean more or less in this or that direction; but it is vitally necessary that every linguist should cultivate the study of literature, and equally essential that the professional literary scholar should build upon a sound and stable foundation of philology. To divorce the two disciplines, and still more to set one up in opposition to the other, will be disastrous to both. These are commonplaces, no doubt, but, in this country at all events, they are truisms which it is our duty to proclaim till the rising generation in our universities shall cease to regard them as paradoxes.

REFERENCE WORKS ON INDO-EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

(Prepared through the courtesy of Professor Carl D. Buck of Chicago University)

A brief list of the most important general works for the study of Indo-European Comparative Philology in general and of the historical grammar of the several Indo-European languages. (See also the bibliographies under the other language sections; here are cited mainly historical grammars, etymological dictionaries, etc.) Only the works of a more general character are mentioned, no attempt being made to cite the countless important books and articles dealing with special problems.

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THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO THE OTHER SCIENCES.

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IN order to answer this question, we need to consider a preliminary question, namely, whether religion can be regarded as the object of scientific knowledge in the same manner as other processes of the intellectual life of the race, such as law, history, and art. It is well known that this question has not always received an affirmative answer, and indeed it can never be answered in the affirmative so long as the position is maintained that the only religion is that of the Christian Church, whose doctrines and teachings rest upon an immediate divine revelation, and that these must be accepted by men in blind belief. Under the position of an authoritative ecclesiastical faith there can indeed exist a theoretical consideration of the doctrines of faith, as it was the case with the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages, which with great earnestness sought to harmonize faith and knowledge; nevertheless, no one of the present day would give to the scholastic theology the name of science with the modern meaning of the term science. The scholastic theology used great formal acuteness and skill in the work of defining and defending ecclesiastical traditions, still there was lacking that which for us is the essential condition of scientific knowledge, the free examination of tradition according to the laws of human thought and the analogy of

the general experience of humanity. The great hindrance to the progress of the knowledge of religion was the accepted position that the truth of the ecclesiastical doctrines was beyond human reason and outside of human examination, since their truth rested upon an immediate divine revelation. Whether this supernatural authority was ascribed to the Church or the Bible makes very little difference, for in either case the assumption of such an authority is a hindrance to the free examination of that which claims to be the divine revealed truth.

But is this assumption really justifiable in the nature of the case? Do the doctrines of the Church rest upon a supernatural divine revelation? So soon as this question was really earnestly considered, and the thinking mind could not always avoid the consideration, then there was revealed the inadequacy of the assumption. Two ways of examination led to a common critical result, the philosophical analysis of the religious consciousness and the historical comparison of various religions. The first to enter upon these ways and at the same time to become the founder of the modern science of religion was the keen Scotch thinker David Hume. Truly the thought of Hume was still a one-sided, disorganizing skepticism; even as his theory of knowledge disturbed the truth of all our previous common-sense opinions and conceptions, so also his philosophy of religion sought to demonstrate that all religion cannot be proved and is full of doubt, and that the origin of religion was neither to be found in divine revelation nor in the reason of man, but in the passions of the heart and in the illusions of imagination. As unsatisfactory as this result was, nevertheless it gave an important advance to the rational study of religion in two directions, in that of religion being an experience of the inner life of the soul and in that of religion being a fact of human history.

Kant added the positive criticism of reason to the negative skepticism of Hume; that is, Kant showed that the human intellect moved independently in the formation of theoretical and practical judgments, and that the various materials of thought, desire, and feelings were regulated by the intellect according to innate original ideas of the true and good and beautiful. Thus as a natural result there came the conception that the doctrines of belief arose not as complete truths, given by divine revelation, but, like every other form of conscious knowledge, these came to us through the activity of our own mind, and that therefore these doctrines cannot be regarded as of absolute authority for all time, but that we are to seek to understand their origin in historical and psychical motives. So far as one looked at the ceremonial forms of positive religion, these motives indeed were found according to Kant in irrational conceptions, but as far as the essence of religion was concerned they were rather found to be rooted in the moral nature of man. This is the consciousness of obligation of the practical reason or of the conscience, which raises man to a faith in the moral government of the world, in immortality and God. With the reduction of religion from all external forms, doctrines, and ceremonies and the finding of the real essence of religion in the human mind and spirit, the way was opened to a knowledge of religion free from all external authority. Those philosophers who came after Kant followed essentially this course, though here and there they may separate in their opinions according to their thought of the psychological function of religion. When Kant had emphasized the close connection between religion and the moral obligation, then came Schleiermacher, who emphasized the feeling of our dependence upon the Eternal, and who sought to find the explanation of all religious thoughts and conceptions in the many relations of the feeling to religious ex-

perience. Hegel on the other hand sought the truth of religion in the thought of the absolute spirit as found in the finite spirit. Thus Hegel made religion a sort of popular philosophy.

At present all agree that all sides of the soul-life have part in religion; now one side may be the more prominent, now another, according to the peculiarity of certain religions or the individual temperaments. The philosophy of religion has, in common with scientific psychology, the question of the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will, and as yet there may be many views of this question. Altogether the philosophy of religion is looking for important solutions to many of its problems from the realm of the present scientific psychology. Experiences, such as religious conversions, appear under this point of view as ethical changes in which the aim of a personal life is changed from a carnal and selfish end to that of a spiritual and altruistic purpose. These are extraordinary and seemingly supernatural processes; nevertheless in them there can still be found a certain development of the soul-life according to law. Modern psychology especially has thrown light upon the abnormal conditions of consciousness which have so often been made manifest in the religious experience of all times. That which religious history records concerning inspiration, visions, ecstasy, and revelation, we now classify with the well-known appearances of hypnotism, the induction of conceptions and motives of the will through foreign suggestion or through self-suggestion, of the division of consciousness in different egos, and in the union of several consciousnesses into one common mediumistic fusion of thought and will. The explanation of these experiences may not yet be satisfactory, but nevertheless we do not doubt the possibility of a future explanation from the general laws controlling the life of the soul. The fact that we can through psychological

experiments produce such abnormal conditions of consciousness justifies us in taking the position, that certain psychical laws are at the foundation of these conditions which in their kind are as natural and regular in their functions as the physical laws which we observe in physical experiments. These solutions which modern psychology so far has given, and hopes still further to give, are of great importance to the philosophy of religion. They are an indorsement of the general principle which one hundred years ago had been advanced by critical speculation, namely, that in all experiences of religious life the same principles which control the human mind in all other intellectual and emotional fields shall hold sway. Nothing therefore should hinder us in scientific research from following the well-defined maxims of thought, and unreservedly applying the same methods of scientific analysis in theology as is done generally in the other sciences.

The claim of the Church to infallibility and divine inspiration of its dogmas is weakened under this view of the work of the philosophy of religion. Prophetic inspiration and ecstasy, which usually were thought to be supernatural revelations, are now declared by the present psychology to come under the category of other analogous experiences, such as the action of mental powers which, under definite conditions of individual gifts and on historical occasions, have manifested themselves in extraordinary forms of consciousness. However, these enthusiastic forms of prophetic consciousness cannot be accepted for a higher form of knowledge or even as of divine origin and as an infallible proclamation of the truth; on the contrary, these forms are to be judged as pathological appearances, which may be more harmful than beneficent for the ethical value of the prophetic intuition. At least, it has come to pass that all forms of revelation must come under the examina-

tion of a psychological analysis and of an analogical judgment. Hence their traditional nimbus of unique, supernatural, and absolute authority is for all time destroyed.

We are carried to the same result by the comparative study of the history of religions. The study shows us that the Christian Church, with its dogma of the divine inspiration of the Bible, does not stand alone; that before and after Christianity other religions made exactly the same claims for their sacred scriptures. By the pious Brahman the Veda is regarded as infallible and eternal; he believes the hymns of the old seers were not composed by the seers themselves, but were taken from an original copy in heaven. The Buddhist sees in the sayings of his sacred book "Dhammapadam" the exact inheritance of the infallible words of his omniscient teacher Buddha. For the confessor of Ahuramazda the Zendavesta contains the scriptural revelation of the good spirit unto the prophet Zarathustra; according to the rabbis the laws revealed unto Moses on Mount Sinai were even before the creation of the world the object of the observation of God; for the faithful Mohammedan the Koran is the copy of an ever-present original in heaven, the contents of which were dictated word for word to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. Whoever ponders the similar claims of all these religions for the infallibility of their sacred books, to him it becomes difficult to hold the dogma of the Christian Church concerning the inspiration and infallibility of the Bible as alone true and the similar dogmas of other religions as being false. Rather he will accept the view that in all these examples there are found the same motives of the religious mind, that here is given an expression to the same need common to all seeking for an absolute and abiding basis for their faith.

The study of the comparison of religions has discovered in religions other than that of Christianity many very strik-

ing parallels to many narratives and teachings of the Bible. It may be well to recall very briefly some of the important points. Owing to the fact that the Assyrian cuneiform writings have now been deciphered, there has been found a story of the creation which has many characteristics in common with those of the Bible. There is found a story of a flood, which in its very details can be regarded as the forerunner of the story of the flood in the Bible. There have been found Assyrian penitential psalms, which, in consciousness of guilt and in earnestness of prayer for forgiveness, can well be compared with many psalms of the Bible. Recently the Code of the Assyrian King Hammurabi, who reigned two thousand three hundred years before Christ, has been discovered. The similarity of this Code with many of the early Mosaic Laws has called general attention to this fact. In the Persian religion there are found teachings of the Kingdom of God, of the good spirits who surround the throne of God, of the Spirit hostile to God and of an army of his demons, of the judgment of each soul after death, of a heaven with eternal light and of the dark abyss of hell, of the future struggle of the multitudes of good and bad spirits and the victory over the bad through a divine hero and saviour, of the general resurrection of the dead, of the awful destruction of the world and the creation of a new and better world,—teachings which are also found in the later Jewish theology and apocalypse, so that the acceptance of a dependence of Jewish upon corresponding Persian teaching can hardly be avoided. Also Grecian influence is observed in later Jewish literature, in proverbs, in the wisdom of Solomon and the Son of Sirach; especially in the Alexandrian Jewish theology are found Platonic thoughts of an eternal, ideal world, of the heavenly home of the soul, and the Stoic conception of a world-ruling divine Logos.

It is from this source that the Logos to which Philo had already ascribed the meaning of the Son of God and the Bringer of a divine revelation crossed over into Christian theology and became the foundation of the dogma of the Church concerning the person of Christ. Of still greater importance than even all this was the opening of the Indian and especially the Buddhistic religious writings. In these we have, five hundred years before Christianity, the revelation of redemptive religion, resting upon the ethical foundation of the abnegation of self and the withdrawal from the world. In the centre of this religion is Guatama Buddha, the ideal teacher of redeeming truth, whose human life was adorned by the faith of his followers with a crown of wonderful legends; from an abode in heaven, out of mercy to the world, he descended into the world, conceived and born of a virgin mother, greeted and entertained by heavenly spirits, recognized beforehand by a pious seer as the future redeemer of the world; as a youth he manifested a wisdom beyond that of his teachers. Then after the reception of an illuminating revelation, he victoriously overcomes the temptation of the devil, who would cause him to become faithless to his call to redemption. Then he begins to preach of the coming of the Kingdom of Justice, and sends forth his disciples, two by two, as messengers of his gospel to all people. Although he declares that it is not his calling to perform miracles, nevertheless the legends indeed tell how many sick were healed, how with the contents of a small basket hundreds were fed, how possessed of all knowledge he reveals hidden things; how overcoming the limitations of space and time, swaying in the air, being transfigured in a heavenly light, he reveals himself to his disciples just before his death. And at last, in the faith of his followers, having passed from the position of a human teacher to that of an eternal heavenly spirit and lord

of the world, he is exalted as the object of prayer and reverence, to many millions of the human race in Southern and Eastern Asia.

It is hardly possible that the knowledge of this parallel from India to the New Testament, and of the Babylonian and Persian parallel to the Old Testament, can be without influence upon the religious thought of Christian people. Although we may be ever so much convinced concerning the essential superiority of our religion over all other religions, nevertheless the dogmatic contrast between absolute truth on the one side and complete falsity on the other can no more be maintained. In place of this view there must enter the view of a relative grade of differences between the higher and lower stages of development. No longer can we see in other religions only mistakes and fiction, but under the husk of their legends many precious kernels of truth must be seen, expressions of inner religious feelings and of noble ethical sentiments. One should therefore accept the position not to object to the same discrimination between husk and kernel in the matter of one's own religion, and to recognize in its inherited traditions and dogmas legendary elements, the explanation of which is to be found in psychical motives and in historical surroundings, even as they are found in the corresponding parts of religions other than the Christian religion. Therefore the historical comparison of religions takes us away from an absolute dogmatic positivism to a relative evolutionary manner of study, placing all religions without exception under the laws of time progression and under the causal connection of the law of cause and effect. The isolation of religion therefore is no more. It is regarded as being a part of other human historical affairs, and must yield to the test of a thorough unhindered research. The value of the Christian religion can never suffer in the view of a rea-

sonable man, when it is not accepted in blind faith, but as the result of discriminating comparison.

As the evolutionary philosophy of religion uses the method of science without exception in the case of all historical religions, so also it does not shrink from taking up the question of the beginning of religion, but believes that here also is found the key in the analytical, critical, and comparative method. And here is found the assistance of the comparative study of languages, ethnology, and paleontology.

The celebrated Sanscrit scholar, Max Müller, sought in the comparative study of mythology to prove the etymological relation of many of the Grecian gods and heroes with those of the mythology of India and to trace the common origin of all these mythical beings and legends in the personification of the movements of the heavenly bodies, the thunder and lightning, the tempest and the rain. All mythical belief in gods of the Indo-Germanic peoples seems to have arisen out of a poetical view and dramatic personification of the powers of nature. Suggestive as this hypothesis is, it is not by any means sufficient to give us a complete explanation of the subject. In fact, others have shown that primitive religion does not altogether consist in mythical conceptions, but mainly in reverential actions, sacrifices, sacraments, vows, and other similar cults, which have very little to do with the atmospherical powers of nature, but rather with the social life of primitive people. And when once the sight was clearly directed to the social meaning of the religious rites, it was then observed that even the earliest legends concerning the gods were connected far more closely with the habits and customs of early society than with the facts of nature. Tylor's celebrated book concerning "Primitive Civilization" is written from this standpoint, an epoch-making book, showing the original close

connection of religion with the entire civilization of humanity, with the views of life and death, the social customs, the forms of law, their strivings in art and science; a book with a large amount of information, brought together from observation on all sides. In this channel are found all the researches which to-day are classified under the name of Folk-lore; seeking to gather the still existing characteristic customs and forms, legends, stories, and sayings, in order to compose these and to discover the survivals of earliest religion, poetry, and civilization of humanity. The gain of this study pursued with so great diligence is not to be underrated. These studies show that all that, which at one time existed as faith in the spirit of humanity, possessed within its very nature the strongest power of continuance, so that in new and strange conditions and in other forms it continued to remain. Under all changes and progress of history there is still found an unbroken connection of constant development.

As important, however, as the possession of a general knowledge of historical forms of development is to the philosophy of religion, nevertheless the possession of this knowledge is not wholly a fulfillment of the purpose of the philosophy of religion. To understand a development means not merely to know how one thing follows as the result of the other, but also to understand the law which lies at the foundation of all empirical changes and at the same time controls the end of the development. If this principle holds good in the understanding of the development in the processes of nature, much more does the principle hold good in understanding the processes of intellectual development of humanity, which have for us not only a theoretical, but at the same time an eminently practical interest. The philosopher of religion sees in religious history not merely the coming together of similar forms, but an

advance from the lowest stage of childlike ignorance to an ever purer and richer realization of the idea of religion, a divinely ordained progress for the education of humanity from the slavery of nature to the freedom of the spirit. The question now arises: where do we find the principle and law of this ever-rising development? Where do we find the measure of judgment for the relative value of religious appearances? It is clear that the general principle of the complete development cannot be found in a single fact which is only one of the many manifestations of the general principle, and it is just as clear that the absolute norm of judgment is not found in a single fact always relative, presenting to us the object of judgment and therefore being impossible to stand as the norm of judgment. Therefore the principle of religious development and the form of its judgment can only be found in the inner being of the spirit of humanity, namely, in the necessary striving of the mind into an harmonious arrangement of all our conceptions, or the idea of the truth, and into the complete order of all our purposes, or the idea of the good. These ideas unite in the highest unity, in the Idea of God. Therefore the consciousness of God is the revelation of the original innate longing of reason after complete unity as a principle of universal harmony and consistence in all our thinking and willing. Hence, in the first place, arises the result that the development of the consciousness of God in the history of religion is always dependent upon the existing conditions of the two united sides, the theoretical perception of the truth and the moral standard of life. In the second place the result arises that the judgment of the value of all appearances in the history of religion depends as to whether and how far these appearances agree with the idea of the true and the good, and correspond with the demands of reason and conscience. That science which is engaged with the

idea of the good we name Ethics; that which is engaged with the last principles of the perception of truth, using the expression of Aristotle, we may name Metaphysics, or following Plato—Dialectic. Recognizing then in the idea of God the synthesis of the idea of the true and the good, the philosophy of religion is closely related with both, Ethics and Metaphysics.

At present the relation of religion to morality is an object of much controversy. There are many who hold that morality without religion is not only possible but also very desirable; since they are of the opinion that moral strength is weakened, the will is without freedom, and its motives corrupted on account of religious conceptions. On the other hand, the Church, considering the experience of history, finds that religion has ever proved itself to be the strongest and most necessary aid to morality. In this contest the philosophy of religion occupies the position of a judge who is called upon to adjust the relative rights of the parties. The philosophy of religion brings to light the historical fact that from the very beginnings of human civilization, social life and morality were closely connected with religious conceptions and usages, and indeed always so interchangeable in their influence that the position of social civilization on the one side corresponded with the position of religious civilization on the other, just as the water-level in two communicating pipes. Therefore it follows that it is unjust and not historical to blame religion on account of the defects of a national and temporal morality; for these defects of morality, with the corresponding errors of religion, find a common ground in a low stage of development of the entire civilization of the people of the time and age. Further, it becomes the task of the philosophy of religion to examine whether this correspondence of religion and morality, recognized in history, is also found in the very nature of morality

and religion. This question in the main is answered without doubt in the affirmative, for it is clear that the religious feeling of dependence upon one all-ruling power is well adapted not only to make keen the moral consciousness of obligation and to deepen the feeling of responsibility, but also to endow moral courage with power and to strengthen the hope of the solution of moral purposes. The clearer religious faith comprehends the relation of man to God, so much the more will that faith prove itself as a strong motive and a great incentive of the moral life. Such a conception will not make the moral will unfree but truly free, not in the sense of a selfish choice, but in the sense of a love that serves, knowing itself as an instrument of the divine will, who binds us all into a social organism, the kingdom of God. And, on the other hand, the more ideal the moral view of life, the higher and greater its aims, the more it recognizes its great task to care for the welfare not only of the individual but of all, to coöperate in the welfare and development of all forms of society, the more earnestly the moral mind will need a sincere faith that this is God's world, that above all the changes of time an eternal will is on the throne, whose all-wise guidance causes everything to be for the best unto those who love him.

A like middle position of arbitration falls to the philosophy of religion in the matter of the relation of religion to science. The first demand of science is freedom of thought, according to its own logical laws, and its fundamental assumption is the possibility of the knowledge of the world on the basis of the unchangeable laws of all existence and events. With this fundamental demand science places itself in opposition to the formal character of ecclesiastical doctrine so far as the doctrine claims infallible authority resting upon a divine revelation. And the fundamental assumption of the regular law of the course of the world is in

opposition to the contents of ecclesiastical doctrine concerning the miraculous interposition in the course of nature and of history. To the superficial observer there appears therefore to exist an irreconcilable conflict between science and religion. Here is the work of the philosophy of religion, to take away the appearance of an irreconcilable opposition between science and religion, in that the philosophy of religion teaches first of all to distinguish between the essence of religion and the ecclesiastical doctrines of a certain religion, and to comprehend the historical origin of these doctrines in the forms of thought of past times. To this purpose the method of psychological analysis and of historical comparison mentioned above is of service. When, then, by this critical process religion is traced to its real essence in the emotional consciousness of God, to which the dogmatic doctrines stand as secondary products and varied symbols, then it remains to show that between the essence of religion and that which science demands and presupposes, there exists not conflict but harmony. When the idea of God is recognized as the synthesis of the ideas of the true and the good, so then must all truth as sought by science, even as the highest good, which the system of ethics places as the purpose of all action—these must be recognized as the revelation of God in his eternal reason and goodness. The laws of our rational thinking then cannot be in conflict with divine revelation in history, and the laws of the natural order of the world can no more stand in conflict with the world-governing Omnipotence; but both, the laws of our thinking and those of the real world, reveal themselves as the harmonious revelations of the creative reason of God, which, according to Plato's fitting word, is the efficient ground of being as well as of knowing. It is therefore not merely a demand of religious belief that there is real truth in our God-consciousness, that there should be an activity

and revelation of God himself in the human mind; it is also in the same manner a demand of science considering its last principles, that the world, in order to be known by us as a rational, regulated order, must have for its principle an eternal creative reason. Long ago the old master of thinking, Aristotle, recognized this fact clearly, when he said that order in the world without a principle of order could be as little thinkable as the order of an army without a commanding general.

But while it is true that science, as the ground of the possibility of its knowledge of the truth, must presuppose the same general principle of intellectual knowledge which religion has as the object of its practical belief, then by principle the apprehension is excluded that any possible progress on the part of science in its knowledge of the world can ever destroy religion. We are rather the more justified in the hope that all true knowledge of science will be a help to religion, and will serve as the means of purifying religion from the dross of superstition.

Truly it can easily be shown that a divine government of the world breaking through, and now and then suspending the regular order of nature through miraculous intervention, would not be more majestic, but far more limited and human, than such a government which reveals itself as everywhere and always the same in and through its own ordained laws in the world. And again, that a revelation prescribing secret and incomprehensible doctrines and rites, demanding from humanity a blind faith, would far less be in harmony with the guiding wisdom and love of God, and far less could work for the intellectual liberty and perfection of humanity, than such a revelation which is working in and through the reason and conscience of humanity, and is realizing its purpose in the progressive development of our intellectual and moral capacities and powers. When therefore

science raises critical misgivings against the supernatural and irrational doctrines of positive religion, then the real and rightly understood interests of religion are not harmed but rather advanced; for this criticism serves religion in helping it to become free from the unintellectual inheritance of its early days, in helping religion to consider its true intellectual and moral essence, and to bring to a full display all the blessed powers which are concealed within its nature, to press through the narrow walls of an ecclesiasticism out into the full life of humanity, and to work as leaven for the ennoblement of humanity. Not in conflict with science and moral culture, but only in harmony with these, can religion come nearer to the attainment of its ideal, which consists in the worship of God in spirit and in truth. Even though they may not be conscious of their purpose, but nevertheless in fact all honest work of science and all the endeavors of social and ethical humanity have part in the attainment of this ideal.

It is the work of the philosophy of religion to make clear that all work of the thinking and striving spirit of humanity, in its deepest meaning, is a work in the kingdom of God, as service to God, who is truth and goodness. It is the work of the philosophy of religion to explain various misunderstandings, to bring together opposing sides, and so to prepare the way for a more harmonious coöperation of all, and for an always hopeful progress of all on the road to the high aims of a humanity fraternally united in the divine spirit.

THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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THE encyclopedic scheme of this Congress assigns to the History of Religions its proper place as one of the great departments of historical science. My task is to trace the progress of this branch of learning in the nineteenth century. The Philosophy of Religion belongs to another division of the Congress; the Problems and Methods of the History of Religions are to be discussed at this session by Professor Schmidt; while the history of research in the chief religions of the world individually, and the present state of investigation in each, will engage the several sections of this Department. The nature and scope of the present paper are thus defined; it is to sketch in outline the development within the last century of the general history of religions, avoiding as far as possible trenching upon the fields of other speakers.¹

The history of religions was not, either in name or in fact, a new study in the nineteenth century. The revival

¹ See Hardy, E., *Zur Geschichte der vergleichenden Religionsforschung*, in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, iv, 45-66, 97-135, 193-228; Jastrow, M., Jr., *The Study of Religion*, 1901, c. 1. To the classified bibliography appended to the latter work (pp. 401-415) the reader is referred for a fuller survey of the literature than can be given in this paper.

of learning brought to the knowledge of scholars the religions of the Greeks and Romans, and what Greek and Latin writers had to tell of the religions of other ancient peoples—Egypt, the Semitic East, Persia, and India. The study of the Bible, to which the Reformation gave a new impulse, opened the sources of the history of Judaism and Christianity. Travelers and discoverers from the beginning of the fourteenth century brought back accounts, often marvelous enough, of the religions of remoter Asia, and, from the new continent beyond the sea, of the civilized peoples of Mexico and Peru as well as of the savage tribes. Soon missionaries, both in the Old World and in the New, from more intimate acquaintance, began to give more authentic information about the beliefs and customs of many races. A keen interest was thus aroused in the religions of the world, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many comprehensive works upon the subject were written, some of them on a large scale. Most of these are descriptive rather than properly historical, but the name “History of Religions,” implying at least an apprehension of the true nature of the task, became common toward the end of the eighteenth century.¹

The question of the origin of the heathen religions was also discussed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the prevailing opinion being that the worship of the heavenly bodies was the earliest form of “idolatry”—a theory which had been inherited from the last ages of classical paganism itself. Voltaire touched with a keen observation the improbability of this theory; both he and Fonte-

¹ Among the earliest comprehensive attempts was Alexander Ross, *Πανθεσμία, or View of all the Religions of the World . . . from the Creation to these Times*, London, 1652. This work had an extraordinary success; a second edition appeared in 1655, a third in 1658; and within ten years it had been translated into Dutch, German, and French. Of the works of the eighteenth century it may suffice to name here the large and splendidly illustrated *Cérémonies et Coutumes Religieuses de tous les Peuples du Monde*, Amsterdam, 1723-37, 7 vols. fol., afterwards enlarged to 10; sumptuously reprinted, Paris, 1807-10, in 11 vols. The engravings are by Bernard Picart, the (anonymous) text by J. F. Bernard and others.

nelle made some sensible and strikingly modern remarks on the subject, which passed unheeded. Dupuis's *Origines de Tous les Cultes*, which we may take as marking the close of this period, is a learned and thoroughgoing attempt to trace all religions and mythologies, including Judaism and Christianity, to one source, Egyptian sun-worship.¹

The astral theory of religion was not, however, in undisputed possession of the field at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its ancient rival, Euhemerism, still had its adherents,² and a new and formidable competitor had appeared. De Brosses, in his *Culte des Dieux Fétiches*,³ turned from interpretations of poetical mythology to the investigation of the religions of living races in a state of savagery, and showed how irrational phenomena in higher religions, such as the worship of living animals in ancient Egypt, might be explained by the beliefs and customs of modern African tribes. Upon the lowest plane of culture men worship, not the heavenly bodies, but chance stocks and stones, rocks of strange shape or color, trees, animals, all of which De Brosses comprised under the term "fetish," originally applied by the Portuguese to the rude artificial objects possessing magical properties, half amulet, half idol, which play a large part in the religion of the West African negroes. Still farther extended to the worship of material objects in general, sometimes including even the heavenly bodies, "fetishism" became a formula in which many writers of the last century thought that the origin of religion had been found.

¹ Dupuis, C. F., *Origines de Tous les Cultes, ou Religion Universelle*, Paris, 1794, 3 vols. 4°, with a supplementary volume of plates; also in 10 vols. 8°.

² The most important work of this school in the eighteenth century was that of Banier, A., *La Mythologie et les Fables expliquées par l'Histoire*, Paris, 1738-40, 3 vols. 4°; 2d ed. Paris, 1748, 8 vols. 8°; English translation, *The Mythology and Fables of the Ancients explained from History*, London, 1739-40, 4 vols. 8°.

³ De Brosses, C. F., *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches, ou Parallèle de l'Ancienne Religion de l'Égypte avec la Religion Actuelle de Nigritie*, 1760, 12°.

The position of the history of religions in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century is best represented by Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker*.¹ The successive editions of this work, the French translation and adaptation by Guigniaut,² and the writings of Creuzer's disciples—among whom F. C. Baur is numbered³—may be said to record the history of the subject through the first half of the century. The discredit into which Creuzer's theory of "symbolism" has fallen, in consequence partly of the contemporary criticism of Lobeck⁴ and others, partly of the general progress of the study, should not lead us to ignore the fact that his volumes furnished a useful and comprehensive collection of what was then known about the principal religions of the world; while of the theory itself it has been justly said that it had at least the merit of recognizing that mythology is a produce of religion, not merely a play of poetic fancy.

Reviewing from our own point of view these earlier essays, we can see that the treatment of the history of religions suffered, like all other branches of historical research, from the striking lack of the historic sense which characterized the age of "Aufklärung," and from the alternative attitude of credulity or skepticism toward the sources which could be overcome only by the establishment of the principles of historical criticism; while peculiar hindrances existed in religious prepossessions. So long as Christian

¹ Creuzer, Fr., *Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker*, 1810-12; 2d ed. 1819-23, 6 vols. with Atlas; 3d ed. 1837-42, 4 vols.

² Guigniaut, J. D., *Les Religions de l'Antiquité*, Paris, 1825-41, 10 vols, 8°.

³ Baur, F. C., *Symbolik und Mythologie oder die Naturreligion des Alterthums*, 1824-25, 3 vols.

Of the numerous other works of the first half of the nineteenth century may be named, Melners, C., *Allgemeine kritische Geschichte der Religionen*, 1806-07, 2 vols; Constant, B., *De la Religion considérée dans sa Source, ses Formes, et ses Développement*, 1824-34, 5 vols.; Schwenck, Konrad, *Mythologie der Griechen, Römer, Aegypter, Semiten, Perser, Germanen und Slaven*, 2d ed. 1855, 7 vols. (1st ed. under a somewhat different title, 1843-53); Eckermann, K., *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte und Mythologie*, 1845-1848, 4 vols.

⁴ Lobeck, Chr. A., *Aglaophamus, sive de theologiae mysticae Graecorum causis*, 1829.

writers regarded all the religions of the world except Judaism and Christianity as sinful aberrations from a primitive revelation, and freethinkers conceived of all existing religions, including Christianity, as corruptions, under the hand of self-seeking priests, of a pure "natural religion," no true understanding of the phenomena was possible. The way to progress was opened by a sounder conception of the nature of history in general, and of the history of religion in particular, which we associate with the names of Lessing and Herder. That the history of religion is the record of a development whose law is, first that which is natural, then that which is spiritual, is an idea so familiar to us that it is hard to realize that little more than a century ago it was novel and revolutionary.

The acceptance of a true conception of history and the achievement of a sound historical method would, however, of themselves have availed little, apart from the vastly enlarged knowledge of religions, both ancient and living, which has been gained in the last hundred years.¹ At the beginning of the century the religions of Greece and Rome, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam were the only religions which were known through native sources or their own sacred books, unless we make a partial exception of Chinese texts translated by Jesuit missionaries. For Egypt and Babylonia, India and Persia, the chief or only sources of information were the fragmentary and often conflicting reports in Greek and Latin authors. Since then the religious literature of India, surpassing all others in extent and variety, and covering a period of three thousand years, has been brought to light. The Avesta, whose chief books were brought to Europe in the eighteenth century, has been made intelligible by the labors of three generations

¹ On the history of these discoveries, see Hardy, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, IV, 97 ff.

of scholars, and many later Zoroastrian writings recovered. The Chinese classics and the sacred books of Taoism have been repeatedly interpreted in the light both of native comment and of Western philology. The decipherment of the Egyptian hieroglyphic writing in the early nineteenth century was followed by continuous excavation and discovery, the latest stages of which have extended the historical horizon over distant centuries, and promise to make the civilization and religion of the Old Empire almost as well known as that of the New. In Assyria and Babylonia civilizations not less ancient than that of Egypt have been brought to light; and there also religious monuments and texts of the most diverse kinds, representing perhaps four millenniums, are accumulated with a rapidity that outruns the utmost activity of decipherers and students.

In the classical field the discovery and methodical use of remains and monumental sources has done much to enlarge and correct the notions formed from the literature alone. By this means only it has proved possible to reconstruct, at least in broken outlines, the genuine Roman religion, as distinct from the late syncretism which is represented by all the literary sources. Recent excavations, again, have revealed the antiquity of a high Hellenic or Proto-Hellenic civilization in the eastern Mediterranean basin, and of an active intercourse with Egypt and the East; while the "Mycenaean" tombs and the palaces and caves of Crete disclose something at least of the religion of that remote age. The discovery or evaluation of a multitude of documents of inferior religious authority, but often of the highest historical importance, and above all the critical study of the canonical sources themselves and the comparison of other religions, have led to conceptions of the history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, differing often radically from those which prevailed only a gen-

eration ago. Thus on all sides the authentic knowledge of the chief historical religions of the world has been immeasurably enlarged by the discoveries and investigations of the nineteenth century.

Sacred books and other literary sources are, however, not the only witnesses to ancient religions.¹ The collection of German "Mährchen" made by the brothers Grimm, proved to contain Teutonic myths, depotentiated and disguised; and comparison with Norse, Greek, and later with Vedic mythology, suggested that in Germanic folk-lore were remains of a common Indo-Germanic tradition.² The investigation, by Mannhardt and others, of popular customs, especially peasant customs, and beliefs connected with agriculture and vegetation, showed that here also, in what the prevalence of Christianity had reduced to the rank of superstitions, were survivals of the religions which Christianity supplanted.³ The study of folk-lore and the "lower mythology," and of popular custom and superstition, which has been so diligently prosecuted in the last half-century, opens to the student of the history of religions sources which often supplement or interpret in a most welcome manner his literary material. For the great mass of peoples and religions which have never created a sacred literature the student is wholly dependent on this stream of living tradition and practice. Anthropology, which Waitz raised to the rank of a science,⁴ gives to religion a place corresponding to its pervasive significance in savage and semi-civilized societies, and thus becomes one of the most important auxiliaries of the history of religions. It has

¹ See on the following, Mannhardt, W., *Wald und Feldkulte*, 1875-77, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. I-xi.

² Grimm, J. u. W., *Kinder-und-Hausmärchen*, 1812-15; 2d ed. 1819-22, 3 vols. See especially, Grimm, J., *Deutsche Mythologie*, 1835; 2d ed. 1844; 3d ed. 1854; 4 ed. besorgt von E. H. Meyer, 1875 sqq.

³ See Mannhardt, cited above, n. 9.

⁴ Waitz, Th., *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, 1859 sqq. (continued by G. Gerland); see also Bastian, A., *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, 1860, 3 vols., and in numerous other works.

established the universality of religion, and shown, beneath all differences, a large measure of agreement in the religions of peoples of the most diverse races upon the same plane of culture and with similar social organization. The study of the agreements and the differences shows the common characteristics of the savage mind, the influences of history and environment, and peculiarities that seem to be racial. The subject presents to the student of social psychology some of his most interesting problems.

Between the religions of the lowest peoples and those which have reached the highest level in intelligence and spirituality there is an unbroken connection; not only do survivals and superstitions persist in the most advanced religions, but the germs of their loftiest conceptions may sometimes be recognized in barbarous surroundings. The field, wide as it is, is one; the history of religions points onward to a history of religion.

The immediate task of the scholars of the nineteenth century in their several fields was the mastering of these vast acquisitions of material—the establishment of trustworthy texts, the creation of philological apparatus, the interpretation and criticism of the literature; the restoration and decipherment of inscriptions; the verifying and sifting of the reports of travelers and discoverers; the comparison, classification, and interpretation of phenomena. Great things have been accomplished in all these directions by philologists, archæologists, and ethnologists; upon the foundations thus laid future generations will securely build. If the division of labor sometimes narrowed the horizon, it at least conduced to thoroughness in a limited field. The relations of some languages and literatures to one another were, however, such as not only to invite but to demand comparative treatment. The older Avestan scriptures, for example, could be rightly understood only when the light

of comparative philology was added to the native tradition; and the common background of the Indian and Iranian religions seemed to require the application of the same method. Names and myths appeared, again, to connect the gods of the Vedic hymns with those of Greece, and more remotely with other branches of the Indo-Germanic family. The philologists who attempted by comparison of the common stock of words or roots to construct a picture of primitive Indo-Germanic culture could not exclude from their consideration the language of religion.

It was, in fact, from Vedic studies that the initiative came, which in the second half of the nineteenth century gave a new impulse to the study of the history of religions; and Professor F. Max Müller, if not the originator of the "Comparative Science of Religion," will always have the merit, not only of contributing largely to its progress, but of having created an interest in the subject, and secured a support for it without which some of its most notable achievements would not have been possible.¹ It is easy now to see the fundamental defects of Müller's method and the erroneousness of many of the conclusions which, with little modification, he maintained to the end of his life. The hymns of the Rig-Veda are almost as far as the Homeric epics from being the product of a simple society, or the "childlike speech" of primitive religion; the equation of Indian and Greek gods and myths is often effected by dubious etymologies or partial and inconclusive coincidences. The identification of the gods with natural objects, and the meteoric interpretation of the myths is as-

¹ See Kuhn, A., *Hermes-Sarameyas*, *Zeitschrift f. das Alterthum*, vi, 1848, 117-134; *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks*, 1859; Schwartz, W., *Ursprung der Mythologie*, 1860; *Sonne, Mond und Sterne*, 1864; Müller, Fr. Max, *Comparative Mythology* (Oxford Essays), 1856; *Chips from a German Workshop*, 1867, 2 vols.; *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, 1872; *The Origin and Growth of Religion, illustrated by the Religion of India* (Hibbert Lectures), 1878; *Natural Religion*, 1889. *Physical Religion*, 1891, *Anthropological Religion*, 1892, *Theosophy, or Psychological Religion*, 1893 (Gifford Lectures); *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, 1897, 2 vols.

sumed—following the classical mythologists of the time—rather than established; the insecurity of the results being manifest from the possibility of the rival “nubilar” or “crepuscular” theories. The most radical fault of the system, however, was the arbitrary limitation of the material. In particular, the isolation of hymns and myths from the ritual was a fruitful cause of misunderstanding; and the assumption that the darker side of Indian religion, as represented in the Atharva-Veda or parts of the Brahmanas, is wholly a late declension from the pure Vedic faith, led to its virtual exclusion from consideration; the same assumption was made concerning the darker features of Greek religion in contrast to the aspect presented in the Homeric poems.

At this point, therefore, Müller’s method and results were assailed by the critics of the anthropological school, among whom Andrew Lang wielded the most trenchant pen.¹ What demands explanation in the myths is the irrational and immoral element. This is not to be explained away by allegorical interpretation, in ancient or modern fashion; it is not accounted for by the theory of “disease of language,” which makes of it misunderstood poetry or metaphor. The savage features of ancient mythology are the natural product of a savage state of society, and survived in civilization under the conservative influence of religious tradition. The proof of this is the mythology of modern savages, in which corresponding phenomena are observed among the most widely separated and diverse races. Moreover, mythology is not the only or even the most important witness to religious beliefs. Custom, ceremony, ritual—the things which the gods expect of men and

¹ Lang, Andrew, *Custom and Myth*, 1884; *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, 1887, 2 vols.; 1899, 2 vols.; *Modern Mythology*, 1897; *The Making of Religion*, 1898, 2d ed. 1900; *Magic and Religion*, 1901. The last two volumes against some positions of the anthropological school.

which the worshipers do in the service of the gods, not tales about the gods, of whatever origin—constitute the real substance of religion, and embody its fundamental ideas. Many myths are not poetical reflections of natural phenomena, but efforts to account for the existence of strange rites and customs or to explain their meaning.

It is the task of the modern student, not merely to collect from the writings of travelers, missionaries, and political agents the facts concerning the religious practices and beliefs of rude peoples, and to record and classify them, but to account for their origin and persistence, and for the transformations they undergo in the development of civilization. This was the problem to which Tylor addressed himself, particularly in his *Primitive Culture*.¹ Man's earliest known explanation of the phenomena and forces of nature is "animation"; not only what we call living things, but what are for us inanimate objects, are by primitive man endowed with a life like his own, a soul with passions and will. There are also spirits that are not confined in particular objects, but roam freely, manifesting themselves sometimes in one way or place, sometimes in another. These spirits are in part the souls of dead men, neglected or hostile, which it is necessary to placate or to avert. This primitive "animism" is the earliest science and philosophy; though not itself religion, it shapes the religious conceptions of savages everywhere, and maintains itself with extraordinary tenacity in advancing culture. Fetishism, stock- and stone-worship, idolatry, as well as ancestor-worship, Shamanism, and magic, have their roots in it. With a one-sidedness which Tylor carefully avoids, Herbert Spencer, Lippert, and others derive all religion from

¹ Tylor, E. B., *Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilization*, 1865; *Primitive Culture*, 1871, 2 vols. 3d ed. 1891; Lubbock, J., *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, 1870, 6th ed. 1902; *Prehistoric Times*, 1865, 6th ed. 1900.

offerings to friendly ghosts or rites designed to thwart the malice of unfriendly ones;¹ Spencer's theory being in effect, as he himself recognizes, a revival, in an apparently scientific form, of ancient Euhemerism.

Anthropological studies have not only thrown light upon the operation of the savage mind and on the influence of its theory of man and nature upon religious conceptions, but have shown how the development of religious ideas has been affected by the social organization. The phenomena to which the name "totemism" has been given, for example, are generally associated with a peculiar clan constitution, in which descent is regularly reckoned in the female line. Traces of this form of social organization have been discovered among peoples which have long since got beyond it; and it has been inferred, on insufficient grounds, that all races have passed through it. But while this generalization may not stand, the studies of McLennan, W. Robertson Smith, Frazer, and Jevons² have unquestionably shed light on many hitherto obscure problems in the history of religion. The recognition of the intimate connection between the social and political organization and religion has, however, a much larger significance, which remains to be fully evaluated. Closely related to this are the economic factors, which have influenced the development of religion both indirectly, through the social organization—the conditions, for example, which make the horde rather than the tribe the unit—and directly, by determining occupation, constraining to migrations, and the like. This side of the subject has only recently begun to receive the consideration it deserves, especially at the hands of French scholars,

¹ Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Sociology*, ch. 8-16; Lippert, Julius, *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit*, 1866-67, 2 vols.

² McLennan, J. F., *Fortnightly Review*, Oct. and Nov., 1869; Feb., 1870; Fraser, J. G., *Totemism*, 1887; *The Golden Bough*, 2 vols. 2d ed. 1900; Smith, W. R., *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, 1885, 2d ed. 1903; *The Religion of the Semites*, 1889, 2d ed. 1894; Jevons, F. B., *Introduction to the History of Religion*, 1896.

Tarde, Durkheim, and others. The general trend of modern investigation has thus been to bring out the complexity of the problem, the multiplicity of the factors whose interaction has determined the development of religions.

In the discussions of the last century the question of the origin of religion has had a prominent place. In one sense, Why is man so universally and obstinately religious? the question belongs to the philosophy of religion; the history of religions can give no answer, though it can put the theories of philosophers to the critical test by comparison with the facts. But in the other sense in which the question is often taken, What was the primitive form of religion? the historian must again confess his inability to answer. There was a time, not so long ago, when the Homeric poems or the hymns of the Rig-Veda were imagined to be witnesses to primitive Indo-European religion. The anthropologist makes a similar mistake when he imagines that the religions of the lowest modern savages may be regarded as survivals of primitive religion. The Australian black or the Andaman islander is separated by as many generations from the beginning of religion as his most advanced contemporaries; and in these tens or hundreds of thousands of years there has been constant change, growth and decay—and decay is not a simple return to the primal state. We can learn a great deal from the lowest existing religions; but they cannot tell us what the beginning of religion was, any more than the history of language can tell us what was the first form of human speech. In like manner, attempts to define the stages of religious development, as, for example, in Comte's scheme, Fetishism, Polytheism, Monotheism, with a prophecy of Positivism, have very little value even as a scheme of classification.

Reviewing the progress of the last half-century, we see that the field of investigation has been widened so that it now includes all known religions, ancient and modern, from the lowest to the highest, and that all the sources and the special sciences which throw light upon man and society are made tributary to the history of religion. Psychology, individual and social, anthropology and ethnology, archæology, social, political, and economic history, as well as literature, are consulted, for it is recognized that nothing which affects man's life, inner or outer, is devoid of influence on his religion. It has also become clearer, in the course of investigation and discussion, that the study of religions is a purely historical discipline, to be pursued by strict historical methods. By confining itself to its proper task it will lay the securer foundations for a philosophy of religion. For this reason objection may properly be made to the name "Science of Religion," introduced by Max Müller, and adopted by many, for example, by Tiele in his Gifford Lectures. The term "science," by its correspondence to "Science of Language," suggests, to the English reader at least (and was, I think, intended to suggest), a method and a goal different from those which we regard as properly historical; a search for principles and laws such as belong to the natural sciences and to certain philosophical conceptions of history, Hegelian or Positivist. The influence of this idea may be seen in the attempted classifications of religions, whether Müller's own (artificial) linguistic classification, or Tiele's "morphological," and in intent genetic, system. Asserting the scientific character of all rightly conducted historical investigation, we have no reason to emphasize it specially in the case of the history of religions, and do better to disuse a term which is either a truism or an error.

It remains to speak briefly of the place which the history

of religions has made for itself in the world of learning.¹ The consciousness that a new and important field of knowledge had been opened by the discoveries of religious literatures and monuments in the nineteenth century manifested itself in various ways. In Holland a series of volumes, in the sixties, on the leading religions of the world, including Judaism and Christianity, from a purely historical point of view, was followed, in the reorganization of the theological faculties of the state universities in 1877, by the establishment of chairs of the history and philosophy of religion, of which that at Leiden was filled by Tiele;² while a corresponding chair in the city University of Amsterdam was occupied by Chantepie de la Saussaye.³ In France a professorship of the history of religions in the Collège de France was founded in 1879, and has been filled since that time by Albert Réville;⁴ and in 1886 a section of the religious sciences was formed in the École des Hautes Études en Sorbonne. The progress of these studies in France was also much furthered by the establishment of the Musée Guimet (1879; since 1888 in Paris), with its collections and library and its liberal subvention of publications, including the first periodical devoted to the subject, the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* (since 1880). In England a long series of Hibbert Lectures, and more recently several of the Gifford Lectures, have contributed to the spread of knowledge and the quickening of interest; while the *Sacred Books of the East* have made accessible,

¹ See on the following, A. Réville, "La Situation Actuelle de l'Enseignement de l'Histoire des Religions," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, XLIII, 1901, 58 ff.

² Tiele, C. P., *Geschiednis van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid tot op Alexander den Grooten*, 1893, 1902, 2 vols.; German translation by G. Gehrich, *Geschichte der Religion im Alterthum*, 1895 sqq.; *Elements of the Science of Religion*, 1897, 1899, 2 vols. (Gifford Lectures).

³ Chantepie de la Saussaye, P. D., *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 1887-89, 2 vols. 2d ed. (with the coopération of a number of scholars), 1897, 2 vols.

⁴ Réville, Albert, *Prolegomènes de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1881 (English translation by A. S. Squire, 1884); *Les Religions des Peuples Non-Civilisés*, 1883, 2 vols.; *Les Religions du Mexique, de l'Amérique Centrale et du Pérou*, 1885; *La Religion Chinoise*, 1889.

in translations by eminent scholars, a large part of the religious literature of the world. In Germany the subject has been slow in finding recognition in university programmes of study, though Roth lectured on it at Tübingen from the fifties to his death, and though German scholars have made many of the most valuable contributions to the study. The *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (since 1898; new series 1904) gives a much-needed organ for the publication of investigation and discussion.¹ In America lectures on the history of religions were given in Harvard University in 1854-55, and regularly since 1867; and in more recent years at many other places, among which may be named Boston University, Cornell, Chicago, Yale, and in some of the independent theological schools, as at Andover. Finally, mention must be made of the Parliament of Religions at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, whose published proceedings fill two volumes; of the International Congress for the History of Religions in Paris in 1900, and of that which has held its sessions within a few weeks in Basel (August-September, 1904).

On every hand we see a recognition of the importance of the subject and a growing interest in the study. The nineteenth century accomplished much; it is for the scholars of the twentieth century, in all lands, heirs of the labors of their predecessors, encouraged by their success, admonished by their mistakes, to accomplish yet greater things.

¹ Other periodicals which should be mentioned are *Revue des Religions*, 1889 sqq., and *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses*, 1896 sqq.

THE RELATIONS OF THE RELIGIONS OF ANCIENT INDIA TO THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION.

BY HERMANN OLDENBERG

(Translated from the German by Prof. E. W. Bagster-Collins, Columbia University)

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I

IN this paper I shall attempt to answer for my own theme those questions which this Congress puts to the representatives of every science. What relation does the investigation of the religions of ancient India bear to other allied branches of research and to the science of religion as a whole?

Before, however, tracing the lines of connection that carry us beyond the boundaries of our own province, I dare not, self-evident as this may seem, fail to mention the fact that a large part of our scientific labor has to be carried on within its own domain, so to speak, for itself alone. Like all historians, we investigate individual forms that are never again identically repeated. At the most they are only similar. Our first desire is, then, not to compare these forms with others, nor to subordinate them to general formulas. We wish, rather, to grasp their meaning truly and fully as if they were independent. Everywhere in the

study of history there is to-day a mighty force that impels the student to search for the incommensurable, the elemental in the lives of nations as well as of individuals. And perhaps in few fields of historical investigation is this feature naturally so strongly accentuated as in our own. The people of ancient India occupy a unique position among the peoples of antiquity; the Indian spirit goes on willfully and obstinately its own strange ways. Is it wonderful, then, that there is among Indian scholars a widespread desire not to introduce non-Indian elements in any consideration of Indian life and thought? "India for the Indians!" Indeed, we should never really accustom ourselves to the peculiar modes of Indian thought, our sympathy for the Indian soul would always lack depth, if we did not understand how to keep aloof all foreign issues. And how is the historian to set aside this feeling of sympathy? Let him remember the words of Faust, "my own self to them extend." Let him live in his imagination the glowing fantasies of the Indian religion, long for the peace of Nirvana with the longing of Buddhism. Let him experience the tragedy of the conflict of the two souls in the breast of the Indian people, the one Aryan and noble, the other humble and wild. And if all this seems to take place far away from our own world, just for this reason our growing familiarity with regions so distant may come to have a peculiar charm.

Are all demands that we make of our work met in this manner? Certainly not. We have restricted the field of vision more than the nature of the case really justifies. We do not regret it; it has been an advantage. Now, however, something else remains to be done. In the attempt to study deeply any one individual thing, we must not forget that it is but one part of an all-embracing whole. It is a part that has developed into very independent directions. It still remains, however, a part of the whole. In order

to understand it as such, there is need of the comparative, systematic, and far-seeing kind of research that finds lines of connection everywhere. To what extent can such work be mastered by one and the same scholar, who has become absorbed in the limited field? Must there be a division of labor? This is a personal question that concerns scientists more than the science itself. Science merely commands that, no matter by what hands, both kinds of work shall be done.

II

Gates leading abroad are not wanting, you see, in the boundary walls of our province. In order to discover the roads leading out from them, however, we must first of all call to mind the dominating event in the history of ancient India that prescribes the directions that many of these roads shall take; namely, the migration of the Aryans to India. These races, related as their language shows, to the great European peoples, indeed forming in the distant past one people with them, came in their long wanderings from the northwest. For a long time they sat at the gates of India, in Iran. A part of them remained there,—the ancestors of the Iranians that later assembled about Zoroaster, Cyrus, and Darius. Others crossed the mountains and wrested northern India from the darkskinned aborigines.

These facts are well known. We have to gather from them, however, for the questions with which we are concerned, first and foremost the fact that the religious beliefs brought by these wanderers into India must have left such a prehistoric impress as to direct the Indologist's attention beyond India, and as to induce the investigator of non-Indian religions to include Indian conditions in his researches.

The comparative philologist, aided by eminent Sanskrit

scholars, has undertaken the task of reconstructing the long since lost language of the parent-stock of the Indians, Iranians, Greeks, Italians, Celts, Germans, Slavs—in a word, of the Indo-Europeans. Do the religion and mythology of India and the corresponding European forms lend themselves to similar comparisons? Taking India for instance as a starting-point, can we learn the nature of the religion of the Indo-European period, and, if we again go back from the standpoint thus gained, can we discover the origin of the old Indian and European religions? It is undoubtedly justifiable in principle to ask such questions. Yet when we speak of such investigations it usually means nothing more than looking back upon illusions that are and had to be things of the past. This is, at least, my own firm conviction, and it is also shared by many others.

The time is past when the Vedic scholar was also the comparative mythologist. Religious ideas are naturally subjected to many more indeterminable transformations than languages. The process of change from the Vedic gods to Apollo or Mars cannot be so clearly pictured as the changes, say, from the Indian to the Greek and Latin sibilants or optative forms. Even that objective certainty based upon ancient monuments that is shared by many other branches of comparative research dealing with antiquity is wanting. Moreover, the unfavorable aspect of the whole problem is bound up with the question as to the position of the Indo-European mother country. At one time this was thought to be in Central Asia: the Indians did not seem to be very far distant; they could in many respects be regarded almost as the representatives of the Indo-Europeans themselves. But we have come to see that that earliest home was very probably situated in Europe. What distances between that home and Vedic India, what contact of the wanderers with strange peoples of different origin,

what unavoidable, and for us, incalculable race-mixture, what changes in economic and social conditions! Middle and North-European, Germanic and Lithuanian data would, we must now assume, teach us more and surer facts than the Veda, provided we possessed similar data of approximately as great antiquity. Nevertheless the comparisons that have been drawn between India and Europe have not been quite without success. We may even to-day regard it as certain as well as important that the comparison of the old Indian word *deva*, "god," with the corresponding words of the Occident, and the relationship of this word with *dyaus* (=Zeus), "the sky," gives us the right to attribute to the Indo-Europeans the conception of gods as bright beings, living in the high heavens. On the other hand, most of the attempted comparisons of individual gods, demons, and myths are uncertain, even if not actually false. Do similarities of sound in names and faint similarities between forms really point to each other from such a distance? Or do mere chance resemblances deceive us? They furnish results that one may believe, if one wills, but no proof compels one to believe them. They are results that one will dare least of all make the basis for further investigation. How different the comparisons seem to us to-day that are confined to the religions of the ancient Indians and the neighboring closely related Aryans, the Iranian Zoroastrians, as against the rash combinations that would teach us to interpret, in the light of the Veda, the whole series of European forms from the Olympus of Homer to German folk-lore and children's games! The distances in time, space, and race-mixture necessary to be bridged over were just as great in the latter case as they are insignificant in the former. Proportionately better success must necessarily attend the less pretentious undertaking.

Indeed, I dare assert that it has become possible, by the happy alliance between Indian and Iranian investigation of religions, to reconstruct many of the principal features of the belief peculiar to the ancestors of both peoples in their prehistoric relationship. The chief rôle falls naturally here to Indian investigation. For the common basis of their belief is more distinctly evident in Indian traditions.

The migration of the Indian Aryans to their new land, the beginnings of new race-formations that were gradually to transform the Aryan belief here most deeply, only just began to be felt even in the Vedic period. The stronger creative forces left their impress at first upon the Zoroastrian religion,—the thought and will of a great personality. Yet enough of the old still remains also on this side to assure the Vedic scholar, in coöperation with Iranian scholars, of many a valuable result for his own purposes. Above all, he may rejoice in the fact that he is able to make an important contribution here to the knowledge of a non-Indian religion. He teaches the investigator of the Avesta the background of the old belief, from which the teaching of Zoroaster stands out in bold relief.

III

We can sum up the investigations thus far mentioned by saying that students of ancient, related religions endeavor by their comparisons to extend the knowledge of direct tradition backwards into prehistoric periods. It is of course quite evident that a much brighter light falls upon fields that lie nearer historic times than upon the more remote past. It may accordingly appear for a moment paradoxical to speak of pressing back still farther, and to assert that the certainty of our undertaking not only does not any longer diminish; on the contrary it begins to increase. The certainty increases because we are dealing

with those prehistoric periods when the play of racial individualities has not yet become unfathomable, but a kind of law with which we can reckon, which everywhere produces like forms.

I am now speaking of scientific movements that are still in their infancy. I am well aware that many an investigator of great authority does not share my conclusions. I can only voice my own conviction; the future must decide whether it be right or not.

The young science of ethnology carries us back to primitive forms of religions, far beyond Indo-European conditions. From it we learn, as you know, that certain rudest types of religious conceptions and practices are found everywhere among peoples of the same low level of civilization in apparently wonderful though undoubted agreement. Religious research here assumes somewhat the attitude of the natural science. What it reports does not differ much from a chapter taken from the life of animals. A further inference has been drawn from the above-mentioned agreement. It is not less widely known that these very same primitive forms must have been the basis, likewise, of all higher forms of religion in the distant past. Hence the investigation of Indian religions is clearly placed in new and very far-reaching relations. If it formerly carried on a coasting-trade, so to speak, it must now venture out upon the high seas. It ventures to make comparisons that are no longer restricted to the Indo-European field. It throws aside for a time the tools of comparative grammar, the time-honored technique of philology, and leaps over boundary lines usually set for the routine work of the science. In order to discover the greatest antiquity, it studies the present. It accompanies the journeys of the traveler among the Red Indians, Kaffirs, Australians, and those less pretentious travels of discovery among those

classes of our own people, where so many primitive modes of thought are found even to-day. It then searches in its own field for the primitive religious forms that it found there. We find the same impulse here as everywhere in historical science, and also in art,—to put new life into the old material and the old problems, by letting the light of present day illumine the world of books and traditions. We are not the first in this field of research. I call to mind the much lamented names of two masters: Erwin Rohde studied Greek religious beliefs, Robertson Smith the religious cult of the Semites. Our science has also begun this bold though possible task, and we may even now say that results have been attained; and also, of course, an outlook upon new problems that formerly were not raised, could not be raised. For, if anywhere, the words,

To riddle after riddle we the answers read,
find the inevitable reply,

To riddles new each time the answers lead.

The elements of the religion of ancient India that have been brought into the right perspective with the aid of ethnology, usually differ, as one might expect, from those with which the comparative studies of Indo-Germanic scholars dealt. There is little here about gods and heroes, of rich poetic myths. We are dealing with the low, the crude, and the uncouth; with kobolds and demons, with the worship of the dead, with fetishism and magic, with the grotesque, which, when we learn to understand it, ceases to be grotesque. As we find such universal human forms again in the Veda, some of the barriers that seemed to isolate this from the outer world fall down. The student of the Veda, having taken up the relations I have attempted to describe, learns how a prehistoric form fuses with higher religious forms, envelops itself in them, transforms itself into them and broadens itself out into them.

He learns to see in the priest, the medicine-man, in many a sacrifice, in some old incantation for rain, in the pious symbolism of burial customs, the pale terror of the savage at the treacherous, avaricious soul of the dead. He resolves conceptions and customs occurring side by side in the texts into a sequence of the old and the new, the beginnings of which lie perhaps thousands of years apart. It is as if we were walking through a city and gradually discovered, behind the at first apparently uniform exterior, the mighty remains of a distant past, the late additions merely adhering to the old. If in order to shed light upon these relations, our investigations can by chance make use of materials that lie infinitely removed in space and time from our own field of research, who would blame us for rejoicing at the bold indirectness of such an attempt? The Indologist can here no longer claim for himself, as formerly, in comparative mythology the leading part. It is not for him to teach the ethnologist, but to learn from him, concerning the appearance and significance of the lower mythological and religious forms. Undoubtedly he contributes his share to the huge collection of material with which ethnology must work, and I believe that that science rightly appreciates this fact. But on the whole, he plays the role of the recipient. For some time to come he will make many a blunder in sifting and working over that which he appropriates to himself. Where such distant vistas have been opened up to research, as in this case, one's vision must necessarily often become distorted. This does no harm. He is faint-hearted who does not have faith that our very mistakes will bring us nearer the truth.

IV

Let us now turn from the prehistoric relations which students of Indian religions are engaged in interpreting

to historic times. The wanderings of the Aryans have come to an end. The old tribal relations have been broken up. Boundaries have been made that frustrate every attempt to treat the history of ancient India as merging into a general history of antiquity. Still such boundaries do not exclude the existence of some intercourse at the frontier. Even over greater distances there was for centuries, by land and by water, a never wholly interrupted intercourse between India and the outer world. What religious possessions has this intercourse borne hither and thither?

When one simply expresses such a question, it suggests the varied relations in which Indology must stand to all allied branches of scientific inquiry. No single individual can grasp all this. It is not the result of any undervaluation of the investigations in question, but only the feeling of my own insufficiency, if I do not call to mind many things. What problems does the quick and brilliant development of Assyriology set for us? What questions arise from the estimation of the mighty influences of Brahmanism, and particularly Buddhism upon Central Asia, farther India, and China? I cannot trace these tendencies; I shall only speak of a few problems that deal with a world closer at hand.

Both Indologists and students of Greek philosophy we find examining the question whether the teachings of Pythagoras show traces of Indian influence, as a daring and ably defended recent hypothesis maintains, and whether, many centuries later, Indian sages and thaumaturgs likewise had a share in the varied and confused influences of Oriental mysticism that are found in the writings of the neo-Platonists. In another field there is a problem that may arouse us still more: How can we account for the similarities between the narratives and speeches of the four Gospels and those of the Buddhists?

The story of Jesus in the temple, the encomium of Simeon—are they constructed from the story of the wise old man Asita, who approaches the child Buddha and praises his coming glory? The temptation of Jesus in the wilderness and the temptation of Buddha in solitude by Mara the evil one, the walking of Peter on the sea, the widow's mite, the parable of the prodigal son and the corresponding Buddhistic parallels,—what is one to think about all this? Have features been really added to the picture of Christ by the contemplative imagination of the disciples of Buddha living in the monks' abodes along the Ganges? Important as these questions are, I naturally have no intention of discussing them here. I merely wish to describe how Indology joins forces with other branches of research in their solution. I desire only to emphasize the following point. When the problem is to determine the possible influence of an Indian prototype upon any non-Indian circle of ideas, Indology can never do more than contribute to forming the decision. The decision itself can be reached only within the province covered by the other science. The Indian scholar will determine that the Indian prototype in question has such and such a form and goes, or can go, back to such and such a time. The fellow worker will likewise ascertain corresponding facts regarding the phenomenon that may eventually be regarded as an imitation. When these preliminary questions have been settled, there then begins the more subtle investigation, which in cases of this kind does not really come within the sphere of Indology. Does the civilization which is so claimed to be influenced, for example the early Christian, present within itself the conditions by which the phenomena in question can be adequately explained without assuming derivation? Does the configuration of the forms disclose any abnormalities, erosions, joints, fissures, that might give weight to the opinion

that foreign elements have been mingled? Then there still remains the question in case such an admixture is to be assumed, whether it must be derived precisely from India. The peculiar trend of his imagination, I might almost say a kind of subconscious patriotism, all too easily drives the Indologist to this conclusion. The investigator of a particular field possesses a vivid knowledge of this field alone. Almost inevitably his scales must tip in favor of his own subject, when different ones are claiming to be the point of departure of some historical movement.

In these last sentences I have touched upon a peculiarity of these investigations which I must not neglect; namely, the subjectivity of the critic and his scientific temperament are wont to play here a particularly dangerous rôle. We see students, on the one hand, grasping with ready faith at every similarity between widely separated facts and constantly finding traces of historical relationships. The phlegmatic are also not wanting. They are filled with the greatest mistrust whenever they are expected to risk a leap or even a step from one sphere of civilization to another. The more anxiously, however, one tries to avoid one or the other failing, the oftener one arrives at a *non liquet* as his final decision. The cases in which objective criteria help us out of this uncertainty are not very frequent, and unfortunately often these prove to be not really the important ones.

Thus, for example, I fear that the question regarding the relations between the New Testament and Buddhism belongs to those that do not admit of an absolute yes or no. I myself can of course not speak here with the authority of the specialist. Only a high authority on the New Testament can shoulder the responsibility of deciding this case. Still, my subjective impression is that nothing in the four Gospels necessarily points to any real borrowing from

India. There is hardly more than inner parallelism with Buddhism. A prominent Indologist said a short time ago that just as "Babel" now knocks noisily at the gates of the Old Testament, so Buddha knocks, gently, at the door of the New Testament. Certainly any one who examines the latter periods of early Christian literature hears such knocking now and then. Even the dumbest ear can hear it repeated in the medieval Christian tale of *Barlaam and Josaphat*, the whole history of the youth of the royal son of the house of Sakya. But Buddha scarcely seems to me to knock at the gates of the New Testament.

The results of the investigations are similar, when we examine whether Christianity, in turn, has influenced ancient Indian forms of religion, the Krishna religion, for example. When we are dealing with influences coming from the opposite direction, from west to east, as in this case, the leading part falls to Indology, for the reasons I have already mentioned. Even here, however, the outcome, partially at least, is quite uncertain. Even if the wonderful poem *Bhagavad Gita* sings that the belief and love of the pious man look towards the god incarnate, even if the divine Krishna says there, "Whoever loves me is not lost," I for one should not like to assert positively that Christian influences are in evidence. It seems to me that the thought expressed in the *Bhagavad Gita* is everywhere in accord with Indian thought in its development. Even here, again, the later texts show us another picture. We find a kind of Christmas-cult consecrated to the birth of the child Krishna. We come across stories of the new-born god incarnate in a stable; shepherds and shepherdesses are gathered round the blessed mother; even "the ox and the ass" are present. Such facts will, of course, silence even great skepticism.

Let us look backward. Can we conceal from ourselves the fact that when Indology, together with classical

philology, or with New Testament research, treats such problems of derivation, the results are rather meagre? What does the holy martyr Josaphat signify for Christianity, or the idyl of the Krishna child for Hinduism? It is well to record scrupulously such borrowings; the amateur may, with pleasure, take in them the interest of the collector in a rare find. The historian, however, who seeks for the essential in things, will surely not feel so enthusiastic. Even if any of the New Testament narratives should really show evidences of Buddhistic influence, although I doubt it very much personally, the picture of Christianity would probably not be affected in the very slightest degree. We are aware that there was great mingling of religious elements of most varied origin in the last centuries before and the first centuries after Christ,—Grecian, Egyptian, Jewish, Babylonian, and Persian. India was not separated from these movements by impassable barriers; still it was so remote that it could have had only a minor share in them.

v

We have now reviewed all the prehistoric as well as historic relations. Have we, however, really exhausted thereby all that the study of Indian religions has to offer to the whole science? We have found the results obtained with regard to the belief of the Indo-Europeans both few and unsafe, the extent of the Indo-Iranian relationship narrowly restricted. We have found ethnology more often our creditor than our debtor. Furthermore, the remoteness of the civilizations of Central Asia and the farthest East that were influenced by India and the insignificance of the religious exchange with the West,—does all this form an adequate basis for determining the importance that the study of the religions of India has for understanding the

world in which we live? Certainly not. Whether the study of Buddhism, for example, possesses a universal significance over and above its own special one, cannot depend upon whether a few stories from the great wealth of Buddhist legends may have found their way into Christian literature. We are not dealing here with mere chance, external correspondences, but with inner relations.

Here and there we find analogous and yet different forces working on a similar yet different soil. These produce analogous yet different forms. We shall certainly refrain from speaking as if a fixed law, in the full sense of the term, were conceivable, or as if history were simply a collection of forms that naturally fit into a symmetrical system already discovered or yet to be discovered. Nevertheless the substantial identity that I have already mentioned, that we find in the lowest forms of civilization of which ethnology teaches, can certainly not be absolutely lost in the higher phases of history, in such differentiations as progress produces among the more highly organized, less inert forms. The identity of the former case becomes here a certain though often very limited parallelism. Parallelism, however, means neither more nor less than law and order. And indeed we may say that, for many stages of the way across the vast historical tracts, even now a gleam of law and order rewards the patient observation of the scientist and the intuition of the genius. It is an order whose constant fusion with its opposite, with what is plainly mere chance and inexplicable, is one of the leading characteristics of historical development.

The comparative study of languages and literatures, of judicial and social life, proves that it is possible to find many a trace of law and order. Why should it not prove to be equally true of the history of religions? Like helps to understand like from east to west. It aids in recogniz-

ing the hidden traces, in reconstructing the fragments, just as it is possible for a reader who is acquainted with a large number of careers and mental developments to construct a whole life from fragmentary biographical data. Such comparisons likewise help us particularly to discover the principal active causes behind the facts themselves. The similarities as well as the dissimilarities are helpful. Our view broadens so as to include the whole wealth of possibilities. The single fact takes its rightful place by showing itself to be one variety among others. We learn to raise the question, even solve it, perhaps, as to what causes have given each fact its peculiar characteristics.

Whoever pursues such problems will find Indian traditions especially valuable for much that is included under the head of religious thought and life. They are wonderfully preserved in true Indian vastness. It is a primeval forest through which, however, the steadfast zeal of the philologist has succeeded in making paths. The oldest traditions go back to a very remote past; they appear scarcely younger than the Indian people themselves. Moreover, tradition, ever communicative and frank, helps us to trace the long development through thousands and thousands of years. We believe we see in the texts before our eyes how their conception of nature and the world, reflected in their religion, develops step by step. We see how the art of presenting problems which creates this knowledge, how the direct or the indirect relation of the knower to his knowledge passes through one phase after another. Above all we hear what needs, hopes, and longings are expressed one after another in rational order. Particularly the older *stadia* of this development lie wonderfully clear before us; namely, the progress from the half-naïve, half-artful religious cult of the Veda to the deep speculations of the Upanishads, then to the religion of salvation of the Buddha.

This process, hardly influenced at all from without, has been able to go on according to its inherent law. Why should it not help us to understand the parallel developments in the West in the sense that I have designated? The student learns at every step, I may say, that this is not a deceptive hope. For instance, let us consider the sacrifice, an historical problem broad in scope. What forces, what thoughts have been set in motion here during these thousands of years! The forms, however, in which the sacrifice appears are at first incomprehensible hieroglyphics; our task is to decipher them. Nowhere do we find such exhaustive details regarding the sacrifice as in ancient India, especially the period of its richest maturity, to which it had been brought by the long labors of the priestly caste. How much more clearly we see the Vedic Brahman exercising his office than the Roman Flamen, for instance! Accordingly, I think, and the results already obtained bear me out, that any one who desires to reconstruct and interpret the remains of Western sacrificial rites and ceremonies must get his inspiration above all from India. Indian tradition is just as instructive, if one attempts to get a glimpse of how those tendencies that incline toward uniting religion and morals forced their way into the old mass of religious ideas, that were rather indifferent to moral ideals. It would be an endless task, however, to indicate all similar problems. We should meet with the same experience in every case; namely, that the Vedic religion, both by virtue of its historic position and its magnificent state of preservation, offers unparalleled opportunities for study to any one who desires to penetrate to the heart, to the very foundations of those old religions, religions with an old and crude basis, with the creations of riper thought and feeling above, and finally, we may add, with the seeds just visible of a still riper, more perfect future growth.

I should like to illustrate still further the importance of the Indian religions for the general problems of the science of religion by mentioning one form that appears later than the Vedic period. Buddhism represents to us one of the highest forms of religion. Buddhism and Christianity have long since seemed to be comparable to the mind that seeks to bring harmony into the bewildering religious phenomena. They are the most powerful religions of the East and West. Both are world-religions having no national boundaries. Both are religions teaching salvation, breaking all restrictions set by ceremony or law. The same type of religion of salvation—thus the relation has been formulated—has been realized twice in the history of the world, in the West by Christianity, and in the East by Buddhism.

It is quite evident how great the interests of the science of religion are in a discussion of this scheme. The student of Buddhism will, however, appreciate the fact that he and his fellow worker in the New Testament will not of themselves be able to make such a discussion possible. A third must help,—the student of Greek thought. It is known how nearly related to Buddhism are the ideas that flourished in certain old Grecian religious orders and schools of philosophy, and are even found here and there in Plato. Comparison with Buddhism offers the best means of approaching and understanding these ideas. The earthly existence seems to these Greeks, as to Buddhists, to be shrouded in darkness. The soul has fallen from its true home into "life without life," into an impermanent world. As in Buddhism, suffering lasts indefinitely in the wanderings of the soul, in which it "exchanges life's painful paths one of another." But like Buddha the wise man recognizes and points out the "way to salvation." He teaches the art of freeing one's self from bodily existence. Knowledge and philosophy lead the spirit to the bliss that Plato

extols. In a sudden vision the eternal one, that ever is, beams upon him, and into union with him he enters freed of all fetters, just as the blessed certainty of Nirvana illumined the son of Sakya in the holy night: "Destroyed is the rebirth, fulfilled the holy change and duty done; I shall not return to the world again."

The national differences between the two peoples are of course clearly seen when one more closely examines these ideas. How could it be otherwise? Yet after all, the harmony is wonderful with which the voices of the Greek thinkers answer the yellow-robed Indian monks. It reminds one almost of those correspondences that we saw ethnology finds between the ideas of peoples most widely separated. There lies the same haze of vague forebodings over both these ideal worlds, the Grecian as well as the Indian. There is the same longing for the cessation of motion, of becoming and change. With it sounds of triumph are mingled: the proud consciousness of one's own power to call a halt to that motion. And this implies that we must never oppose to one another these moods as peculiarly Indian or Christian. They are certainly not Indian alone. Allied Indian and Grecian research teaches that they are the products of forces that do not belong to simply one country. Accordingly the necessary basis has now been given the science of religion for investigating these forces; namely, how far do they agree with, and how far do they differ from, those which have produced Christianity?

Perhaps the differences will first strike the eye. On the one hand, in India and Greece, we have the wise man who, through his knowledge of the nature of the world and the workings of the universal law, rises above the suffering that it brings him; on the other hand, in Christianity, the pious man who, though poor in spirit, clings to the mercy

of the all-loving God with childlike confidence. On the one hand, the final goal as conceived by a mind accustomed to metaphysical abstractions, as rest freed from all "becoming" in the realms of "ideas" or those places

Where there is no being, nothing firm, is the isle, the only—

of Nirvana. On the other hand, the blessed hope of spirits longing for life, the transfiguration of a most living, most personal existence perfecting itself in God. We have here the sharp antitheses that appear doubly sharp compared with the harmony between Indian and Greek modes of thought. Who would wish to obscure them? But it is not obscuring them when we ask whether, in spite of differences of race, civilization, temperament, powers of imagination, complexity or simplicity of thought, it is not after all the same longing, here as there, a longing originating in the depths of the soul for the world beyond. It is a longing for the "far off," to leave the dullness of the world and life of the senses for the freest, brightest heights. The hand that was once eagerly and rudely stretched out after worldly goods has been drawn back. One dreams of the inexpressible, whose secrets one must perforce call by many ever changing names. It sounds in the souls like grand chords of stirring and solemn music.

I can merely indicate what pictures the science of religion has to draw here. The assistance of students of Indian religions is not certainly the least to give it the power to reduce these pictures from floating mists to definite form. We accompany that science to its very heights. We furnish it with material, with facts that shall prevent it from merely playing with airy forms. Moreover, whatever we have given it returns to us again open to a higher, broader, and freer understanding. I said at the beginning of my discussion that each historical form is itself alone,

occurs only once. Now we think we see reflected in this one form other forms, scattered over wide stretches of space and time. The single form remains constant, and yet it may appear to us as if it first received its fullest significance, its position in all life, through this reflection.

Have I strayed too far, in what I have said, from the question of the relation of the different branches of investigation, into a discussion of the relationships of the objects of these investigations? It will hardly be possible to deal with the first problem objectively without constantly introducing the second. My real aim, however, was always this, to show how our study is closely associated with that of our fellow scientists, with the work of specialists, and with the study of broad and universal problems. If it were conceivable that our share in all this were suddenly made void, surely many a gap would be bitterly felt. The science of religions would be more limited and poorer if, among the voices of the peoples that it hears and interprets, the voice of that people were missing which created the prayers and sacrifices of the Veda and the figure of the Buddha shrouded in mystery.

BRAHAMANICAL RIDDLES AND THE ORIGIN OF THEOSOPHY

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FROM olden times, as an early exercise of the primitive mind in its adjustment to the world about it, comes the riddle or the charade. The fresher the vision, when the world was young, so much keener was the interest in the phenomena of nature, in the phenomena of life, and in the simple institutions which surrounded man. All harmonies and fitnesses, all discrepancies and inconsistencies attract the notice of children and the childlike man. Hence children love riddles; hence savage or primitive peoples put them. All folk-lore is full of them. They are the mystery and at the same time the rationalism of the juvenile mind. As civilization advances they still sustain life, but they grow more complicated, more conscious and exacting, as the simpler relations become commonplace, and interest in them fades and wears off. Finally the riddle and the charade remain only in games and occasional plays on words. Humor and fun have taken the place of the shallow mystery which is now gone forever.

Mythology and religion are largely attempts to account for outward nature, and to adjust the inner self to outward nature: we may say confidently that the riddle-question and the riddle-answer could not fail to come out in these attempts. We may trust in this, as in many related matters, to the Vedic poets. Their intense pre-occupation with nature myth, with liturgy and with the psycho-physical qualities of man, is expressed to some extent in riddle form: the Veda is the home of the mythological, liturgical, and philosophical charade. And what is particularly interesting and quite puzzling, there are also riddles about ordinary things which descend to the level of the nursery and the bar-room.

It is one thing to know that riddles are ever near and dear to the heart of the people; it is another to account directly for the impulse which originated them or preserved them in a religious literature of a type as advanced as the Vedic hymns. How and why were they produced or preserved? There must have been some peg to hang them on.

The Veda is in no sense a *belles-lettres* collection. All its books are in some sense religious; they are for the most part, in fact, liturgic. All early Brahmanical literary remains, no matter under what impulse they were originally composed, were preserved for some useful purpose. The Hindus of the time of the Veda, if we judge them by their writings, were a practical people, in spite of the speculative turn of their minds. Their literature of a hundred works or more, the famous Upanishads not excepted, has in view personal advantage, the favor of the gods, the grant of wishes, or the destruction of enemies. The same motive, after all, pervades also the theosophic, pessimistic Upanishads: they also pander to a desire—the desire to escape the eternal round of existences. Whatever is left of the literature of early Brahmanism was saved because it had managed to obtain a

work on some definite occasion, because it was primarily composed for a religious purpose, or secondarily adapted to such a purpose. It is not otherwise as regards the riddle.

The Vedic word for riddle is *brahmodya*, or *brahma-vadya*, that is, analysis of, or speculation about the *brahma*, or religion. The great sacrifices, the so-called *çrāuta*-sacrifices, such as *rājasūya* (coronation of a king), or *açva-medha* (horse-sacrifice), were for the most part undertaken by kings and rich nobles, not by the smaller householder who could not afford them, or had no occasion for them. They had in them the elements of tribal or national festivals. Of course they were expensive. A large number of priests had to be present, and they were not at all shy about asking fees (*dakshinā*) for their services. A sly way they had of making these fees exorbitant; namely, they recited poems in praise of generous givers of old, so-called *dānastutis*, "gift-praisers," and *gāthā nārāçanishyah*, "stanzas which sing the praises of generous men." In most of these simply fabulous stories of presents to the Brahmans are recorded. They sing these songs so loudly that the Vedic texts in their soberer moments stamp them as lies (*anrtam*), and decry them as pollution (*çamalam*). Once the reciter of gift-praises and the man drunk with brandy (*surā*) are placed on the same plane; they are so foul that gifts from them must not be accepted. Now we are told distinctly that the Vedic kings, or tribal Rājas, were not only interested in the mechanical perfection and success of the sacrifices undertaken under their patronage, but that they were even more impressed by the speculative, mystic, and philosophic thoughts which were suggested by various phases of the sacrifice. In later Upanishad times the kings appear as the questioners of the great Brahmans who solve for them the riddle of existence. Whenever their questions are answered satisfactorily, in the midst of a continuous discourse,

the king again and again is excited to generosity: "I give thee a thousand (cows)," says King Janaka of Videha repeatedly to the great Vedāntic Brahman Yājñavalkya, as the latter unfolds his marvelous scheme of salvation in the "Great Forest Upanishad." Kings were known to give away their kingdoms on such occasions; and kings became themselves glorious expounders of theosophic religion.

Thus the Brahmans who must impress the "generous giver" with their theological profundity—sometimes the hollowest mock profundity—used the riddle-form, inherited from ancient folk-lore, to enliven the mechanical and technical progress of the sacrifice by impressive intellectual pyrotechnics. One Brahman puts the riddle; the other answers it. It is a theological "quiz," arranged by the parties: questioner and responder know their parts to perfection.

At the horse-sacrifice two priests ask and answer: "Who verily moveth quite alone; who verily is born again (and again); what, forsooth, is the remedy for cold; and what is the great (greatest) heap?" The answer: "The sun moveth quite alone; the moon is born again (and again); Agni (fire) is the remedy for cold; the earth is the great (greatest) heap." (*Vājasaneyi Samhitā*, 23, 9 and 10.)

"I ask thee for the highest summit of the earth; I ask thee for the navel of the universe; I ask thee for the seed of the lusty steed; I ask thee for the highest heaven of Speech (*Vāk*)." The answer is: "This altar is the highest summit of the earth; this sacrifice is the navel of the universe; this soma (the intoxicating sacrificial drink) is the seed of the lusty steed; this Brahman priest is the highest heaven (that is to say, the highest exponent) of Speech." (*Ibid.* 23, 61 and 62.)

The priest called Hotar asks the priest called Adhvaryu: "What, forsooth, is the sun-like light; what sea is there like unto the ocean; what, verily, is higher than the earth;

what is the thing whose measure is not known?" The Adhvaryu priest answers: "Brahma is the sun-like light;¹ heaven is the sea like unto the ocean; Indra is higher than the earth; the measure of the cow is (quite) unknown." (*Ibid.* 23, 47 and 48.)

The Brahman priest asks the Udgātar priest: "How many are the sacrificial substances, and how many are the syllables; how numerous the oblations and the fagots; the categories of the sacrifice let me ask you; how many Hotar priests sacrifice in season?" The Udgātar priest answer: "Six are the substances of the sacrifice, and hundred are the syllables; eighty the oblations, and three the fagots; the categories of the sacrifice I do tell thee; seven Hotar priests do sacrifice in season." (*Ibid.* 23, 57 and 58.)

And now by previous arrangement a mutual admiration riddle; it is an undisguised *oratio pro domo* in which the Brahman priest, or High priest, and through him the entire priesthood, is extolled in terms of frank selfishness. The Udgātar priest asks the Brahman, the highest priest at the sacrifice, the following leading questions: "Who knows the navel of this universe; who heaven, and earth, and atmosphere; who knows the birthplace of the lofty sun; knows, too, the moon, whencesoever born?" The Brahman priest answers: "I know the navel of this universe; I, heaven and earth and atmosphere; I know the birthplace of the lofty sun; know, too, the moon, whencesoever born." (*Ibid.* 23, 59 and 60.)

We see the whole stuff of religions: nature myth, liturgy, human psychology, theosophy; they all present themselves as mystery fit for the riddle, and they are handled often in a very fresh and original way; perhaps yet more often with labored obscurity, with mock profundity, designed to swell the importance of the too simple thought. But what is

¹ Byron, *Siege of Corinth*, xl.

most remarkable, the same ritualistic texts that have preserved the divine riddle have also preserved the, so to speak, human riddle—very human indeed, in its choice of the most ordinary objects, in its shallow didacticism, in its lumbering humor, and in its naïve grossness. Especially in the so-called *kuntāpa*-hymns of the Atharva-Veda, a curious medley of gift-praises, didactic stanzas, riddles, and obscenities, all of which are firmly imbedded in the liturgy, the homely riddle appears, at the first blush, like the cry of a baby in arms in a serious assembly. What shall we say of religious texts that break out in the nursery-charade? Once it is said that the gods propounded these charades *à la* sphinx to the Asuras, or devils, and so got the better of them: "In that which lies stretched out there is hidden that which stands: (what is it?)" Answer: "The foot in the shoe."

"By drawing two little ears to one's self they are gotten out in the middle: (what is it?)" The tying of a knot in a rope.

"Well, here it is, east, west, north, and south; as soon as you touch it, it melts away: (what is it?) Answer: "A drop (of rain)."

Then three riddles from the animal and vegetable kingdoms, typifying the actions of quick arrival, swift disappearance, and firm standing, or permanence. The thing is at once subtle and simple: "Bounce! he has come: (what is it?)" Answer: "The dog." "Whish! it is gone: (what is it?)" Answer: "The fall of a leaf." "Bang! it has trodden: (what is it?)" Answer: "The hoof of an ox."

The decencies of present-day literature forbid the report of that very characteristic class of riddles which deal with human nature in the narrow sense, and with the sexual relation (Atharva-Veda, 20, 133), but is well to bear their existence in mind when looking for an explanation. The theme, of course, primarily suggests popular origin. Yet its

presence in the liturgy is taken with the utmost seriousness by the ritualists; they explain and apologize for its foolish and obscene character. The entire material has the look of a fossil: it is something which must have stood in a pre-historic period outside of the sacrifice, being connected with it at first by looser, more accidental ties, until the rigid formalism of which the existing texts are the final expression had placed everything upon the same footing of sanctity. The nursery-charade, and worse, cannot reasonably be supposed to have found its way into the ritual in any other way. This is true in spite of the scientific seriousness of the Hindu mind and its naïve love of schematizing, which makes it possible in later times for the *ars amandi* (*kāma-śāstra*) to treat the most incredible things in scientific *sūtra* style—the style, for instance, of the *sūtras* of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya philosophies, or the grammatical rules of Pāṇini. This material was obviously popular at first, and I have little doubt as to the reason of its presence in the sacred texts. It generally occurs in close neighborhood to the festive “gift-praises,” which, as stated above, were not only intended to stimulate future givers, but also mark the note of hilarity. No doubt these served as a bridge from the real solemnities of the sacrifice to what, for lack of a better term, we might call—borrowing a German student term—a kind of a liturgic “saukneipe.” Plainly speaking, the bestowal of the sacrificial fees (*dakṣhinā*) in many cases must have led to gormandizing and drunkenness, and these were probably in turn followed—the practice is not entirely unknown at the present day—by shallow witticisms of this sort. This we must not imagine to have taken place without interruption, without recollection of the religious character of the occasion as a whole, because theosophic and cosmic riddles and discussions come in too. In the main, however, social jollification was the original motive, until, in the

course of the ossification of the ritual, even the most trivial moments march by in the procession of the sacrifice, misunderstood and suspected, yet respected. They are now as sacred and ineradicable as the most thoughtful prayer to the gods. But a modern Vedāntist, the late Svāmī Vivekānanda, found it in his heart to speak of "those disgusting Vedas."

We can now understand both the origin and the enormous propagation of the theosophic riddle and the theosophic hymn, which is always more or less of a riddle. Grown from folk-lore roots, fructified by the Hindus' intense appreciation of all relations as mysteries, it grew to full strength in connection with the sacrifice and its patronage of a superior variety of religious intellect. The highest forms of Hindu religion have always operated from the ontological side, from the severely intellectual side. Faith and piety, sentiment and emotion, are almost entirely wanting in early Brahmanism, although in later times *bhakti*, or piety, tends to rival the religious emotions of John Tauler and Thomas à Kempis. No one will say that theosophic thought would not have existed without the technicalities of the sacrifice and its intellectual scintillations, but it is easy to see that it owes a great deal of its development to the sacrifice. Wisdom-searching Rājas weary of the world, Janaka and Ajātaśatru, Buddha and Bimbisāra, have as much to do with the development of Hindu religion as the thirst for new truth native in the Brahmans themselves. They are the Maecenases of the "poor clerics," and they, having a superabundance of the world, are attracted permanently to the things beyond. So, without doubt, early theosophy grew under the same patronage, in a natural desire of the Brahmans to vitalize the outer forms of the ritual technicalities; in a natural desire, too, to obtain position and reputation by something better than the handling with rigid correctness

of firewood and sacrificial ladle, of *soma* drink and oblations of melted butter.

The extent to which the riddle habit had taken hold of those early philosophers may be seen in the outer form of the riddles themselves. In the cases hitherto mentioned, the question is stated in full, and the answer is given in full. But this is not the only form. Sometimes (*Āitareya Brāhmaṇa*, 5, 25, 15 ff.) the riddle is put in a concise categorical statement, instead of a question; the answer again follows. Again—and this is the most common form—the riddle is put either in the form of a categorical statement or a question; the answer is withheld: either it is held to be too obvious, or the object is to impart additional interest and mystery to the riddle. Finally there are riddles (*Āitareya Brāhmaṇa*, 5, 25, 23; *Āçvalāyana Çrāutasūtra*, 8, 13, 14) which contain only the answer to a question, which is presupposed and easily supplied. Countless statements based on remote analogies, harboring violent paradoxes, indeed at first sight nonsense, are in reality riddles. There is hardly anything in the wide world of things and thoughts which does not share some quality with something else: this is enough to justify identification. When the essence or outer form fails, the name opens the door to a labyrinth of etymological crookedness in which every road leads to every goal: the name and the thing (*nāma* and *rūpa*) are of equal value and dignity.

The *Rig-Veda*, the most important of Hindu books, contains two riddle hymns of great interest, about neither of which the last word has been said. One (8, 29) is a hymn of ten small crisp stanzas which, I venture to say, is a so-called *nivid*, or invitation to the gods to come to the sacrifice. But what kind of an invitation? Instead of the usual clear note of fervent call, ten varieties of gods are merely indicated by their most salient qualities. The names of the

gods are never mentioned, but instead catch-words, as it were *leit-motifs* in the Wagnerian sense, which describe them so definitely as to leave no doubt as to which one is meant. The stanzas are arranged so that the first seven deal with single gods (*eka*); the next two with dual gods (*dvāu*); the tenth with a plural group of divine beings (*eke*). To realize how subtly all this is done, we must notice that the three important divinities of stanzas three, four, and five all carry weapons or tools; yet the stanzas keep them so distinctly apart that no hearer could possibly have been in doubt:

3. "An axe (*vaçī*) of brass one carries in his hands; he is firmly fixed among the gods."

It is the god Tvashtar, "Fashioner."

4. "A bolt (*vajra*) is fixed within the hand of one; the demons with it does he slay."

It is the god Indra, the Hercules of the Veda.

5. "A sharp weapon one holds in his hand; strong (*ugra*) he is; the urine (*i. e.* rain) of heaven is his remedy (*jalāshabhasaja*)."

It is the god Rudra (Civa).

The eighth stanza reads:

vibhir dvā carata ekayā saha pra pravaseva vasatah.

"Two gods together with one goddess travel, drawn by birds; like travelers do they travel far."

The two Aṇvins, the young sons of the morning, suspiciously similar to the Dioskuri, Castor and Pollux, travel with their bride Sūryā, the young sun-maiden, upon a car drawn by birds. As they are at the same time the heavenly physicians, they are thought to be particularly welcome guests, and they stop off, in the course of their travels, at the houses of the pious, and this cunning riddle is the invitation extended to them.

The other hymn of the Rig-Veda (1, 164) is the *pièce de résistance* of the riddle literature. It is an assemblage of fifty-two longer stanzas, all of them, except one, riddles whose answers are not given. The one whose answer is stated is identical with the first one cited in this paper. The others involve objects or ideas which, instead of being called by their ordinary names, are indicated, either by their well-known qualities, or, preferably, by some mystic or symbolic indication. Numbers especially play a great part in these indications. The subjects are either cosmic, that is, pertaining to nature; mythological, that is, referring to the accepted legends about the gods; psycho-physical, that is, pertaining to the human organs and sensations; or finally, crude and tentative philosophy or theosophy. Heaven and earth, sun and moon, air, clouds and rain; the course of the sun, the year, the seasons, months, days and nights; the human voice, self-consciousness, life and death; the origin of the first creature and the originator of the universe—such are the abrupt and bold themes. The mysticism and symbolism of these riddles make their solution a task of unequal certainty; yet on the whole they also are remarkably clear, considering the stout efforts that seem to have been made to obfuscate their sense.

The first riddle is:

“Of this dear gray Hotar priest the middle brother is of the rock; the third brother carries ghee on back. Here have I seen the householder that has seven sons.”

It is the god Agni, “Fire,” in three important aspects. The first is the sun, or heavenly fire, the old, or immemorial sacrifice fire in the sky; the second is the fire of the heavenly rock, or cloud, that is, lightning; the third is the earthly sacrifice fire upon whose back the oblations of ghee are poured. The whole is the household fire with seven sons, that is, many tongues.

The second riddle is: "Seven hitch the car that has one wheel; a single horse that has seven names draws it. The wheel of three naves is imperishable, and not to be checked: upon it do all beings stand."

The riddle is in the main clear. The answer is the sun. A single wheel drawn by the seven sun-steeds courses on the sky. The three naves are either three divisions of the day, or, less probably, of the year. In the light of the imperishable sun all beings carry on their existence.

As a specimen of a theosophic riddle we may take 46. It contains the suggestion, fateful for all advanced Hindu thought, that above and behind the great multitude of gods there is one supreme personality; behind the gods there is that "Only Being" of whom the gods are but various names.

"They call (it) Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and Agni, or the heavenly bird Garutmant (the sun). The sages call the One Being in many ways; the call it Agni, Yama, Mataricvan."

It is but a step from this idea to the pantheistic, absolute, without a second, Brahman-Ātman of the Upanishads and the Vedānta philosophy—that perfervid monism, the like of which the world has not seen outside of India.

Significantly this riddle habit has insinuated itself into the more systematic and continuous speculations. There is a famous hymn, Rig-Veda, 10, 121, in which Prajāpati, the lord of creatures and the world, the typical Father-god, is lauded without stint, but his name is never mentioned: instead at the end of each stanza, the question is asked as a kind of riddle, "Who is this god that has such and such qualities, and performs such and such wonderful deeds?" Of course every one knows, but the later theologians have gravely constructed a god "Who" out of the question: *mirabile dictu*, the riddle question turned into an anthropomorphic god!

1. "In the beginning there arose the germ of golden light; he was the one born lord of all that is. He established the earth and this sky—who is the god to whom we should offer our oblations?"

3. "He who through his power became the sole king of this breathing and slumbering world; he who governs all, men and beasts—who is the god to whom we should offer our oblations?"

There are two points which impress themselves forcibly in connection with these riddles as we see them put into the service of philosophic speculation. First, the cool intellectuality of Hindu theosophy, its clever yet often mechanical play with terms, and its growingly rigid and logical definitions are unquestionably in a measure the children in direct descent of the riddle habit, which has found its way from folk-lore beginnings into myth, liturgy, and philosophy. That the Hindus of the time of our texts took these things seriously, we can see from the name they have given the entire habit and practice—*brahmodya*, discussion of the *brahma*. The name is in any case daring; but it would be childish, unless, at the time of its giving, the higher rather than the lower, the mystic philosophic (in the broadest sense) rather than the trivial, riddles were in the mind's eye. Anyhow it is quite clear that in India, and, so far as I know, in India only, the riddle, to use the French expression, has arrived. It has there become a vehicle and doubtless also a promoter of higher, or, let us say, more cautiously, persistently complicated thought, and it approaches in dignity the other earlier efforts to solve the mystery of existence and the universe, as they appear in the theosophic hymns of the Veda and in the prose Upanishads.

There is a second matter upon which these riddles throw strong light. A distinguished scholar has recently advanced the theory that Hindu philosophy is not, as has been tacitly

assumed, the product of Brahmanical intellect, but that it was due to the spiritual efforts of the Royal or Warrior Caste. Professor Garbe,¹ of the University of Tübingen, is an eminent student of Hindu philosophy, and at the same time well versed in the early literature of the Vedas. He is not an admirer of Brahman civilization: on more than one occasion has he poured out the vials of the just wrath against the many pretensions and the cruelties which the Brahmins have practiced during the period of their ascendancy in India through several millenniums. But not content with that, he believes that the Brahmins were not only bold bad men, but also that they were too stupid to have worked their way from the sandy wastes of ritualism to the green summits where grows the higher thought of India, notably that monism which is *the* Hindu intellectual idea *par excellence*. For centuries the Brahmins were engaged in excogitating sacrifice after sacrifice, and hair-splitting definitions and explanations of senseless ritualistic practices. All at once, says Professor Garbe, lofty thought appears upon the scene. To be sure, even then the traditional god-lore, sacrificial lore, and folk-lore are not rejected, but the spirit is no longer satisfied with the cheap mysteries of the sacrificial altar; a passionate desire to solve the riddle of the universe and its relation to the own self holds the mind captive; nothing less will satisfy. In this observation of Professor Garbe everything is correct, nay even familiar, except the words "all at once." Mental revolutions rarely come all at once; least of all in India. The evidence of fairly continuous records shows that every important Hindu thought has its beginning, its middle, and its final development. Now the Vedic riddle is certainly a product which has been fostered up to its actual scope, an extraordinary scope, as we

¹ See the first article in his volume of essays, entitled "Beiträge zur Indischen Kulturgeschichte" (Berlin, 1903).

have seen, by the Brahmans. It is tied by so many threads to Brahmanical literature and Brahmanical performances that there can be no doubt. All the riddles occur in the midst of unquestioned Brahmanical texts; most of them are in the standard metres of the Brahmanical Vedas; a reasonable explanation why they were taken up and propagated by the Brahmans, namely, to enhance the interest and importance of their intellectual performances, has been stated above. No other reason has ever been suggested.

Now the boundary line between theosophic riddle and the more set efforts at theosophic speculations cannot be found. "They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and Agni, or the heavenly bird Garutmant; the sages call the One Being in many ways," etc. This is a riddle, as we have seen. How far is this from another statement in a hymn of the Rig-Veda (10, 129, 2): "That One breathed (itself), without breath, through its own will; other than it there nothing since has been." Here we have the severest monism in a Brahmanical hymn in the same metre (*trishtubh*) in which the Vedic poets loved to call upon their fustian god Indra. Even Brahmanical nature-worship is dashed again and again with monism. Rig-Veda, 1, 115, 1, says of Sūrya, the sun: "The sun is the Self or Soul of all that moves or stands." Another stanza (Rig-Veda, 3, 62, 10), the famous so-called Sāvitrī, which remains sacrosanct at all times, and is recited to this day by every orthodox Hindu, turns to Savitar, another form of the sun:

"We meditate on the adorable light of divine Savitar, that he may arouse our holy thoughts."

Here is almost the first touch of that inimitable combination of the Upanishads, the Ātman "breath" and the Brahma "holy thought," that is, the combination of physical and spiritual force into one pantheistic One and All. As a modern Hindu, the late Rājendralāl Mitra, says of the

Sāvitṛī:¹ "It is, of course, impossible to say what the author of the Sāvitṛī had in view, but his Indian commentators, both ancient and modern, are at one in believing that he rose from nature up to nature's god, and adored that sublime luminary which is visible only to the eye of reason, and not the planet we daily see in its course." Kātyāyāna, in his Index to the Rig-Veda (the so-called Anukramanī), after reducing all the gods of the Veda to three types, to Agni (fire and light on earth), to Vāyu (air or wind in the atmosphere), and to Sūrya (sun in the sky), proceeds still farther to assert that there is only one deity, namely the "Great Self" (*mahān ātmā*), and some say that he is the Sun, or that the Sun is he." Similarly Yāska in the Nirukta.

I am afraid that Professor Garbe has worked himself into the state of mind that there is only one kind of good Brahman, namely, a dead Brahman, to paraphrase a saying about that other Indian, the American Indian. Selfishness, foolishness, bigotry, and cruelty galore—the marks of these some Brahmans have left in their compositions, foolishly as behoves knaves. But there were Brahmans and Brahmans. The older Upanishads, written in the exact language and style of the so-called prose Brahmana texts, figuring, indeed, as parts of these compositions, joining their speculations closely to their ritualistic mysticism, were composed by Brahmans who had risen to the conviction that not "the way of works" lies the salvation that is knowledge. Countless Brahmanical names crowd these texts: Naciketas, and Çvetaketu; Gārgya and Yājñavalkya, and many others. Even the wives of great Brahmans participate in these spiritual tourneys, and occasionally rise to subtler appreciation than their lords of the mystery of the world and the riddle of existence.

¹ Introduction to his edition of the Gopatha-Brahmana, p. 24.

Professor Garbe has been attracted to his position by the interesting fact that the Upanishads narrate on several occasions that the knowledge of the ultimate philosophy was in the keeping of men of royal caste, and that these taught their knowledge to Brahmans. This is put in such a way that the Brahman, after having aired his own stock of theosophy, "lays down" before the king's superior insight. The king is then represented as graciously bestowing his saving knowledge upon the Brahman. Once or twice, however, the king turns braggart, and mars his act of generosity by claiming that the warrior caste are the real thing, and that they alone in all the world are able to illumine these profound and obscure matters. I doubt whether this justifies us in regarding the warrior caste as the spiritual saviors of India. In the first place the very texts which narrate these exploits of the Kshatriyas are unquestionably Brahmanic. Would the arrogance and selfishness of the Brahmans have allowed them to preserve and propagate facts calculated to injure permanently their own standing? Surely not.

The situation is somewhat as follows: There never was a time in India when the Aryas, that is, the three upper castes, were excluded from Brahmanical piety. Now as theosophy, by its very terms, shuts down on the ritual, the special profession of the Brahmans, there is nothing at all in it to exclude occasional intelligent and aspiring men of the other noble castes. This is true up to the present day. Here is where the good Brahman, of whom Professor Garbe will not hear, comes in. The compilers of the Upanishads were honest enough to recognize this participation, to express their unbounded admiration of it, because after all there was to them something unexpected in it. They are carried away by it to a certain amount of ecstasy, the kind of ecstasy that goes with a paradox, as when the son of a peasant becomes

a professor at a university. We must not forget either that the Rājas were after all the source from whom all blessings flow. Even in theosophic occupation the Brahman remains the poor cleric with the Rājas as his Maecenas. I think that any one who reads these statements of royal proficiency attentively will acknowledge that they are dashed in the Upanishads, as they are in the Ritual, with a goodly measure of *captatio benevolentiae*. In other words, the genuine admiration of high-minded nobles is not necessarily divorced from the sub-consciousness that it is well to admire in high places. Even really good Brahmans might do that. If King Janaka of Videha punctuates Yājñavalkya's brilliant exposition of theosophy by repeated gifts of a thousand cows, King Ajātaśatru of Benares, real intellectual as he is, will not allow admiring Brahmans to starve. So we find here at the end of the religious development, when the riddle of the universe has been solved, the same economic conditions which govern the singing of Vedic hymn, the sacrifice to the gods, and the propounding of those humbler riddles which form the starting-point of our discussion. But with all their faults we love them still: some Brahmans, though not all Brahmans, were at all times, as they are to the days of Ćānkara and Kumārila, the intellectual leaders of India; brilliant helpers from the other castes lend occasional aid.

THE PROGRESS OF ISLAMIC SCIENCE IN THE LAST THREE DECADES

BY IGNAZ GOLDZIHNER

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THE title given by me to this discourse clearly indicates that we study and judge the life of Islam, and the documents from which we learn the history of its development, from quite different points of view from our predecessors of half a century ago. The scientific study of Islam has exhibited very significant progress in these last decades. I not only mean to say that we know *more* about Islam, and that our knowledge is more abundant than that, for instance, of Hadrian Reland's (1704) contemporaries. This increase of knowledge is the natural outcome of two things: first, a more intimate knowledge of the countries where the believers in this religion live; secondly, the always increasing knowledge of the theological literature of Islam and its sects. But we also know Islam in quite a different manner from our predecessors. That is to say, we consider it from other points of view and study it by other methods.

There are two groups of the scientific results of our modern time, which could not pass without having an effect upon the study of Islam, nor could the researches concerning it escape their influence either.

First, the methods of historical critics which have proved successful with the documents of other religions. In other words, the traditional documents of the origin and development of Islam have been submitted to the same historical-critical examination as we have been taught to apply to the literary witnesses to ancient Christianity and rabbinical Judaism.

Second, the science of comparative religion, which has only risen in these last decades, has established ethno-psychological laws of universal value for the understanding of the origin and growth of the religious ideas of men; of it, too, we have made use in comprehending the complicated phenomena of the historical Islam.

We have, then, applied the results of these two methods, the historical-critical and the comparative-religious, to our consideration of Islam. You cannot fail to observe on these premises the total change which has taken place, leaving aside special monographs, when you compare the manuals of our day treating *universal* questions with those of older literary periods. How much rubbish has been cleared away, from what different points of view the seeds, bloom, and fruit of Islam are considered! How the dead letter has been brought into life and placed in living connection with historical reality! The great Hadrian Re-land, to whom we owe the first scientific treatises on Islamic institutions, when introducing his subject, believed he could not better recommend his inquiries than to present them "*uti docetur in templis et scholis Mohammedicis*"; that is to say, "as they are taught in Muhammadan temples and schools." We modify this principle, or rather enrich it and represent Islam as it appears in its development, in its living formation, and in its effects on society and in history.

If, after these introductory remarks, I had to indicate in short the results themselves which this new scientific

HAROUN-AL-RASCHID

Photogravure from the original Painting by J. Kœckert

Haroun-al-Raschid was Calif of Bagdad in the eighth century. Under him the Eastern califate attained its greatest height of splendor and power. He is, however, best known from the tales of the Arabian Nights, in which everything curious, romantic, and wonderful is connected with his name, or is supposed to have happened in his reign.



view of Islamic matters has brought to light, I could on this American soil deliver myself of that task with the greatest ease. Read the book appearing scarcely a year ago in New York by my learned friend, Duncan B. Macdonald,¹ Professor in Hartford, whom I am particularly happy to see among my hearers to-day, and I feel sure the volume will afford enjoyable reading for you all. You will find there united in interesting literary form, and with exact scientific touch, the results to which the modern scientific views lead, and a solid conclusive summing-up of conscientious and minute researches about Islamic development, as it appears in a literature embracing thirteen centuries. It is a contribution offered by America to this department of knowledge, calling forth our thanks.

But what are the paths modern science had to follow to come to such results? This shall form the subject of my reflections to-day.

II

It is no longer *single* errors of detail which we have to correct. Of course some of them have prolonged their lives with the obstinate perseverance peculiar to untruths, creeping, even to this day, from manual to manual and belonging to the iron fund of Oriental *falsa*. Some pet notions to which the Orientalists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries clung very closely are now extirpated root and branch like the seven nations of Canaan. For instance, you could read in older works—and it sometimes appears in newspapers even to the present day—that Muhammad found his last resting-place in Mekka in the holy Ka'bah, and also that his tomb there is the goal of the famous pilgrimage of Islam. The tale about the magnetic

¹ *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, by Duncan B. Macdonald. New York (Charles Scribner's Sons), 1903. (Series of Hand-Books in Semitics, edited by J. A. Craig, no. ix.)

walls, between which the coffin of the Prophet is suspended in the air, has—we hope—vanished altogether. The books about the East and the travels of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not do without that fable. The idea universally spread in past centuries, that every Jew wishing to share the Prophet's Paradise as a true Believer was obliged to pass through the Christian religion, by being regularly baptized, as Jesus is also acknowledged by Islam as a prophet, has likewise disappeared, though Martinus Baumgarten of Nürnberg (1507) was not the last to believe and copy the story.¹

These and many other things, we are now luckily done with. They did not endure until we had penetrated with our critical lead into the depths of popular ideas. But what was sustained more obstinately than a dozen such blunders was the thoroughly false doctrine, which had caught hold on our educational literature; namely, that the barrier between the two great divisions of Islam, the Sunnites and Shi'ites, consists in this, that the latter recognize beside the Koran nothing as an authority, while the former acknowledge beside that revealed religious book also the Sunna, namely, tradition, as a source of religious conduct and creed; an erroneous view which to this day has not yet disappeared from the schools.

But the errors in these particular questions can only be attributed to false information. With correct information such blunders could have been easily prevented.

The true progress of the science of Islam, of which we are to speak here, brings us into close connection with the forming and developing forces and factors of Islam. You can now ask first of all, Do we know and understand the Koran better than the scholars of the preceding genera-

¹ Cf. the present writer's article: "Die symbolische Rose in den nordafrikanischen religiösen Orden," in *Oesterreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 1890; p. 8 ff., where are presented a considerable number of such mistakes.

tion, and can we present this advanced knowledge to an instructed public in a sure form? This first question we can at once answer in the affirmative. Not that we have learned a great deal as regards the language and the exegesis of this sacred book of Islam, though there are peculiarities (for instance the knowledge of borrowed words)¹ by which our understanding has increased in this too. Yet in general the philological problems of the Koran are not so complicated as those of the Vedas and the Avesta. But the indefatigable zeal and masterly penetration of scholars like Theodor Nöldeke, W. Robertson Smith, and Julius Wellhausen² have, out of most minute researches into and criticism of the literary remains and by simultaneous comparison with other Semitic faiths, diffused surprising light upon pre-Islamic religion and the sentiments and institutions of the old Arabians: a significant progress compared to the last preceding valuable analysis of the pre-Islamic religion by Osiander (1853) and Ludolf Krehl (1862). By the deepening of our knowledge about the pre-Islamic state of Arabian religion, about the civilization and ethical positions, the customs and laws of the tribes, our points of view for judging Muhammad's reform are essentially enriched and its starting-points and antecedences are now clearer to our eye. In one word: the environment, in which the Prophet grew, the community to which he applied himself with his enthusiastic speech, have approached us scientifically and therefore we understand them better.

¹ S. Fraenkel, *De vocabulis in antiquis Arabum carminibus et in Corano peregrinis* (Lugd. Batav. 1880).—Dvöřak, *über die Fremdwörter in Koran* (Wien, 1885, Sitzungsber. der Akad. der Wiss. zu Wien, Phil. hist. Cl. vol. 109).

² W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (Cambridge, 1885; new edition, London, 1903); J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidenthums gesammelt und erläutert* (Berlin, 1887, Skizzen und Vorarbeiten, part 3; new edition, Berlin, 1897), and the important criticisms of these works by Th. Nöldeke, in *Z D M G.* vols. 40 and 41.—W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, First Series (London, 1889; new edition, 1899); Wellhausen, *Die Ehe bei den Arabern* (Göttingen, 1893, in *Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellsch der Wiss.* no. xi).

The impulse also inducing Muhammad to destroy the pagan traditions of his native country, the Jewish and Christian elements, namely, in his teaching, have been examined closer and closer. Though the theological interest has from the beginning of these studies ever favored the inquiry into the dependence of Islam on Judaism and Christianity, even this old tendency has again taken a new quickening, and I take pleasure in referring at this place to the valuable Eli Lectures of the American scholar Henry Preserved Smith on the relationship of the Koran to the Old and the New Testament.¹

Among the sources from which Muhammad derived the constructive thoughts of his doctrine, Parseeism enters more and more into the foreground of consideration. One could rather presume that the Prophet of Arabia has been influenced, besides some eschatological elements which the believers of monotheistic religions all owe to Parseeism, also in other religious points of view by the Madjus (as he calls the followers of Parseeism) who were accessible to him. It is not very attractive, that the idea of the personal "impurity" of the Unbeliever—a Persian idea—should be the fruit of this influence. And indeed, at a closer view we find that the motives to intolerance, the persecution of followers of other persuasions, and to inter-confessional quarrels show themselves also in the further development of Islam as the fruit of Persian influence and not as the primitive effects of Arabism, which is quite inoffensive in religious respects.² In the same proportion as the analytical researches are getting deeper and deeper, in like manner the special inquiries about single points of Koranic belief are spreading more and more. Consider-

¹ H. P. Smith, *The Bible and Islam, or the Influence of the Old and New Testaments on the Religion of Mohammed*, being the Eli Lectures for 1897.

² Cf. the present writer's paper: *Islamisme et Parsisme*, published in *Actes du premier Congrès international d'Histoire des Religions*. Vol. I, (Paris, 1901).

ing the manifold theoretical divergences existing between the different schools as to the dogmas which all could freely develop within their spheres, it will not be an easy task to state a dogmatic of Islam as a system, though desired from so many sides, which could be compared to the settled structure of the dogmatics of any Christian confession. My regretted teacher, Ludolf Krehl (died in 1901), who was one of the most competent authorities in this matter, has enriched science with many valuable special researches¹ and left a comprehensive work of this kind, which will, let us hope, be published by his pious successors. Meanwhile we have in different monographical researches many a useful treatise on the religious system of the Koran. Besides the work of Hubert Grimme² embracing the whole extent of this sacred book of Islam, we have monographs on *Muhammad's Doctrine of Revelation* (1898, by Otto Pautz)³ and also on *The Doctrine of Predestination in Mussulman Theology* (1902, A. de Vlieger).⁴

III

Considering the mere form, there is certainly no seemingly surer kind of authentication than the great volume of reports, recognized as the tradition of Islam, can show

¹ *On the Doctrine of Predestination in the Koran and its Relation to Other Islamic Dogmas* (Berichte der Kön. Sächs. Ges. der Wissensch. Phil. Hist. Cl. for 1870); *Contributions to Islamic Dogmatics*, I (*ibid.* 1885); *Muhammadan View on what they call fitra* (Festgruss an Rudolf Roth, Stuttgart, 1893); *Contributions to the Characteristic of the Doctrine about "Faith" in Islam* (Leipzig University-program for 1877).

² *A system of Koranic Theology* (Mohammed, part II, Münster, 1895.)

³ *Muhammads Lehre von der Offenbarung quellenmässig untersucht* (Leipzig, 1898).

⁴ The doctrinal differences between the various dogmatic parties, as well as their history, have not yet been worked out in a *conclusive* manner since the attempt made by Alfred v. Kremer, in his *Herrschende Ideen des Islams* (Leipzig, 1868) and by Prof. Houtsma, in his *Strijd over het dogma in den Islam* (Lelde, 1875). That is the reason why we have not dealt here with inquiries concerning single elements relative to this question. But we should mention many useful contributions hereto by Martin Schreiner in his studies published in *Z D M G*, vols. 42, 52, 53, and in the *Annual Reports* of the Berlin Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums, for 1895 and 1900.

The origin and the historical character of Sufism (Islamic theosophy and mysticism) in its manifold shapes are also among the tasks to be solved in times to come.

to prove its credibility. You there meet with testimonies reaching backwards from generation to generation to the very founders and from trustworthy informants, who, as regards character and moral integrity, are above all suspicion, about words and deeds of Muhammad and of his companions, who report the words and deeds of their Master. You will understand with what painful conscientiousness the pious Muhammadans applied themselves to possess the Master's words in authentic form as reported by the best witness. On this depended their exact knowledge of the sacred history of Islam, the correctness of their creeds, nay, the very righteousness of their religious and lawful life; in a word, the conditions of their salvation. Holding in mind the importance of this matter, full care was bestowed by Islam upon the proof of authenticity of these documents and also upon the statement of the criteria of trustworthiness.

We can boldly assert that the criticism bestowed by the science of orthodox Islam upon the transmitted bulk of tradition is in general the *oldest example for such critical activity in the literature of the whole world*. It is attested to have existed since the eighth and ninth centuries of our era and to have attained its prime in the tenth. And strange to say, we must state here that the merit of having first formed the idea of criticism of religious sources is due to Islamic theology. Influenced by the great accuracy bestowed by conscientious Islamic critics upon their material, Occidental students were in fact benumbed for a long time by the nimbus of authenticity and truth surrounding those collections of Muhammadan tradition whose professed end was to separate the chaff from the pure corn by the application of an apparently strict method.

But no sooner did we make a closer inspection than we had to come to the conclusion that the points of view

from which the Oriental critics started could lead to many a delusive result, in spite of the *bona fides* which they practiced. There are other critical points of view that are of value in our mature historical criticism. Thus you can find in the authenticated Islamic tradition contradictory information about the same events, and directly opposed utterances and orders of the Prophet on the same subject. You can find a great number of anachronisms which could only—as their theologians allow—be understood by the admission of prophetic foresight; there are praising and blaming remarks, approving and admonishing sayings, which can only refer to circumstances that occurred long after the time from which those traditions profess their derivation. You will see that the traditions often show plainly the tendency to uphold the lawfulness of the then actual constitution of the Islamic state; since their collection and criticism took origin under the shadow of the ‘Abbaside Khalifate. Nay, we have proofs that sayings, which might be favorable to opposing political schemes were directly suppressed. We have come, therefore, to the result that the tradition acknowledged as authentic, far from being able to pass for a testimony of the youth of Islam, has rather the varying stamp of the diverging directions and currents prevailing in different circles during the first three centuries. Hence the contradictory accounts and orders about the same question in religious and political affairs. Every school opinion has fabricated an authority reaching back to the Prophet’s time. Each of the diverging doctrines has for its support a sentence of the Prophet’s, which bears every appearance of authenticity, presenting itself in the most naïve and immediate manner. Orthodox believers, freethinkers, anthropomorphists, and spiritualists, all can show good traditions to support their doctrines.

The Islamic tradition presents the same picture in polit-

ical history. The distinguished Professor of Strassburg, Theodor Nöldeke, has proved recently (1898) in a classical essay, *On the Tendentious Construction of the History of the Primitive Ages of Islam*,¹ how reports about questions seemingly trivial, as, Who was Muhammad's first follower?—about the minute characteristics of Abû Tâlib, 'Ali's father—also of 'Abbâs, the Prophet's uncle—the reports about the part they played in Muhammad's childhood—were produced by political and constitutional tendencies.

The question, "To what end?" offers one of the most useful points of view in judging the tradition of Islam. To have clear insight into the laboratory of these highly appreciated documents of primeval Islam, we must always keep in mind the ritualistic, dogmatic, and political dissensions of struggling parties, which emerged in Islam in the course of its ancient stages of development.²

Sometimes the very text of the tradition lets us see, as it were, its own biography, for any one acquainted with the technics of this kind of literature. You may see this, for instance, in a little fragment of traditional text, which, though insignificant in itself, yet is highly interesting as regards the history of civilization, and which I am going to put before you in translation. For your better understanding I must premise that the quotation is preceded by the following doctrine attributed to the Prophet: "If you hear that the plague has broken out in a country, do not go there; but if you are already there, do not leave the country from fear of catching the illness."

You see, Islam is putting up here a practical precept of how the every-day experience of contagious diseases may be somehow squared with the conviction that one cannot escape God's decree, and that one should not even try to

¹ *Z D M G*, vol. 52.

² Cf. the author's *Muhammadanische Studien*, vol. II (Halle, 1890).

evade it. Two opinions seem to have existed in old Islam as regards infection. The one does not admit any causal connection of events, but imputes each to a separate decree of God's. Such a view could not admit the possibility of a contagious character in certain diseases. The other did not base the explanation of facts entirely on dogmatical suppositions; some at least cared, in spite of a fatalistic creed, for their own skin and for saving their own property. The following traditional report shows you the struggle of these two modes of proceeding:

"Abû Huraira relates that the Prophet taught the following: *there is no contagion and no cankering worm* (causing disease), *and no soul-ovels* (into which, according to the belief of the Arabs, the souls of the unavenged are transformed, in order to cry for the murderer's blood). Thereupon a Bedawi, who was present, threw in: 'O Messenger of God! but how is it that we see camels lying fresh and healthy like gazelles in the sand of the desert; then a scabby camel mixes with the flock, and infects all the healthy animals?' Then the Prophet replied: 'But who infected this sick camel?'

"Abû Salima relates that he heard later from Abû Huraira, that the Prophet had said: 'One must not bring a sick one among healthy ones,' and that he (A. H.) denied his previous comments. Then we said to him: 'Did you not say before, in the Prophet's name, "There is no contagion"? Then he muttered something in the Ethiopic language.—Abû Salima says: "I have never noticed that he had forgotten anything,"' (that he had told us formerly)."¹

You can believe me that the Oriental commentators were not wanting in ingenuity for making the shadow disappear which was cast by the story just mentioned upon

¹ Bukhari, *Tibb* nr. 35, *Sahih Muslim*, v, p. 54.

the earnestness and trustworthiness of Abû Huraira, who was one of the amplest informants from the Master. But, however naïvely the tale presents itself, it is technically nothing else than the reflex of, *first*, the two simultaneously existing views on the nature and efficiency of infection; *secondly*, the concession which knowledge, founded on experience, wrung from a religious conception. The fact of such a concession has found in Abû Huraira's hesitation and revocation a form suitable for these circles.

One is entitled to conclude that this critical penetration into the primeval documents of Islam shows a great progress in our knowledge of its oldest history. It is not only important, as regards the religious history of Islam, but also as concerns the criticism of the historical tradition. First on this path was Alois Sprenger, who not only pointed out, in his *Life and Doctrine of Mohammed* (1861-65), the importance of the traditions as an historical source, but also gave many hints for their critical use; an attempt, it is true, which has not removed altogether all credulity in the reconstruction of the ancient history of Islam. Since the great storehouse of the historical work of Tabarî became universally accessible in a completed edition, masters of historical and philological criticism, like Nöldeke, de Goeje, Wellhausen,¹ and their followers, have given us examples how we can gain from the narratives gathered by Tabarî, and which often represent the events from different points of view, by comparing them with

¹ M. J. de Goeje, *Mémoire de la Conquête de la Syrie* (Leide, 1900) [*Mémoires d'Histoire et de Géographie Orientales*, no. 2, new edition]. J. Wellhausen. *Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islam* [Skizzen und Vorarbeiten, VI]; the same; *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin, 1902).

Our knowledge of the situation under the Muhammadan conquest with regard to the native Christians, especially in Egypt, and in general about the system of administration and economy in the primary Islamic state, has been, after the standard works of Alfred v. Kremer, considerably promoted by the study of the Vienna Papyrus documents (Archduke Rainer), in whose examination Professor v. Karabacek has led (*Mittheilungen*, Vienna, 1886 ff.). We may hope that a further increase of our knowledge will be gained from the treasures acquired lately by Heidelberg University.

other data, an historical stratification of sources which can be used to construct real history.

But here we have to do only with religious tradition, and we have to bring out how the criticism of the traditions now more and more prevalent makes for a progress in Islamic science not to be underestimated. In spite of the radically skeptical tendency, which is imposed on it as a duty by its scheme, its method has proved to be a good means to lead to a positive history of the early development of Islam.

With the sources of Islamic law our view of the law itself must stand in the closest connection. About that also we have a few words to say.

IV

The idea formed about these matters, which are generally considered the zenith of Islamic spirit, has undergone a total change in the last few decades.

No later than two centuries after the birth of Islam, in the first half of the ninth century of our era, we find a well-developed and thoroughly elaborated system of Islamic law, which has been long considered the ripe fruit of Arabian genius.

This prejudice is now altogether removed, the more so, since we have learned how much this system owes to Roman law, not only in its particular regulations, but also, which is far more important, with regard to questions of principle in methodology. The Arabic names themselves of the Islamic science of law and of its authorities, have been proved to be the translation of corresponding Latin words. No doubt you will comprehend that the progress made in our knowledge of this relationship in Islamic law could not remain without influence on our judgment of its nature.

But this again had to give way to new ideas also from another point of view. The system of the Muhammadan

"Fikh," which, as "*rerum humanarum ac divinarum cognitio*," extending to all circumstances of the orthodox life: to ritual law in the widest sense, to legal states of social life, to the laws of Divine service, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage, purity, to the laws of food, to the regulations concerning religious war, as well as to the fundamental doctrines of politics and the constitution of the state, to the laws of family life and hereditary affairs, to those connected with obligations, to penal laws and judicial proceedings—this whole encyclopedical system of religious legislature had been considered as an actual constitution of law, setting up the organism of the Muhammadan state and family life, elaborated by sagacious legislators according to the practical wants of one vast empire, and whose management and execution had been the object of the anxious care of Muhammadan authorities for thirteen centuries: in one word, as a Code Napoléon for Islam.

In later days, historical consideration has proved that only a small part of this system, connected with religious and family life, has a practical effect as of old, while in many parts of merely juristical character this theological law is entirely put aside in actual jurisdiction. You see that we have not here to do with a living system of law, and also that those students of law have been on a wrong path who, without looking at the character of Islamic law in the light of history and to the criticism of sources, make use of these dead codes as data for the knowledge of life, and base their studies of comparative law on this view.

To the same distinguished Dutch Orientalist, whose great work upon Mekka, beside the *Manners and Customs* by Edward Lane, presents the most reliable and attractive description of Islamic life and society,¹ we owe the total change, carried out in general by his works, toward a right knowledge of Muhammadan law, and also the reform of

¹ G. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, 2 vols. (Haag, 1888-89.)

our general views about the character of Fikh. Snouck Hurgronje was really the first who set forth with great acuteness and sure judgment the historical truth, namely, that what we call Muhammadan law is nothing but an *ideal* law, a theoretical system; in a word, a learned *school-law*, which reflects the thoughts of pious theologians about the arrangement of Islamic society, whose sphere of influence was willingly extended by pious rulers—as far as possible—but which as a whole could hardly ever have been the real practical standard of public life. He finds there rather a *doctrine of duties* (*Pflichtenlehre*) of quite an ideal and theological character, traced out by generations of religious scholars, who wished to rule life by the scale of an age which in their idea was the golden period, and whose traditions they wished to maintain, propagate, and develop. Even the penalties for offenses against religious laws are often nothing else but ideal claims of the pious, dead letters conceived in studies and fostered in the hearts of God-fearing scholars, but neglected and suppressed in life where other rules became prevailing. We find even in the oldest literature of Islam many complaints about the negligence of the religious law by 'Ulema in their struggle against the practical judges, that is to say against the executors of actual law.¹

By this correct definition of Fikh as a doctrine of mere duties, the notion of its character appears in a new light. The scientific historical judgment of this discipline entered herewith into a new phase of which Snouck Hurgronje must be called the author.²

¹ Cf. the present writer's paper, *Muhammadanisches Recht in Theorie und Wirklichkeit*, in Kohler's *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. 8.

² The principal theories of this scholar, explained in his manifold publications, are summed up in his essays, *De Islam* (published in the Dutch review *De Gids*, 1886), *Le Droit Musulman in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, vol. 37 (1897).

Based on these methodical and historical principles, the Dutch scholar Th. W. Juynboll has given the most valuable scientific system of Muhammadan law in his work *Handleiding tot de Kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet* (Leiden, 1903).

By another fundamental doctrine Dr. Snouck has also established a new point of view for the understanding of the legal life of Islam. It had indeed been known before that orthodox Islam has four "roots" in its law: first, the Koran; secondly, tradition; thirdly, deductive reasoning; and fourthly, the concensus of the orthodox community. It was understood also, in a way, that the validity of these sources of law followed each other in descending rank; that is to say, the consideration of the ecclesiastic concensus only occupied the place of a root of law, in case scripture, tradition, and reasoning forsook us. Now we know—and this knowledge of ours is one of the most important advances in the science of Islam—that the *principle of concensus* (in Arabic *Idjmâ'*) *is in verity the key to comprehending the phenomena of historical Islam*. Not so much the Koran and tradition—I have said elsewhere—is the standard for the management of religious matters, as the manner in which the words and sense of these two are interpreted by the common feeling and sense of the competent community.

This principle is the foundation and the legitimizing basis for the admission, even for the obligatory character of all innovations adopted by Islam in the course of its history. The admission of a certain dogmatic method in explaining Koranic words, the authority awarded to the acknowledged collections of authentic traditions, the statement of what has to pass for orthodox in law, the admission of newly arisen opinions and doctrines, in one word, the whole historical Islam—all this is founded on the normative power of the consensus.

So the whole prevailing theory and practice must trace its legitimacy, even its legality, back to this. If we had only the text of the Koran, the texts of the Sunna, and the results of deductive reasoning, with these three approved

“roots” for the construction of law, we should have many riddles before us in considering the real religious life in Islam. How, for instance, could the worship of saints spread all over Islamic territory, with all the manifestations of anthropolatry attaching to it, and be brought into harmony with the uncouthly inflexible monotheistic theory on which the dogmatic of Islam is based? Are there not dozens of passages in the Koran and sayings in the Sunna to justify the fighting motto of the Wahhabites and of precedent puritans, who, in all these superstitions covered under the mask of piety, see only polytheism and mere paganism, by which the purity of the creed is dimmed and falsified? This would certainly be the case, if the great principle of Idjmâ‘ were not there to justify such outgrowths as being in accordance with righteous Islam, in spite of the contrast they form to the real doctrine of that religion. The general feeling of the believers has adopted all this, as well as many other strange things, so that there can be no “failing.”

Without the consideration of this great principle orthodox Islam, as it is, would be quite incomprehensible to us, as according to the ideas of Islamic theology, orthodoxy consists in being in complete congruity with the consensus. One becomes a heretic by merely contradicting the *Consensus Doctorum Ecclesiae*.

You will often have to deal in the history of Islam with the paradox that a reactionary doctrine corresponds to the traditional ones and still does not pass for orthodox. Take, for instance, the Wahhabite movement. It is a protest against anti-Islamic innovations; no one can deny that its puritanism agrees more nearly with the fundamental doctrines of Islam than the abominations against which it fought. But nevertheless it is heterodox. It rebelled against developments which in the course of the centuries

were admitted and sanctioned by the consensus, and for that very reason had the only legitimate claim to pass for the correct form of Islam, "*nam diuturni mores consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur*" (*Institut.* I, ii, 9).

v

But although, particularly in the Sunnitic quarters of Islam, this collective, or, as it has been called, catholic trait has manifested itself, it must be remarked, on the other hand, that just as much feeling has been shown for the *individual peculiarities* of the single parts of that wide territory over which the creed of Islam has spread.

This is shown most plainly in the attitude to the old pre-Islamic institutions of religion and law. Even the canonical Islamic system has assimilated many elements from the native systems of the conquered countries. Many a principle of method, as well as many a detail of Islamic law, has been borrowed from the Roman law, as we have just observed, and hence has become canonical law in Islam.

Yet it is not this that I wish to develop here further, but rather a manifestation of provincial individuality in the Muhammadan practice, still perceptible in our days. In complete independence of the main stream of canonical law Islam tolerates in many chapters of civil and criminal law native law-customs, which are often directly opposed to the theologically fixed law. Therein the ethnographical individualities put themselves forth with their national traditions. These provincial customs are called the 'Âdât. As Arabic philology attaches more importance now to scientific inquiry into popular dialects besides the classical language than it did four decades ago, in like manner the 'Âdât have been made a subject for collection and historical consideration within the period whose scientific progress forms the topic of this paper. But for our knowledge of

them, our information about *living institutions* would be utterly deficient.

And as there is no observation more fascinating in the history of the human mind than that of the close tie uniting the present state of nations with the traditions of their past, notwithstanding all the historical changes undergone by them, in like manner there lies, in this kind of facts, an elevating perception that traditions which have lasted for thousands of years are reflected in these 'Âdât, over which the flood of history has been flowing, without sweeping them away. Even Islam, that overwhelming power, which, sword in hand, stormed the nations, could not destroy them.

In the customary laws of the present Muslim Kabyles of Northern Africa you will find characteristic elements in disharmony with legal Islam, which are identical with or at least kin to the customs and laws mentioned in antiquity in connection with the Numidians and Mauritanians. Those people are quite aware of their opposition to Islamic ordinances, which extends even to Koranic commands as if the Koran had not been revealed to them at all. According to the Kabyle legislation the feminine sex is entirely excluded from the capability of partaking in any inheritance; women are deprived of all rights as regards private law. As to the civil law of the Koran these Kabyles opine that its prescriptions were made for a country quite different from theirs, for a nation that had a different manner of life from their own.¹ But nevertheless they are partakers in the community of Islam and look for the Paradise of Believers.

We can therefore welcome as one of the most gratifying advances in the knowledge of Islam, that more and more attention has been paid to the 'Âdât of the separate Mu-

¹ Cf. *Z D M G*, vol. 41, p. 38 ff.

hammadan people. Chiefly in two geographical territories much fertile work has been done. I have just mentioned the population of Northwest Africa being a territory where the French colonial administration has pursued the collection of the *Âdât* with great zeal. The three volumes by Hanoteau and Letourneaux, *La Kabylie et les coutumes Kabyles* (Paris, 1872-73), is a classical work of codification of Berber custom-law. As regards special studies, still more extensive is what Dutch scholars have done in the Indian insular colonies of their beautiful fatherland, for the knowledge of the *Âdât* among their Muhammadan subjects. The description of the religious life and social customs of the Atjehs (1893) and of the Gajô (1903), given to us by Snouck Hurgronje in two of his most instructive books,¹ offer undoubtedly the most exact treatise on the *Âdât* in countries whose formal law is Islam. The scientific reviews dedicated to the investigation of the philology, geography, and ethnography of Dutch India² are rich in fine and thorough investigations into these conditions. I can well mark these important researches and gatherings as a welcome advance in our modern scientific study of Islam, though they have mostly kept themselves rather in the frame of ethnography.

Equally rich in stimulating elements are the data of provincial peculiarities with which we meet in matters of creed and religious exercise. Here is a rich crop for the chapter of ethno-psychology and religious history which can be headed *Survivals* to use a term brought into vogue by Edward B. Tylor. We have examples of direct remains

¹ Snouck Hurgronje, *De Atjehers* (Batavia-Leiden, 1893-94), 2 vols.—*Het Gajoland en Zijne bewoners* (Batavia, 1903).

² Let us mention in the first place the volumes of *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, published by the Royal Institution for Dutch-Indian Studies. For special chapters on the *Âdât* of Java and Madura see Van den Berg, in the vol. 1892, pp. 454-512, and 1897, pp. 83-181. In the first note of the former paper some previous literature on the *Âdât* is mentioned. J. A. Nederburgh began in 1896 to publish in Batavia a periodical *Wet en 'Âdât*; but it was only carried on till 1898, in all, three issues.

of pagan worship in tribes, outwardly submitted to Islam. Al-Bekrî, an Arabic geographical author of the eleventh century (died 1094), transmits to us in this relationship remarkable facts about North African Islam. In his time many a Berber tribe made offerings to Roman monuments, prayed to them for the recovery of their sick, and felt grateful to them for the prosperity of their belongings.¹ This rather indefinite statement is completed by statements from the same author quoted by Yâkût, that three days' journey from Waddân in the territory of Fezzân, south of Tripolis,—now a place inhabited by an enormous number of Shurafâ,² that is, pretending descendants of the Prophet's family,—there was standing on a hill a stone idol called *Krza* (the vowel between *r* and *z* is uncertain). The neighboring Berber Kabyles made pilgrimages to this idol, brought it sacrifices, and held rogation ceremonies in time of drought. I am no friend of mere hypotheses and bold identifications of proper names. Nevertheless, in mentioning this African idol, I cannot help throwing out the query whether we have not before us in this *Krza* the remainder of the name *Gurzil*, mentioned by Corippus in his *Joannide* (II, vv. 109-110, 405; IV, vv. 669, 1139), as the name of an old Berber idol, identified with Jupiter Ammon, and brought into connection with an oracle.

At the same time a Berber tribe in the Atlas Mountains is said, by the same Al-Bekrî, to have worshiped a ram.³ And even in the fifteenth century Leo Africanus can tell us about customs of North African Berbers, which he explains as remains of ancient African paganism which had not disappeared in the times of Islam.⁴ The worship of the

¹ *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, XII, p. 458.

² Cf. Rohlf's, *Kufra* (Leipzig, 1881), p. 147 ff. 176; Mohammed b. Othman el-Hachalchî, *Voyage au pays des Senoussia* (translated by Serres and Lasram, Paris, 1903), p. 134 ff.

³ Bekrî, *Description de l'Afrique septentrionale* (ed. de Slane, Alger, 1857), p. 161, 4.

⁴ *Descriptio Africae* (ed. Antwerpen), p. 112.

ram in Muhammadan North Africa can be brought into analogy with a parallel from quite the opposite end of the territory of Islam. Al-Dimishkî, a cosmographic writer of the thirteenth century (died 1256), informs us regarding the province of Ghilân, Northwestern Persia, along the shores of the Caspian Sea, that the Muhammadans of that country labored under materialistic ideas about the Deity. They went so far as to conceive of God as riding at midday on a white ass. And in fact they bestowed great honors on asses of that color.¹ Indefinite as this remark of the Arabic author may be, at any rate it serves us as testimony of well-pronounced animal-worship among a population who no doubt esteemed themselves orthodox adherents of Islamic faith. Perhaps there is some relation between this superstitious cult of a *white* ass and the ideas about the mythological *Kharem ashavanem* (probably a white ass) of the Zarathustrians (*Bundahish*, ch. xix).

We have thus seen solid pagan remains in the midst of Muhammadan populations. But such religious survivals are not attested of former times only. In different parts of the Islamic world paganism, with uncultivated tribes, in its more or less original forms, has outlasted the ruling influence of Islam, although that was established centuries ago. A remarkable instance in the religious conditions of Muhammadan Madagascar is given in the description supplied by the French Consul, M. Gabriel Ferrand, who has with great industry and zeal revealed to us Malagasy philology and ethnography. Although the Sakalava people have adhered to Islam for three centuries, "they have adopted Islam without bringing any notable change to their former customs and manners." Allah and the Prophet take a prominent place in their religious ceremonies, yet still inferior to Zanahatry and Angatra, their national di-

¹ Dimischki, *Cosmographie ed. Mehren* (St. Petersburg, 1866), p. 226.

vinities. Their life continues to be ruled by the observation of their tabu views, called *fady* in their language, and their magicians pursue undisturbed the pagan customs of their ancestors, with the only difference that this sorcery is practiced under the standard of *Allâh akbar*.¹

This sort of paganism surviving under the shield of a Muhammadan exterior is one of the most decisive factors in the *individual* formation of provincial Islam, and has resisted all exertions of clerical influence enforcing itself from abroad. The following fact, observed in the Caucasian Ingush tribe, can be considered as typical for the coating of pagan reminiscences with the superficial forms of Islam. We choose our examples with intention from parts of the Muhammadan world separated from each other by great distances. The Ingush are Muhammadans in name; but as with most peoples inhabiting mountains, their ancient paganism has conserved itself under their exterior Islam. Hahn, who is best acquainted with the customs of these populations, reports that the worship of the idol Gushmile is almost universal among them and explains how this worship can agree very well with that of Allah. The Muhammadan Galgai (in the Caucasus) pray only by night in front of quadrangular stone columns of the height of a man, erected on hills and in cemeteries. Remarkable is the worship of skeletons in an ossuary near Nasran. The skeletons are said to come from their *Narthes* (ancestors) and to have begun to decay only since the arrival of the Russians. These objects of worship are *covered with green shawls from Mekka*.² This green shawl from Mekka, with which the objects and forms of the old traditional worship are covered, interprets very fittingly the

¹ *Les Musulmans à Madagascar et aux îles Comores*, III (Paris, 1902), p. 80 ff.

² Hahn, *Bei den Pschaven, Chevsuren, Kisten und Inguschen*, in *Beilage* no. 101, *Münchener Allgem. Zeitung*, 1898.

ethno-psychological process involved in the Islamification of such populations. Green is the Prophet's color. Under the "green shawl" the old national *religious* 'Ādāt continue to live.

Even in places where the Islamic ingredients have opposed the popular creed with greater force, this national element lends an individual living color, reflecting the special character of Islam in the different provinces to which it extends, and rendering prominent its locally defined peculiarities.

The minute observation of such facts, on the other hand, has also been useful in reconstructing elements of ethnical religions, which were extinct long ago in their original form, but have been preserved under a superficial Muhammadan veil up to the present day. Following this method Samuel Ives Curtiss, the distinguished professor of Chicago, was able to construct from the present religious customs of the Bedawîn in Syria, Palestine, and the Sinai Peninsula the primitive rites of Semitic religion in a book¹ which fully met the approbation of learned circles on both sides of the ocean. Further researches following the way he took will, no doubt, add to his accumulation of evidence.

Some remains of ancient libation customs have, for instance, been preserved in a communication drawn from the book of the late Egyptian Minister 'Alî Bâshâ Mu-bâarak, which is most ample in this respect.² In the neighborhood of Kastal, in the peninsula of Sinai, is the tomb of a Shaikh Marzûk al-Kifâfi, lying on the Egyptian pilgrims' road. When passing this grave, pilgrims are wont to

¹ *Primitive Semitic Religion of To-day: a Record of Researches, Discoveries, and Studies in Syria, Palestine, and the Sinaitic Peninsula.* (New York, 1902.) German translation: *Ursemitische Religion im Volksleben des heutigen Orients*, with a Preface by Professor Graf W. Baudissin (Leipzig, 1903).

² *Al-Khitat al-âjadida*. Cairo, 1304-06 (1886-88), 20 volumes. Cf. XIII, p. 20.

break glasses filled with rosewater, prepared beforehand in Cairo for that purpose, and to pour the odorous contents over the grave-hill of the quite unknown shaikh. The ancient Semitic ceremony of libation is here extended to an unknown personage transformed into an Islamic saint.

The festival-cycle of universal Islam, with its movable lunary calendar, has no connection at all with the life of nature. The feasts are not spring or autumn feasts; they are bound to days in the calendar which are subject to migration through all seasons. This want is supplied in the popular religious exercises by adopting old pre-Islamic feasts and giving them an Islamic stamp. The Nile, "God's gift," plays, of course, no rôle in the canonical books of Islam. But in the popular religious customs of Egyptian Islam nearly the same reverence is rendered to it as in the land of the pagan Pharaohs, with the difference that everything is turned Islamic and interpreted in that sense. And likewise in the practice of religious customs in Islamic Egypt, as well as in many other countries, pre-Islamic customs and pagan religious conceptions have been adapted and blended with Islamic sense, apart from the official worship, in different circles. The pagan worship of trees, stones, wells, and demons has been preserved; so within the official religious worship numerous superstitious customs of the national pre-Islamic traditions have survived. There is no department in religious life where such traditions present themselves in a more original way than the rites of rogation for rain (*istiskâ*), which have shown themselves to be real depositories of pagan witchcraft.

You will not be astonished at the toleration of much pagan custom within official Islam, if you consider that in the holiest spot of Islam, "God's House" in Mekka, the fetishism exercised at it with the "Black Stone," the formalities of the holy pilgrimage are all *sacra* taken over by

Muhammad himself from the ancient Arabian religion, over which the veil of monotheism has been spread.

I esteem the cultivation of this realm of research and the insight obtained from it into the *individualism*, stamped differently according to provinces upon the catholic Islam, to be one of the most valuable acquisitions of the new Islamic studies. We are thus introduced to the knowledge of *living Islam* and to the historical and ethnographical factors of its manifestations of life. We have passed beyond Reland's theoretical Islam, "*uti docetur in templis et scholis Mohammedicis*," with a mighty step.

A very peculiar field of remainders turned with an Islamic sense is the *worship of saints*. In the forms of this manifestation of religious life, the remains of the old times have taken shelter unknowingly. As in other world-religions, the Muhammadan saints also are often transformed successors of ancient objects of worship. In the local worship of saints, as we just remarked of the tomb of Shaikh Marzûk, near Kastal, remains of pre-Islamic rites are mostly preserved.

Islam has taken hold even of Buddhist sanctuaries, in countries formerly inhabited by followers of Buddha, and interpreted them to suit its own sense. Buddha's footsteps in Ceylon have easily become the footsteps of 'Ali; a jug of Buddha's venerated in Kandahar has been transferred to Muhammad. Grenard, companion to the unfortunate explorer Dutreuil de Rhins in his East Turkestan travels and elaborator of their results, could say with right, about the Muhammadan holy places of pilgrimage in ancient Buddhist territory, that the holy personages worshiped there are mostly *un avatar Musulman de Buddha*.¹ This tenacity of local cults on formerly Buddhistic ground occupied by Muslims has been since confirmed on a larger

¹ *Mission scientifique dans la Haute-Asie* (1890-95), III, p. 46.

scale by my fellow countryman Dr. M. A. Stein, in his wonderful explorations in Chinese Turkestan.¹

It results from all this that it is especially in dealing with the local and provincial worship of saints that we can obtain the information and collect the materials which we have pointed out in the precedent notices as objects of study in religious history. We do not possess a *Legenda aurea* of Islam, nor do Bollandists of Islam come to our help, though the sphere of this religion would be extremely rich in materials for such collections.² We have to gather our materials ourselves with great pains from a wide branching original literature and from the information furnished by observant travelers. Large tracts of Islam are not so well worked for such a crop as we might expect from the means and the easy opportunities offering themselves to explorers just there. I think chiefly of India here. Much preparatory work is done for Egypt, where the learned statesman already mentioned has furnished most valuable materials in his topographical description of the country. Also for Palestine and Syria a considerable amount of careful work has been done in this respect by the coöperators of the Exploration Funds. And extremely useful are the contributions being continually presented of late by the Algerian school,³ following the guidance of René Basset, in this chapter of individual formations in Maghrebine Islam, on the relationship of the special worship of saints in this quarter of Islam to the old traditions of its population.

VI

In our flying review of the progress of Islamic science,

¹ *Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan* (London, 1904), pp. 180 ff.; 226; 329.

² C. Trumelet, *Les Saints de l'Islam, Légendes hagiologiques et croyances algériennes.—Les Saints du Tell* (Paris, 1881).

³ We will point out here in this order of studies the remarkable essay of Doutté, *Notes sur l'Islam maghrilin. Les Marabouts* (Paris, 1900), and other contributions of this scholar.

we could not, within the space we can justly claim for it here, possibly discuss all the questions whose examination marks the progress which this science has taken in the later times. Especially we must regret that we could not devote a special chapter to that ample increase which the knowledge of Muhammadan sects has gained lately. In this respect we should have to mention here among many others in the first place the exhaustive researches of Edward G. Browne on the Bâbî movement in Persia.¹

It could not be our intention to exhaust the task set before us in all its details and to enter into all the starting-points which would present themselves to us in exposing our theme. We can point out only the most prominent points of view from which this progress has been carried out.

What I intended to show you and that of which I desired to convince you is chiefly this: that the undeniable intrinsic progress of Islamic studies has manifested itself in the following ways in the last decades:

- (1) The deeper knowledge of *ancient Islam* and of its *constitutive factors*;
- (2) the methodical treatment of the *documents* reflecting *the development* of Islam;
- (3) the truer insight into the character of the *institutions and laws* of Islam;
- (4) the increasing estimation of *individual formations* within *universal* Islam; and
- (5) the consideration of the *after-effects of pre-Islamic traditions* upon those popular and individual formations.

¹ *A Traveller's Narrative written to illustrate the episode of the Bâb* (two vols.), Cambridge, 1891; *The Târikh-i-jadîd, or New History of . . . the Bâb*: Cambridge, 1893, and many contributions of the same scholar on Bâbî history and literature in the *Journal* of the Royal Asiatic Society.—Cf. also the valuable publications of the Russian scholar A. H. Toumansky on the religious books of the sect.

VII

Our review would be still more defective if we did not add one more remark in appreciation of a means which has helped and still helps us in a valuable way to produce significant progress in our understanding of Islam. I have in mind the important *documents of Islamic religious science* which are within our reach through the labors of printers in the Orient itself. He who would in the sixth decade of the past century study, for instance, one of the most prominent monuments of the religious spirit of Islam, the *Vivification of Sciences*, by Al-Ghazâlî, or other important works of this author, had to seek access to the manuscripts of more or less accessible libraries. Among the great collections of traditions, others than Bukhârî were mostly known only by names or from quotations. Only a few selected men had admittance to these others, no less important. It was seldom that an Occidental scholar got sight of the mass of commentaries, in which an inappreciable philological material, a valuable apparatus for text-critical and exegetical purposes is accumulated, which is so precious in the very field of traditions. The oldest documents of the literature of legal institutions were thought lost. The works of the theological scholastics, whence we take our information about the nature and history of the dogmas of Islam, were only known to a defective extent. All this has been done away with for nearly three decades and a half, by printing in Islamic countries: Turkey, Egypt, Northern Africa, India, Persia. As even the strongest bulwark of ancient Islam, the holy city of Mekka, had to permit telegraph wires to enter her consecrated walls, in like manner she has become one of the centres of Islamic printing. Those publications have furnished us with some of the most important primary sources, sometimes in numer-

ous bulky volumes whose publication could never have been thought of in Europe or America. And even that the most capital commentaries of the Koran, for example the great exegetical work of Tabarî in thirty parts and the "Keys of the mystery" of the great dogmatic authority, Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî, in eight bulky volumes, have become accessible to our scholars, is due to the activity of Oriental typography.

In view of the profit gained from such publications, we excuse willingly the confusing and for our eyes most painful way in which the Persian and Indian lithographs present the explanatory glosses and marginal commentaries. The easy possibility of studying these works nowadays, and rendering them profitable for our researches has been a strong factor in the progress of the thorough and special knowledge of the historical development of the doctrines and institutions of Islam.

That the scholars of the Orient may also profit from our critical method, that they, to whom we owe so much splendid material, may, by intelligent collaboration in our endeavors, contribute to the promotion of scientific work about their own past and present, must be our wish.

THE RELATION BETWEEN ECCLESIASTICAL AND GENERAL HISTORY

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How is ecclesiastical history related to general history? This is a question which is either not treated at all in text-books on ecclesiastical history or treated very briefly. The omission is easy to understand, for it proceeds from a view taken in earlier times and not yet exploded. The ancient and the medieval church regarded the history of the church as something that differed from the history of the world. The Catholic churches of our own day still regard it in the same light. They are convinced that the church is under God's special guidance, possesses an infallible doctrine, is governed by men appointed by the Deity Himself, and has received a promise that it shall remain unchanged until the end of all things. The church and its affairs are thus sharply separated from the rest of history; and while the rest of history, of course, exercises an effect on the church, the effect is only on the circumference and does not reach the centre.

This way of looking at the matter found its classical expression in the earliest account which we possess of eccle-

siastical history, namely, that given by Eusebius. According to him the history of the church is only the further operation and fuller development of the fact that in Jesus Christ the divine Logos came down from heaven, and since that time the history of the church has a place within ordinary history as a history of another kind. This is a view which is in no way affected by putting the beginnings of ecclesiastical history in some sense or other as far back as the beginnings of the human race. Such, indeed, was the attempt which Eusebius, following Justin Martyr, tried to make, and which Augustine actually carried out in his great work *On the City of God*. But by going back to the beginnings of the human race it is obvious that the whole conception of a church and its history may easily be frittered away and destroyed. There were liberal theologians in early times and in the Middle Ages who thus destroyed it—Abelard, for instance. This, however, was not the way in which the church itself understood that its history should be carried back. On the contrary, it clings to the belief that within the general course of events there is a sacred history which is supernatural.

The Protestants of the sixteenth century did not really break with this conception. They did, indeed, deny that the church with its external forms and its government was a divine creation. The whole idea of the church they explained from within. But of the spiritualized church, which they often saw only in the form of a small community, they asserted very much the same thing as Catholicism maintains of its big church. They hardly did anything to shake the notion that there were two kinds of events, and the church remained, as before, the scene of a second history. Orthodoxy in the Protestant churches in our own day still persists in this view. Whether there is any fundamental justification for it is a question on which we shall touch at the close;

but certain it is that in the form in which orthodoxy still clings to the idea it is untenable. The very fact that there is absolutely no criterion by which we can distinguish two kinds of history is enough to destroy it. Moreover, it is also shown to be incorrect by the further fact that all the forces which the church was unwilling to recognize as of equal importance with itself, it had to combat as enemies, thus producing a state of permanent unrest. Finally, experience itself refutes this view, for only when belief in a special kind of history was given up did the history of the church begin to be understood.

It was in the seventeenth century that certain enlightened spirits first shook off this wrong notion. The eighteenth century further developed the knowledge thus won; in the nineteenth it was partly obscured again, but in the end it held its own. We can now say: *The history of the church is part and parcel of universal history, and can be understood only in connection with it.*

But if the history of the church is a part of universal history, it is closely bound up with other factors and developments, not as something alien, but as something akin to them; nay, it is only when thus bound up that it exists at all. The more attention we pay to these connections, the better we shall understand it. There are four large departments of history with which we are here specially concerned:

I. Political history.

II. The history of religion in general.

III. The history of philosophy and of knowledge as a whole.

IV. Economic history.

I have purposely refrained from speaking of the history of civilization in particular, because it cannot be treated scientifically without being divided into various sections.

I.

Political history, in the widest sense of the word, is history proper; for on the way in which men are formed into communities, everything else that happens and all development depend. We may say, then, that the history of the state is the backbone of general history. If we fail to recognize this we reduce history to a series of romances or a sort of clever argument. For the scientific study of ecclesiastical history, therefore, we must insist, first, that the political or social character of the church shall be kept well in mind; and secondly, that its relation to the state in which it grew up, and to the states and communities in and among which it lives, shall be carefully examined.

That the church is a political organization has, of course, in some form or other, always been recognized. Even Eusebius spoke of it as a "polity." But it was only with the historian Mosheim that the first serious attempt was made to present this point of view. Up to his time people shrank from doing so, because they feared, not without reason, that the "divine" nature of the church would suffer if its political character were placed in the foreground. The clue which Mosheim gave was not sufficiently attended to by the philosophical historians in the Romantic movement during the first half of the nineteenth century, unless I except Richard Rothe; nay, even now the correct view has yet to make its way.

The results which it gives us I may state at once: *In every age the first thing to consider is the constitution of the church. But in every period of the history of the church its constitution has been dependent on the general political conditions and ideas of the time; or, to put the matter more accurately, the church has at all times shown a tendency to copy within itself the constitution of the state in which it*

lived, or to prescribe to the state the constitution which the state was to have.

The truth of this proposition may be proved at every point in the history of the church. Consider the Roman Catholic Church—what else is it but the old Roman Empire reproduced in the ecclesiastical domain? At the opposite pole to the Roman Church stand the Free Congregational churches. But do not they, too, correspond to the political idea which prevailed in the land of their birth at the time when they arose, and still prevails? And all the different forms of churches which lie between these two extreme limits—are they not all of them ecclesiastical imitations of the political constitutions in and among which they exist? Everywhere the constitution of the church has followed the pattern set for the time being by the state, or anticipated the constitution which the state was to take.

But by tending to copy the constitution of the state in which it lives, the church comes into a double relation to the state—a friendly and a hostile relation. Up to a certain point this tendency helps the state to carry out its necessary aims. Yet on the other hand, as a result of this same tendency, the church becomes *the rival of the state*. The state must inevitably desire that everything developed within its borders shall be homogeneous with it, so far as law, authority, and the relations of the various classes are concerned. In this sense it is very glad to extend its toleration, nay, even to give privileges, to a community formed in accordance with its regulations. But the church, as a religious community, also possesses *rights of its own*, and as soon as it extends these over the whole field of its political organization, it enters into secret or open opposition to the state; it becomes its rival.

The conflicts, however, which in these circumstances were inevitable, led to complications of a still greater kind. For,

in the first place, the church claimed to be the legitimate successor of the theocratic Jewish State, however much it also emphasized the fact that it itself was something new and of a different nature. In making this claim it at once, protest as it might to the contrary, advanced political pretensions of the most comprehensive character, even if at first it asserted them only negatively. In the second place, the church was not content with simply copying within itself elements in the organization of the state. It refused to allow anything that it copied to have any value outside its own pale. By its own marriage-law it depreciated the civil marriage-law. By the development of its official hierarchy it lowered the authority of the state officials. By its Papacy it lowered the Imperial dignity. Finally, in the third place, after compelling the state to accept the Christian creed, it put the state into a position of the greatest difficulty. By accepting the creed, the state placed itself on the ground taken by the church, and declared the ideals of the church to be the right and the highest ideals. If it was now driven to defend itself against the claims of the church to be master, it was compelled to fight with broken weapons, because it dared not attack the ultimate principles of the church from which its own power was derived. The "Christian" state, then, when confronted by the church, was bound to come off worst; for it was only half what the church was entirely. The Christian state is the state undermined and sucked dry by the church. It is like a towering tree brought to decay by the creeper that has fed on its sap. But when the state decays the national consciousness is always in danger of disappearing as well.

With certain exceptions, however, things did not come to this pass even in the Middle Ages. In the East the state found ways and means of taking over important functions of theocratic government, and of effecting an intimate fusion

between church and nationality. In the West the tension between church and state led to struggles which promoted the progress of civilization; for at the very moment when the church appeared to have attained its aim, the proof was afforded that, however capable it may be of winning a victory, the church is unable to keep possession of the field. Nay, the great developments then began which led to the formation of our modern states and of the Protestant churches. It is part of the very character of modern states that they no longer are, or aim at being, Christian in the same sense as medieval states, and Protestant churches have either wholly or in part given up all theocratic pretensions. But in this connection we must not overlook the fact that even the constitutions and ecclesiastical ideals of the Protestant churches, although they derive their basis from the inherent nature of Protestantism and from the Bible, are in strict dependence on the political theories and ideals which modern times have produced. The state church, the national church, more particularly as it is developed in Germany, offers in all its stages a precise parallel to the developments of the modern state, and the various theories of the state. In the same way, wherever free churches are formed, they are dependent upon the republican and democratic ideas of the period. The converse, it is true, has also happened: a Christian idea has preceded the political idea; but it was the political idea which first produced an ecclesiastical polity corresponding to it. The Christian idea, too, as a rule, asserted itself only when political ideas akin to it came to its aid.

This shows us that the study of political history is the necessary preliminary to the study of ecclesiastical history. Without it the most important developments remain unintelligible. In the history of the church, however, every stage of the political history of the last two thousand years is still, as it were, actually present. In the two great Catho-

lic churches, the Roman and the Græco-Russian, the forms and tendencies of the Middle Ages are embodied; they still live on in them and still threaten us to-day—in Jesus Christ's name—with that Babylonian theocracy which destroys all national and individual freedom. We know how it came about that this universal theocratic ideal could establish itself on Christian ground. A great fraternity embracing the whole human race—have we not there one of the inalienable ideals of Christendom, yet also an ideal which gave room for the mistaken notion, nourished as it was by Old Testament ideas, that this union could be attained in the quickest and safest way by a universal political church-system? The notion is far from being exploded, but it will be driven from the field just in proportion as the ideal of a Christian fraternity *on the basis of freedom* becomes a power.

On the basis of freedom—and *on the basis of nationalities*; for another lesson which political history, when examined in connection with ecclesiastical history, teaches us is that in the latter nationalities play an enormous part, and that any attempt to get rid of them is in vain. Every great nationality has made itself at home in the church in its own way. We can distinguish a Greek, a Latin, a German, an English, an American church-system, etc., etc., and the distinctions that obtain here are more important than all others. They are apparent, above all, in the mode of worship and in the way in which Christianity is practiced; but even the development of doctrine has always been subject to strong national influences. No one who overlooks these distinctions, or explains them wrongly, can help falling into the grossest mistakes and making history obscure. The Christian fraternity at which we aim will come, not as a union of denationalized individuals, but as a union of friendly peoples, each one of which will have developed the best qualities of its race and nationality. This cannot take place

unless each nation knows its own and others' national peculiarities. Nor can the ecclesiastical historian dispense with this knowledge if he wishes to understand the past and prepare for the future of the church.

II.

National history leads us direct to the history of religion in general; for the religions of the peoples to which the church came are very closely bound up with their national peculiarities. If, then, we are to study the history of the Christian religion, a thorough knowledge of the religions of the Greek, the Roman, the Germanic peoples, etc., is necessary. What resistance did these religions offer, what kind of resistance was it, in what respect was it strongest and in what weakest, and by what means did the church overcome it?—these are the questions which at once arise and demand an answer if we are to understand the history of the church.

But there is something more. We should be very short-sighted if we conceived the relation between the Christian religion and other religions solely as a contradiction. That they, too, have had an influence on the *development* of the Christian religion has long been known. Formerly, indeed, it was believed that this influence must be limited to the Christian heresies. It was held that the existence of the Gnostic sects and the rise of other phenomena were to be explained by the influence of paganism on Christianity. But it has become evident in an increasing degree that *the church itself* was also affected by the alien religions with which it fought. Their influence is apparent in the most varied fields, but especially where rites and ceremonies, sacraments, and popular religious ideas are concerned. In Catholicism a religion of the first and a religion of the second order can be distinguished as existing side by side.

If the first kind was to a considerable degree affected, the second was very strongly determined by extra-Christian superstitions. To investigate the extent of this influence in regard to each particular problem is always, no doubt, a task demanding a great deal of care and critical tact. We are more inclined in these days to overvalue than to undervalue the influence of alien religions, and we are too ready to assert dependence where all that is in question is a parallel set of phenomena, developing here and there spontaneously. The abuse of this method, however, must not prevent us from seeing that there are many important phenomena in the inner history of the church which can be explained only by taking account of alien religions; and that, when we are dealing with this history, to look at it from the point of view of the general history of religions is a method that has already borne rich fruit and promises still more.

But it is not enough to study the influence of alien religions on the *history* of Christianity. Nay, we have seen with increasing clearness in the last few decades that the *origin*, too, of Christianity cannot be understood without taking account of them. The Christian religion, no doubt, is the religion of Jesus Christ; but it came when "the time was fulfilled." The Christian religion, then, is the Jewish religion fulfilled, that is to say, brought to a completion and transfigured. But the Jewish religion in Jesus' time was not a simple affair; on the contrary, through the labors of the prophets and the influence of other religions it had become a spiritualized but also a highly complex fabric. In the breadth of its development it was a syncretistic religion, but even on its inner side it was deepened and enriched by extra-Jewish elements. In the course of its transformation into Christianity it did not lose these component parts of its nature. That is why we must go back to Babylon and Assyria, to Egypt and Persia, to discover the origin of im-

portant elements in Christianity. We are doing this to-day, but in doing it we too often overlook the more serious and difficult business of studying the *changes in meaning* which the received elements underwent. Merely to state that they exist, and to say whence they come, carries us a very little way. Nay, we shall become involved in huge misunderstandings and confusions if we do not attend to the *place* which the old material held and the *new meaning* which it received in the Christian Church from the very beginning. It is no doubt true that the seven great Angels came from Babylon, the Devil from Persia, the Logos from Greece. But in the gospel and the apostolic writings the Devil means something different from Ahriman, and the Logos of John and Ignatius is not the Logos of Philo. We can only desire with all our hearts that not only in regard to the Old Testament, but also in regard to the New, the investigation of religious history shall go on; but we must just as earnestly insist that in this process the great changes in the meaning of ideas and conceptions shall be clearly kept in view. Even where the dependence of Christian ideas and practices on pagan is particularly evident—I mean in the case of the sacraments—we must not be content with merely pointing out this dependence; for the Christian doctrine of the sacraments has characteristic features of its own; as is proved, for example, by Justin Martyr's account of baptism.

There is another reason, too, why we must study the history of religion in general. We must study it not only because the history of the church in nearly all its stages has acted on other religions and been itself affected by them, but also because a complete understanding of *one* religion cannot possibly be obtained without a knowledge of others. It is true that the historian of the Christian Church is here at an advantage compared with the historian of any other religion; for Christianity—together with its precursor,

Judaism—is, in space and time, content and development, something so universal that almost all conceivable religious phenomena are to be found in its history. Nevertheless we cannot hope to obtain a definite knowledge of Christianity unless we compare it with other religions. We run too great a risk of taking what is important for what is unimportant, what is primary for what is secondary, and *vice versa*, if we do not compare—so far as comparisons are at all possible. Here, too, the words of the poet apply:

Ehe es sich ründet in einem Kreis
Ist kein Wissen vorhanden;
Ehe nicht Einer Alles weiss
Ist die Welt nicht verstanden.

I do not, of course, mean that our Faculties of Christian Theology should be turned into Faculties of the General History of Religion—we are not here concerned with any merely academic question—but still I am quite sure that the student must not separate the history of Christianity from this wider history, and that the progress of knowledge depends on observing the connection of both.

III.

The history of religion in general leads us to the psychology of religion, and here we have a fresh means of understanding the facts of ecclesiastical history. It is only in the last ten years that we have begun to bring religious psychology and the comparative history of religion into connection with each other, and we have thereby obtained some very valuable results already. Let me specially mention the labors of William James. They have shown us that to study the history of the Christian religion on its dogmatic side alone is not enough, and that together with and previous to this study we can and must pay attention to the fundamental manifestations of religion themselves. In this way

the *independent character* of the religious life has been more vividly brought to mind, and we have been able to get a better view of the question as to what is morbid and what is healthy in religion, what is eccentric and what is central.

Still, these investigations are more applicable to the religions before Christianity than to Christianity itself; for, owing to the close connection between religion *and ethics* which Christianity exhibits, all manifestations of religion that are devoid of an ethical meaning lose their force. They seem to us only just tolerable but not characteristic or normal expressions of religion. Then again, the clear and certain character of the Christian idea of God leaves no room for a state of religious emotion based on the feeling that the Deity is a dark and overwhelming force. Christian piety, as the apostle Paul says, is a "reasonable service," and therefore it stands nearer to the highest qualities and activities of the mind than to the lower.

To philosophy, too, therefore, and to knowledge generally it stands in close relation. This was noticed even in the earliest ages. The Christian apologists of the second century explained Greek philosophy as due to the same spirit of which the full revelation was exhibited in Jesus Christ; and Clement of Alexandria regarded it, equally with the Old Testament, as a preliminary stage of the Christian religion. The development of dogma in the primitive church stood under the influence of Greek philosophy, more especially of Platonism; and in the Middle Ages Aristotle helped to build up the church's intellectual system. In modern times the philosophy of Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling has had its effect on Protestant dogmatics; and in our own day theology has been strongly influenced by the modern theory of knowledge and by psychology generally, as well as by the theory of development.

This is all so evident and so notorious that there is no

need to expatiate on the fact that without a knowledge of the history of philosophy we cannot study the history of the church. But Hegel and his followers ask us to take a step further: Christian doctrine and philosophy, they say, are not only intertwined with each other, are not only akin to each other, but are in the last resort identical. The considerations leading to this hypothesis are as follows: Religion exhibits the relation between man and the Absolute, and a knowledge of the Absolute is that to which our intellectual efforts are directed. In the lower stages of religion, however, this relation is at best only felt; and hence these stages are incomplete, particularistic, and incumbered with alien matter. As development progresses they become more and more pure and spiritual, until they reach their culminating point in Christianity. God is then revealed and recognized as the absolute and immanent Spirit. According to this view, the history of the formation and development of Christian dogma is the real history of the Christian religion; and the most important elements, too, in dogma are the speculative assertions, especially those on the nature of the Trinity and on Christology; for in them the pure, pantheistic knowledge of God comes to expression, in part clearly and plainly, in part only lightly veiled. In this way the history of philosophy and the history of higher, especially of the Christian, religion, are, rightly understood, identical; nay, in their identity we get not only the true history of the human spirit but also the history of God Himself: in this history the *Absolute Spirit* "has come to itself."

This magnificent conception of the history of the church is not, indeed, without some value; but, for all that, it cannot be accepted. That the knowledge of God as the Absolute Spirit forms a main element in the Christian religion is true. On the other hand, since the aim of philosophy is

to get at the ultimate reasons for everything, and these are not to be found in anything material, an elective affinity is thereby established between philosophy and spiritual religion. Moreover, the higher forms of religion have at all times made use of philosophical thought in order to justify the idea of God and give it a fuller development; and, conversely, philosophy has taken account of the ideas expressive of religious and more particularly of Christian faith. But these circumstances must not blind us to the fact that religion and a philosophical theory of the world, so long as the latter keeps to its own ground, are two different things. Religion is a definite state of feeling and will, basing itself on inner experience and on historical facts. This it remains even in its highest stages; and hence the intellectual element in it, although an absolutely necessary element, always takes the second place. Again, religion is never "disinterested," as any theory must be; on the contrary, it has to do with hopes and aspirations; nay, we may even say that religion is the instinct of self-preservation in a higher form—an instinct, however, which in the Christian religion is not concerned with the empirical *Ego* and with earthly life, but with the inmost core of this *Ego*, which is another world, the world of Freedom and the Good, sees its true home. Philosophy cannot and may not know anything of all this, except in so far as it calls religion to its aid when it attempts to study the philosophy of religion. For without religion philosophy remains bound down to the five senses and the whole apparatus of psychology and logic, which everywhere carry it back to at least *two* fundamental factors and *one* uniform process. In religion, on the other hand, it is *one* fundamental factor and *two* processes which we are led to accept. The obscurities to which this state of things sometimes give rise; the "belief" of philosophy in the unity of the fundamental factor and the half-belief of the theo-

logians in the God of religion, have produced endless confusion in the course of history, and brought about the erroneous notion that the results of pure knowledge and of religion are essentially akin to each other or even identical. No! they are different; they are two parallel lines which—religious philosophy apart, which is not *pure* philosophy—are connected only, as it were, by the bridge of certain analogies, or by the flights of fancy which merge their different fields into one in order to give them life.

However—be the distance between them what it may—in the actual history of things they are very closely bound up with each other. They have done each other great service, and together they represent the higher life of humanity. How much does religion, even the Christian religion, owe to the progressive achievements of philosophy and the various forms of knowledge! How much they have done to purify it, to clear it of false ideas, and to free it from impossible pretensions! Religion, no doubt, is very tenacious in clinging to old prejudices, and the history of the relation between philosophy and religion is also the history of a struggle. Andrew White has described it for us. Religion seems always to have had to surrender; but it only *seems*. All that it did was to abandon outworks that were no longer of any use to it. It shed the leaves in which there was no more life. On the other hand, in none of the intellectual systems that have prevailed from time to time has the human mind ever spoken its last word, and nearly all of them have borrowed something from religion. The human mind has had to take these systems back again and again, and put others in their place. The more closely and attentively the ecclesiastical historian examines this struggle of the mind in itself and in its relation to religion, the deeper he will go, and the more indispensable he will make the study of his subject to the science of history as a whole.

IV.

We said just now that the human mind has never spoken its last word in any of the intellectual systems that have prevailed from time to time. Is that true? Have we not, perhaps, its last word in the theory which tells us that it is economic conditions—I mean food, the supply of food, and the place where it can be obtained—which ultimately determine all intellectual life and all higher development, including that of religion? I must not try within the limits of this lecture to explain my reasons for declining to accept such a theory. I may say, however, that it seems to me to be refuted by the mere fact that the most material element acting upon man always produces feelings and ideas which themselves act as forces in their turn, and stand in no simple proportionate relation to their material causes. Moreover, as long as men continue to sacrifice their possessions, their blood, and their life, for ideal aims, it will be impossible for any one to maintain the materialistic view of history except with the help of sophisms.

But although we decline to explain everything that happens by the play of economic conditions, we may still gratefully acknowledge that this latest, the economic, view of history has shed and will continue to shed a great deal of light on the history of the church. Let me show what I mean by a few examples. The great extension of Christianity in the early centuries cannot be explained without keeping the social and economic views and practices of the Christian communities in view. Every one of these communities not only tried to relieve the poor, to provide for widows and orphans, the sick, the weak, those who were out of work or persecuted, etc., but it was also *a regular association for mutual help*. By the union of all these communities in the Empire into a firm alliance with one an-

other a social organism arose which could not fail to attract, in the highest degree, the economically unfortunate. That this is really what happened is shown by pagan writers themselves. It was shown, for instance, by Lucian in his *Peregrinus Proteus*.

But not only did the church step in where social relations were concerned; its thoughts and ideas were also determined by its attitude in questions of economics. The distrust which the church shows toward wealth and capital is in part to be explained by the poverty of the early communities; and here, too, its theories about earthly possessions have one of their roots. When it afterwards came to number both rich and poor in its ranks, it retained that distrust. This had a very paradoxical result: The dangers of wealth, it was said, exist only for the individual Christian; they do not exist for the church, which is preserved from them by its sacred character. There is no harm, then, in the church becoming rich. Rich, accordingly, it became. Part of its wealth was due to the fact that in the dark days of inner and outer convulsion a man's possessions and his capital were still safest under its protection. Hence men often handed over their property to the church, not only in order to save their souls, but also to secure themselves from high-handed acts or sheer robbery. The church entered on the Middle Ages as a great and wealthy and therefore aristocratic power; and the immense struggles between Emperor and Pope, Princes and Bishops, were all in the last resort struggles for wealth and dominion.

The whole history of the church in the Middle Ages may therefore, nay must, be studied from the economic point of view. This is very evident even in the history of monasticism. Up to the time when the orders of mendicant friars arose, the development of Western monasticism has a place in the history of the large landed estate. An abbey would

sometimes form the centre of such an estate, and the abbot *nolens volens* had to provide for his monastery before he provided for the spiritual welfare of his monks. But even the movement which produced the mendicant friars very quickly became in its turn part and parcel of an economic movement, although of a different kind. Light may also be shed on the development of the Papacy from the same source, for one of the conditions of its becoming a sovereign power was the possession of landed property. In the struggle about the investiture of the bishops the questions at issue were concerned just as much with property as with dominion; and as a European power whose possessions were not on a par with its position, the Papacy was especially affected by the economic upheaval which took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. If it was to survive, ready money had to be collected from all sides. To get money it had to raise its spiritual pretensions in every direction, and make them into fresh rights; nay, more, it had to multiply the means of grace which the church offered, and exploit them as financial resources. Just because it was a financial power, however, the Papacy now began to excite distrust and dislike, and this it was that paved the way for the reforming movements. We can thus see how greatly religious theories and ecclesiastical arrangements were dependent on this development. Of the new sacramental observances, of the multitudinous rites and ceremonies, and of the fresh dogmas framed upon them, a large number had their origin in economic and financial necessities.

In this respect the upheaval which the Reformation denoted did not involve any radical change. Here, too, economic and social conditions played a great part. That the Reformation got the upper hand among a portion of the German people was due, first and foremost, to the princes, who aimed at creating territorial churches for themselves

and being masters in their own house. In this connection, however, we must not forget that in the larger towns and in the country districts the Reformation assisted the class consciousness of certain aspiring orders in the community, and that, on the other hand, the knights of the Empire, who were in a bad way economically, attempted by its means to regain their previous position. But it is in France, and, above all, in England, that the close connection between the Reformation and social and economic conditions is particularly plain. Even after England had shaken off the Papacy it was social and economic conditions which determined religious parties and struggles; the King and the aristocracy held to the church of the Thirty-nine Articles; the higher middle classes were Presbyterian; the aspiring lower middle classes were Puritan and rallied to Cromwell's flag. When we look, too, at the way in which, both there and in Protestant Germany, the character and aims of the church were then settled by the theologians, it is plain that side by side with political conditions the theories adopted were strongly acted on by social influences as well. These influences extend even to dogmatics and ethics (the "divinely appointed" orders), and to show that in detail is one of the tasks of the future. We must never allow ourselves to forget, however, that behind the economic factors there are always the political, and that it is these that really turn the scale. In power and effect they outweigh all other factors, so far as externals are concerned.

That the history of the church is most closely bound up and interwoven with all the great branches of general history, is what I have tried to show. In recognizing this fact, and in shaping our study accordingly, there may possibly be some risk of our losing sight of or undervaluing the *special character* which attaches to the history of the church. We shall guard ourselves against any such danger

if we always bear in mind that all our labors in this sphere ought to help us to throw light on the question, *What is the Christian religion?* This must ever remain the guiding-star of our researches, however wide the range which they will have to take. If ecclesiastical history loses sight of that guiding-star, it will also lose the right to form a special subject of study within the science of history. If it follows that star, then what is characteristic of every independent subject of knowledge will also hold good of it—that it unveils itself only to the man who devotes himself entirely to it. Grimm once made the fine observation that knowledge has no secrets, though it has its secrecies; it has no *Geheimnisse*, but it has *Heimlichkeiten*. The history of the church also has its *Heimlichkeiten*. The man who is half-hearted in his efforts about it will see nothing; it is only when he woos it with the loyalty of a Jacob that he will win the bride.

In the history of the church, however, these *Heimlichkeiten* go very deep and are very precious. We have seen that there is no such thing as a double history, and that everything that happens enters into the one stream of events. But there is a single inner experience which every one can possess; which to every one who possesses it is like a miracle; and which cannot be simply explained as the product of something else. It is what the Christian religion describes as the *New Birth*—that inner, moral new creation which transmutes all values, and of the slaves of compulsion makes the children of freedom. Not even in the history of the church can any one get a direct vision of this inner evolution accomplished in the individual, nor by any external facts whatever can any one be convinced of its possibility and reality. But the light which shines from it throws its rays on what happens on the stage, and lets the spectator feel in his heart that the forces of history are not

exhausted in the natural forces of the world, or in the powers of head and hand. This is the *Heimlichkeit* of the history of the church because it is the *Heimlichkeit* of religion.

PROGRESS OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, ESPECIALLY ANCIENT, DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY JEAN RÉVILLE

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—In this paper I have to condense the progress of ecclesiastical history during the nineteenth century and to describe its present state. Ecclesiastical history, that is, the history of the Christian Church in all its forms and of the Christsian religion in all its varieties, is a very extensive science, including the whole religious and moral history of the Christian world. And that history itself is intimately joined to the whole of the spiritual life as well as to the political, social, and economical evolutions of the different Christian peoples. It is not in a few minutes that one can draw up an inventory of such an immense field.¹ My aim is only to put down some guiding-marks, which may be fit to point out the progressive course of this history, especially in the field of ancient Christianity, and to show the present direction of our studies.

Ecclesiastical history is born out of the Renaissance and

¹ Amongst the conditions imparted to European official speakers the second was: "The time to be occupied in the delivery of an address shall be, as nearly as practicable, forty-five minutes."

the Reformation.¹ In the Middle Ages there were chroniclers, not properly historians. The Reformation, while claiming to be a restitution of pure primitive Christian doctrines and institutions which had been spoiled and corrupted by the Roman Church, was obliged to justify such a pretension by historical proofs.² The Catholics, at the other side, endeavored to refute the historical arguments of the Protestants.³ Ecclesiastical history, thus from the very outset subdued to church controversy, took first a confessional character. But the passion of the contest and the importance of the cause imparted to the scholars a life and an ardor which they would never have exerted without this continuous stimulation, and so ecclesiastical history got the start of all other sections of historical science.⁴

After all, with many of them the blessing which results from conscientious researches of the truth prevailed over care of confessional apologetic. One cannot praise sufficiently the admirable works of the monastic scholars and of the masters of Protestant high schools in France and in the Netherlands during the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century.⁵ They have strongly built the layers upon which the scholars of the nineteenth century

¹ We are speaking here of ecclesiastical history in modern Christianity. Ancient Christianity has had a first-rate historian, Eusebius from Cesarea, and others, who left useful writings, although not equal by far to his. But we may say, without doing harm to them, that none of them had the sense of history as we understand it now in modern times.

² For instance, Flaccius and the *Centuriæ Magdeburgenses*.

³ See Baronius and his followers.

⁴ Historical criticism is really born out of ecclesiastical history. From there it extended into what is called "profane" history.

⁵ So we may mention: among the Jesuits, Sirmond, Fronton du Duc, Petau, Labbe, the first Bollandists; among the friars of the Oratoire, Jean Morin, Le Coite, Thomassin, Richard Simon; amongst the Benedictines of St. Maur, Mabillon, d'Achéry, Martène, Durand, Montfaucon, Ruinart, etc.; among the men of Port-Royal, Le Nain de Tillemont; the authors of the *Gallia Christiana*; further on, Elie Du Pin, d'Herbelot, Baluze, etc. And among the masters of the Protestant reformed academies: G. Vossius, Fr. Spanheim, Vltringa, Hottinger (in Switzerland), Louis Cappel, D. Blondel, Jean Dailhé, Basnage, Leclerc, de Beausobre, Samuel Bochart, etc. We must mention also in England: John Pearson and Usher. In Germany the only scholar, who at the end of the seventeenth century has some qualifications of an historian, is Arnold. He was one of the first who were able to appreciate the historical value of heretics.

have erected the edifice under which we take shelter. In a solemn occasion as this one we ought to pay homage to the forefathers, who have founded the greatness of our house.

The result of the intense controversy between Catholic and Protestant scholarship was quite different from what the opponents looked for. It had illustrated the errors on both sides, the prejudices and the party spirit of both. Unconfessional critique availed itself of this experience. Rationalistic history arose, especially in Protestant countries, in England and Germany. In France the source of religious scholarship was exhausted by the persecution of the Protestants and of the Jansenists, by the gradual weakening of the Gallican Church.¹ French philosophy in the eighteenth century disdained to study the past of a religion or of a church which were considered as duly convicted of error and imposture, and the Roman Church did not care for researches which seemed to be dangerous for her. Since, and till the pontificate of Leo XIII, Catholic countries did not contribute any more to the progress of ecclesiastical history otherwise than on secondary questions of archæological nature or of local history, or by the work of some freethinkers and some Protestant countrymen.

Rationalistic ecclesiastical history, though claiming to be independent of dogmatic prejudices, nevertheless obeyed some doctrinal ideas. One while, especially in England, it aimed chiefly to identify true Christian religion with natural religion, and to denounce, as sacerdotal and theological adulterations, fortuitous or voluntary, all doctrines or institutions of the churches which did not agree with that so-called natural religion, that is, with their own religious

¹ Among the Protestants Pierre Bayle, and among the Catholics Huet, Bishop of Avranches, are at the beginning of the eighteenth century the last representatives of the scholarly trained ecclesiastical historians (with some Benedictine friars, who continued though with less profit, the work of their predecessors). Bayle and Huet are both anti-dogmatic writers, but with the second skepticism tends to submit reason to the authority of the church; with the first, on the contrary, skepticism inspires toleration and free criticism. Bayle, who died in 1706, is for a good deal a forerunner.

philosophy.¹ Another while, especially in Germany, it endeavored to show, not only that all things in the history of the church must be explained in a way satisfactory for reason,—which is indeed a postulate of scientific history,—but still more, that all teachings of true Christianity, supernatural as well as natural, were perfectly reasonable.²

Rationalistic historians of the eighteenth century have done a very useful work of clearing away. Their criticism was short-sighted; they do not go to the bottom; the proper sense of religion is not very sound in their works and their philosophy of history is very poor. However, they dealt a blow to the traditional dogmatic conception of ecclesiastical history, after which it could not rise again on scientific ground. Their work will be taken up later on by men of a freer spirit and of a less vulgar common sense, like Schröckh, Ständlin, Spittler, Planck, and later on still, by Gieseler and Hase, whose sense of religion and feeling of historical continuance fired the scholarship, whilst their respect for the texts and the documents secured the soundness of their work.

But let us not anticipate. Between the rationalistic historians of the eighteenth century and those famous masters of ecclesiastical history in the nineteenth century, the spiritual world had been renovated by a great and teeming revolution of idealist philosophy. Ecclesiastical history, indeed, like every science of information, excludes all party and dogmatic or philosophical prejudice. Its sole allowable aim must be to reconstitute men and facts of the past in their

¹ So, for instance, in the works of Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Lord Shaftesbury, of Matthew Tindal, Toland, Collins, and of the historians of Locke's school. Hume's skepticism had most fatal consequences for rationalism and favored a revival of authoritative faith for practical use.

² See the works of Semler, J. A. Ernesti, Michaelis, Walch, Mosheim, etc. The last one has sometimes been called "the father of ecclesiastical history." We ought also to take into account the influence of the "pietism" of Spencer's school. Although not favorable to scientific study of religion, it conduced to throw off the yoke of orthodox intellectualism by urging the importance of piety to the prejudice of the right doctrine. The pietists became anxious to know the history of religious life and feelings, hitherto too much neglected.

objective reality and to teach how events proceed the one from the other. But experience makes out that historical investigations must be led by certain principles, to be productive, and it is philosophy which inspires those principles. After all, we observe that in our studies we are indebted for all progresses to certain regulating ideas, which are directing the activity of our mind. Conjecture, which may be looked for as the sounding-lead of science, springs up from the impression made upon our mind by the first observation of facts; so the state of our mind, that is, the whole of our knowledge and of our ideas, is contributing for a great part to its springing up. Quite as an engineer or a geologist cannot seek after hidden treasures of ore in any country, without being guided by certain principles or by the results of previous inquiries, so the historian cannot sound the past without being directed by some presuppositions. To be guided by conjecture without being subdued to it, to be able to change it as soon as the study of documents require, that is just the historian's skill.

In the field of historical study it is not, as in that of philosophical researches, Kant whose influence was directly quickening. His abstract idealism and his quite static criticism do not care for history. Like the leading thinkers of the French Revolution he looks only after human nature in itself and does not want to study it in time or space. The teeming principles for ecclesiastical history came from other thinkers: from Lessing, who regenerated the old purely intellectual rationalism by his esthetical sense of spiritual life's sound realities and by a thoroughly human conception of religion and ethics; from Herder, the poet and the prophet, the first perhaps who possessed that living sense of history which we have now, one of the first certainly who was gifted with that precious ability of feeling intimately what other civilizations and other peoples had

thought or experienced, instead of judging them all by the measure of his own time and of his own spirit; Herder, the generous author, who set forth the organic conception of history considered as the education of humanity, without isolating the individual man from society nor humankind from nature; from Schleiermacher, who acknowledged the specific character of religion, that is, the consciousness of the bond which unites the finite and the infinite being, and who taught thus theologians to distinguish in every particular religion what is temporary, local, and special in it from what is properly and fundamentally religious in it; and above all others from Hegel, whose philosophy proclaimed identity of the real and the rational and by his identification of "sien" and "werden" assigned to moral as well as to physical science the no longer contested duty of recognizing the logical evolution of things and beings. Thus the whole religious history of mankind was involved in the organic unity of universal evolution as the highest expression of the internal dialectics which are the life of the Spirit or the Being.

To be sure, the influence of those great thinkers was not always a good one. Historians, who drew their inspiration too exclusively from one or the other of them, fell victims of their imagination, of their theology, or of their speculations. Too romantic pupils of Herder or of Schelling wrote romances instead of strict and conscientious history. The theologians, who followed Schleiermacher, too anxious to reconcile their scientific work with their ecclesiastical or dogmatical belief, forfeited treasures of scholarship in sad combinations of the "Vermittlungstheologie."¹ The too zealous disciples of Hegel made history subordinate to philosophical speculation and wrote historical works,

¹ Most of the representatives of that "Vermittlungstheologie" are dogmatists rather than historians. Such are: Twisten, Nitzsch, Julius Müller, Dörner. More properly historians are Ullmann and chiefly Alexander Schweizer (of Zurich), the most original of Schleiermacher's continuers.

which in spite of their more severe form were, in the main, not much different from the historical romances.

But those who knew how to derive profit from such a strong spiritual education, without giving up what requires a severe historical method, had a great influence over our studies. It will be sufficient to notice that from Schleiermacher proceeds Neander, the historian who perhaps better than any other knew how to bring to life again some of the great Christian personalities of the past, and that we owe to the Hegelian school F. Chr. Baur and D. F. Strauss.

Strauss's work has been chiefly negative. His impressive criticism overturned the precarious display of the midway theologians and proved the weakness of many traditional certainties which passed for inexpugnable. But his criticism was too theoretic, too little caring for precise texts and facts as to be able to produce lasting positive results.

F. Chr. Baur is of another value. With him begins really the modern era of ecclesiastical history. For once and for all he put in a clear light the principal tendencies whose clash forms the woof of the first Christianity. His chronological or critical judgments on several texts or documents of ancient Christian literature may be sometimes erroneous; the Hegelian dialectics may have mastered him more than it ought; he may be too much an intellectualist, too anxious for evolution of the ideas and not enough for that of feelings, of religious life, or of the real and complicated conditions of social life. Nevertheless, his dissection of primitive Christianity—the antithesis of the Judæan and the universalist Hellenic Christianity, the very importance of the Gnostic movement (already hinted at by Neander indeed)—has supplied data which have become since a common good for us all and which are no longer contested. Before him none had cleared so distinctly the internal dialectics of the Christian dogmatic evolution or of the origins

of the Catholic Church. At least he was one of the first ecclesiastical historians who saw so distinctly how important it is to know other ancient religions to understand the history of ancient Christianity.

Ecclesiastical history as conceived by Baur is just the contrary of that which the rationalistic historians of the "pragmatic school," like Schröck or Planck, wrote before. These took up with the data of the historical witnesses, linked the facts together with the tendencies and the needs of the individuals who carried them out; they explained the course of history by general and exterior teleology, and judged men or facts of the past at the measure of their own reason and their own conscience, without taking into account the difference of time and country. Neander had already reacted against this quite exterior manner of writing history. He did not attach much importance to institutions or to the concrete realities of social life, but tried to penetrate into the inmost personality of the souls and to raise up some great representative men of the past for illustrating the successive periods of Christian history. Endowed with an intense power of bountiful and generous sympathy, he took up especially the edifying side of history. It was for him a school of Christian experience. But, if he has indeed depicted with a masterful talent the history of some very best Christians, he left thus a series of portraits rather than an organic history such as a scientifically trained mind requires.

Baur, on the contrary, treats the history of Christianity as before all the evolution of ideas. Great individualities are neglected by him, or, better, they are but representatives of ideas; I might rather say, nearly symbolic persons. They are not the agents of history; they are themselves the instruments of the internal dialectics which are unfolding through centuries. A grand and imposing structure, in-

deed, and—let us say immediately—not only a theoretical work, for his materials are elaborated by an untiring scholarship and by strong critical researches; but, after all, sometimes an artificial building, where the intellectual part, the ideas, are preponderating to the prejudice of sentiment, piety, and intuition.

Baur's work, however fundamental, wanted thus to be amended and completed. Some of his pupils, like Ed. Zeller and Weizsäcker,¹ tried to do so. Others, like Ritschl and his school, engaged with a really excessive passion in a reaction against the too abstract and too speculative tendency of his historical conception. Others still, the continuators of ancient rationalism, like Gieseler and Hase,² although availing themselves of the "Tübinger School," took good heed not to be urged by speculation and, as they preserved themselves also from the sentimentality of the Schleiermacherian school, they imparted to their historical work a more objective character and a more measured spirit.

Now we arrive at the quite modern and nearly contemporary period of our studies. Here our report is of a more delicate nature, not only because we should have to speak of scholars still living, like Pfeiderer and Harnack, the two masters we have the privilege to greet respectfully at this Congress, but also because there is not yet enough distance for judging impartially scholars and tendencies with which we are ourselves connected.

Two statements require at the first sight our attention. While during the first half of the nineteenth century ec-

¹ The historians who proceed directly or indirectly from the Tübinger School are very numerous. We shall mention only: Schwegler, Köstlin, Hilgenfeld, H. Holtzmann, Hausrath, Holsten, and Pfeiderer.

² Ancient rationalism had its last survivor in Dr. Paulus. But it had been renewed by Kant's philosophy, with scholars like Bretschneider and Wegscheider, and under the influence of Schleiermacher and of the philosopher Fries, it had been enlivened by de Wette. It seems inconvenient to speak here of the supernaturalist doctrinaire and intellectualist school of Hengstenberg, because he made his scholarly work wholly dependent on doctrine and ecclesiastical tradition.

clesiastical history was but little studied except in German universities, since about 1860 other countries have taken a more and more active part in the common scholarly work.¹ First of all, Dutchland with the great school of Leiden,² afterwards England,³ the United States of America, and allow me to join without counterfeit modesty also France, where under the influence of the *École de Strasbourg* and of Renan, foremost after the renovation⁴ of higher studies since 1870, the scientific production in the

¹ We do not forget one moment that in our days, as before, the share of German scholarship is preëminent in the field of ecclesiastical history. Many special periodicals, a great quantity of unequaled handbooks bear witness to the rich production of scholarly work which is continually afforded to students and theologians. We omit mentioning names; complete pages would be required to do so. We shall only point out the contributors of the *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, edited under the direction of Ad. Harnack, von Gebhardt, and, during the first period, also of Zahn; of the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, edited by Ad. Harnack and E. Schürer; of the *Theologische Rundschau*, under direction of Bousset; of the *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, the second and third editions of which have been presided over by A. Hauck; of the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, edited by Krumbacher; of the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, edited by Brieger; of the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, edited by Preuschen and Krüger; of the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, edited by Gottschick; of the *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, edited by Hilgenfeld. We ought to join the *Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und Kirche*, edited by Bonwetsch, the *Protestantische Monatshefte*, the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, the *Schweizerische Theologische Zeitschrift* (edited by Meili in Zurich).

Roman Catholic theologians, on their side, took an active part in the work of ecclesiastical history, not only in former time with Moehler and with the old Catholics Friedrich and Döllinger, but also more recently with Funk, Bardenhewer, Denifle, Ehrle, Ehrhardt, etc. See also the contributors of the *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, the *Biblische Studien*, the *Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte*, the *Kirchengeschichtliche Studien*, the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, the *Zeitschrift für katholische theologie*.

² It will be sufficient to recall the names of Scholten, Kuenen, Rauwenhoff, Tiele, etc. For ecclesiastical history in Dutchland let us mention also the contributors of the *Theologisch Tydschrift*, the *Nederlandsch Archief voor kerkgeschiedenis*, the *Teyler's theologisch Tydschrift*, the *Theologische Studien*.

³ Since the publication of the *Essays and Reviews*, in 1860, and chiefly since the spirited activity of Robertson Smith, free historical criticism has emancipated itself from ecclesiastical tradition and has taken its flight. We may mention here some names only: the Bishop of Durham, Lightfoot, Davidson, Edwin Hatch, Estlin Carpenter, Armitage, Robinson and his contributors of the *Texts and Studies*, contributions to biblical and patristic literature, the authors of the *Studia biblica et ecclesiastica* of Oxford, the contributors of the *Critical Review*, the *Expositor*, the *Hibbert Journal*, etc. The most significant example of the flight of wholly independent criticism on the field of religious history in England is the recent simultaneous publication of the *Dictionary of the Bible*, edited by Hastings, and of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, planned by Robertson Smith, but elaborated under the direction of T. K. Cheyne and Sutherland Black.

⁴ To be mentioned in the Strasbourg school: Edward Reuss, Baum, Cunitz, Ch. Schmidt, Colani, de Pressensé (who followed afterwards another direction), Albert Réville, Auguste Sabatier. After the war of 1870 the French Protestant faculty of Strasbourg was transferred to Paris by Lichtenberger and Sabatier. There it has become what is called in the theological world the "school of Paris," whose most authorized representative is now Ménégot.

field of ecclesiastical history has much increased.¹ The peculiar character of the present period is the dreadful quantity of publications of all kinds which appear every year in five or six different languages, so that it is more and more difficult to be acquainted with the ever-increasing historical production. The reproduction only of titles of the books, papers, tracts, or essays, published every year, fills a whole volume.² Where is, under such conditions, the man who may pretend to study by himself and directly the whole history of the church? Each of us is obliged to confine himself within the bounds of a special department of the large field, and his excessive specialization is not favorable to the education of the mind nor to the formation of historical judgment. It is of great importance that periodicals may provide for our insufficiency by publishing serious and impartial reviews of the largest possible number of new works.

This superabundance of historical contributions not only results from the extension of the area, where church his-

¹ Under the influence of Duchesne a young school of learned and free-minded historians arose in the present French Catholic clergy, to whom belong men like Abbé Loisy, Lejay, Hemmer, Houtin, etc. There should also be mentioned the contributors of the *Bulletin Critique*, the *Revue biblique internationale*, edited by the Dominican friars of Jerusalem, the *Mélanges d'histoire et d'archéologie*, edited by the Ecole française de Rome, the *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*. See also in Belgium the *Anecdota Maredsolana* and the *Revue Benoîtine*, edited by the Benedictine friars of Maredsous, the *Muséon*, the *Revue de l'Histoire ecclésiastique*, edited at Louvain by Cauchie and Ladeuze; and with the old Catholics in Switzerland the *Revue internationale de théologie*, edited at Bern, by Michaud.

What will become of this interesting flight of free scholarship, which was inspired by Pope Leo XIII, if the spirit which seems now to be prevalent at the Vatican gets the better?

Independent of any denominational tie are in France the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, the *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* (for medieval history), and the *Revue de l'Orient Latin*.

There is no French Protestant periodical specially devoted to ecclesiastical history; but the *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, at Lausanne, the *Revue de théologie et des questions religieuses*, at Montauban, the *Revue Chrétienne*, edited by John Viénot, at Paris, often publish historical papers. We ought also to mention the *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du protestantisme français*, edited by Weiss, and the *Annales de bibliographie théologique*, by E. Ehrhardt, in Paris.

² The *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, published in Berlin by the editor Schwetschke, and the *Bibliographie der theologischen Literatur*, by the same. We ought also to mention here the excellent bibliography, which appears every fortnight in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, edited by Professor Schürer (Berlin, Hinrichs).

tory is cultivated. It arises also—and this is our second statement—from the uncontested triumph of the historical method in the religious field. Scientific concurrence not only became universal like economical concurrence, but everywhere in religious scholarship historical and critical studies became so preponderating that they have nearly displaced all others. Look at the programmes of whatever theological or higher religious school. You will certainly observe that all professors teach history or practice historical and philological criticism: the professor of dogmatic grounds his teaching upon the history of dogma, the professor of exegesis upon the history of the text or upon the historical explanation of the personality of the author, of his ideas, of his style, and so further in all branches of the theological teaching.

In the department of religious science as well as in all other moral sciences, the second half of the nineteenth century has been, before all, the age of the historical method, that is, of the scientific and critical method, even with those men whose dogmatic or philosophical convictions seem to require other agents in history than the forces of rational determination which historical criticism requires. The historian who now relies on miracle or upon arguments of a confessional kind is, so to say, disqualified amongst all those who are not imbued with the same confessional faith. So the most notorious supernaturalists and the most decided partisans take great care commonly not to ground their historical conclusions on dogmatic reasons.

Philosophical speculation is also no longer appreciated by the ecclesiastical historians of to-day. Hegel's dialectical evolutionism has been amended by that of Darwin or of Spencer, and Aug. Comte's positivism has influenced us all, even those amongst us who are not positivists. Under a myth or under a legend we want to discover the

real fact which gave rise to it. The great development of experimental sciences has reacted upon moral sciences and increased the sense of reality and the need of precision. Now records are more strictly respected and the authority of duly ascertained facts has taken root in the historian's mind more deeply than before. Theories are mistrusted, even when they are supported by the most powerful dialectics. What we require essentially from ecclesiastical as well as from all other historians, if they aim at any authority for their works, is: to inquire as completely as possible after all records or testimonies, interpreting them by the most firmly established rules of philology, subjecting them to a most severe criticism, but without any prejudicial view, analyzing them minutely so as to see things as they are and not as we may want them to be; to search for truth in itself without any apologetical prepossession; to replace men of the past in their real life and not in an abstract outline; to discover for each event, for each fact, for each action of men the reason sufficient to explain them rationally and to place them in the universal concatenation of all phenomena.

Here appears another characteristic of the present conception of ecclesiastical history. It is no longer a history above the common run, of a nature different from all others, and which requires special treatment. Formerly the history of Christianity seemed generally to be apart, as a special compartment cut off from the rest of history, a sacred territory separated from the profane world. Now the progress of our general historical knowledge makes us recognize ever better that the history of Christianity—of Christian religion as well as of Christian Church—is intimately bound with the economical, moral, social, and religious history of the surrounding world. The watertight bulkhead which separated the so-called "profane"

from the so-called "sacred" studies has been removed, even for the period of the New Testament. Not only is the same method to be used in both branches, but there is no one to-day who may contest that early Christianity is connected, not only with biblical Judaism, but also with a Judaism quite permeated with Chaldæan, Iranian, and Jewish Alexandrian survivals. Every one must recognize how large is the influence of Hellenism and of Roman pagan tradition in Christianity as it became by conquering the ancient world. Nobody can overlook the eminent contribution of Germanic religion and morals in the Christian world of the Middle Ages. Christianity did not evolve of itself, by its sole proper principles, with only internal logic and without the influence of the surrounding world: its evolution was continually determined by the nature of the different societies among which it was developing and by the precedents of the people among whom it was operating.

This characteristic of our present conception of ecclesiastical history seems to me so decided that I dare to say it is plainly distinctive of our scientific situation to-day. For it implies a deep transformation of the ancient idea of revelation, even much deeper than most of the theologians think, who practice this modern historical method, although they maintain more or less of traditional doctrines of the special origins and the particular fate of the Christian religion.¹ It is not in our province here to elaborate this dogmatic side of the problem. We have only to notice it.

Thus the history of Christianity becomes a section of the

¹ When enumerating the periodicals devoted to ecclesiastical history, we observe that the distinction between Catholic and Protestant publications is still widespread. The reason is that most of these periodicals are connected with faculties or schools preparing ministers for the different ecclesiastical denominations. But their essays may claim historical authority only in the measure in which they are free from any confessional character or any theological or philosophical prejudice.

general history of religions.¹ It becomes secularized. This is a capital point, for it is only under that condition that it may claim its place in the cycle of sciences. Even the very programme of this Congress of Arts and Science in St. Louis is the confirmation of my statement.

To improve really our studies, we ought to push them forward in the direction so indicated. There are, at the present time, most important problems to be solved. On the one side we cannot understand the psychology of early Christianity nor its theological and ecclesiastical formation without becoming better aware of the precedent religious state of the people who became Christian, and growing familiar with the pagan world where Christianity took its historical shape. On the other hand, we cannot appreciate the religious value of the ancient Christian data without being able to compare them with other religious data of the same kind in other religions. For instance, if we want to understand the origin of Christian monasticism, it is necessary not only to know the spiritual tendencies which in the Christian Church itself drove out of the civil life such a lot of believers, but no less the parallel tendencies which were at work in the pagan society of the same time. And if we want to appreciate this great historical event, we ought to be able to compare Christian asceticism and monasticism with the similar movements in other religions, as, for instance, in Buddhism.

We ought not to be taken up wholly by little monographies. They are indeed absolutely necessary. But they

¹ We must notice the large development of the general history of religions in the last twenty years: foundations of new lectureships devoted to general religious history in Dutchland, in Switzerland, in France, in Sweden, and especially in the United States, where this movement was from the first welcomed (Everett Warren, Goodspeed, Toy, Morris Jastrow, Jr., G. F. Moore, Nathaniel Schmidt, and many others; collection of *Handbooks on the History of Religions*). Two special reviews are devoted to these studies: the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, edited by Jean Réville in France, and the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, edited in Germany by Achelis, and, since 1904, also by Dieterich. Concerning this recent development of the general history of religion, see the article in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, t. XLIII, p. 58, *sqq.*

are fruitless, if they remain without connection with a more general historical study. There are certainly still many special points to elucidate in the proper field of ecclesiastical history, especially in the period following the Nicean Council; but those points are generally of secondary importance. Let them be studied in a great number of careful monographies. That is excellent; that is necessary! But this dust of scholarship cannot by itself improve our scientific knowledge, if it be not worked up by men of a larger and more comprehensive mind, able to use all those little and painfully elaborated pieces of stone to make up the mosaic in which the evolution of living history is represented. Alas! that is what we most want. How few are the scholars able to join an immense learning in all details with harmonious and powerful general views, like the master at whose side I have the honor of speaking to-day!

Scientific research does not consist only in resuming ever and ever the same subjects. Beware of generalizing early and prematurely! Such generalizations are the very negation of scientific method. But let us not be afraid to enlarge the field of our researches and to borrow from the neighbors all that may enlighten our mind.

Our highest ambition should be to enlarge our historical material.¹ If there are probably no more important dis-

¹ The discovery of a document like the *Philosophoumena*, for instance, has contributed more to our knowledge of Gnosticism than all dissertations on texts already known. In the last quarter of the preceding century our historical material for the knowledge of ancient Christianity has been largely increased by the discovery of new texts, such as various *Logia Jesu*, the *Didache*, fragments of the Gospel and of the Revelation of Petrus, the Syriac Sinaitic version of the gospels, the Acts of Paul, fragments of several apocalypses and apostolic acts (for instance of John and of Peter), of Coptic apocryphal gospels, the old Latin version of the Epistle of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians, new versions of the *Didascalía*, the Apology of Aristides, new Gnostic texts (chiefly the *Pistis Sophia*, the treatises of the Codex Bezae Cantabrigiae, magic formulas and incantations), acts of martyrs, original texts of "libelli," writings of Hippolytus (Commentary on Daniel, chiefly) and of Methodius, fragments of Meletius of Sardes, of Origenes, of Peter of Alexandria, writings of Priscillian, the Peregrinatio Silvae ad loca sancta, the History of Dioscoros by Theopistos, and numerous fragments of the Church Fathers. Moreover the writings of the Latin Fathers are reëdited in the best conditions in the *Corpus scriptorum*

coveries to make in the libraries of central and occidental Europe, except perhaps in some palimpsests¹—there are in all likelihood still fine records to discover in Oriental countries. Till now we have thoroughly studied Christianity only in the Græco-Latin and in the Germanic world. How much remains to be done before we can know the development of this same Christianity among Oriental or Slavonic peoples! How uninformed are we still of the religious change which took place at the conversion of a great part of the Christian world from the religion of Jesus to that of Muhammad? Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, perhaps also Persia, certainly still conceal vast unknown historical treasures. We have to direct the scholars to that side also.

Finally I should like to account more exactly for the real sense of what I called the secularization of ecclesiastical history. The same rational and critical method, which is used in all other parts of historical scholarship must be applied to religious or ecclesiastical history: that is a fact beyond all further discussion. But to be able to apply it in this special department, you ought to know, of yourself, what is religious feeling or religious emotion. A scholar quite devoid of religious disposition will study religious history only as a deaf man might study the history of music or a blind man that of painting. He lacks the sense, which alone enables him to recognize and appreciate the inmost value of religious doctrines, rites, or institutions.

Let us not forget this: in the history of the Christian Church as well as of all other religions, the work to be

ecclesiasticorum latinorum and those of the Greek Christian writers of the first three centuries are published again with all the resources of modern paleography and criticism in the *Corpus* edited under the patronage of the Academy of Sciences of Berlin.

¹ This is shown, for instance, by the discoveries of Don Morin published in the *Anecdota Maredsolana*.

done is not alone of intellectual nature. You must penetrate the soul of men in the past; you must feel as living realities what was living in their mind, in their heart, in their conscience; you must lay hold not only of the dead formula but of the very spirit. We should not go back to the edifying kind of history, as practiced by the pietists or by Neander. We leave to preachers and to moralists the important duty of working up the precious lessons which history affords them. We claim only justice and truth. So long as we have not acknowledged the feelings, the emotions, even the impressions produced by a doctrine, by a religious personality,¹ institution, cult, or any other religious statement; so long as we have not caught what needs they satisfied, and to what moral dispositions they gave satisfaction; so long we may not claim to know them really. History of dogmas or of cultural observances is the intellectual notation of religious and moral experiences; as long as we have not recognized what these experiences are, we have the shell but not the nut of religion.

In different terms we ought to give more place in our historical works to religious psychology, but to a psychology large-minded and open for all forms of religious life in human kind, an unsectarian psychology, gifted with that generous sympathy which alone enables us to penetrate the inmost nature of other people and to understand even those moral experiences which are most unfamiliar to ourselves, because it makes us lay aside our own peculiarities and revive in others. Secularized ecclesiastical history ought not to be a withered history, mere anatomy. We have to present to our contemporaries, not fossils, but liv-

¹ In religious history an important place is to be assigned to great personalities. The experience of our day as well as the most trustworthy records of the past bear witness to the intensity of the influence of certain personalities, which are productive of moral and religious life. Those who believe in some one are perhaps more numerous than those who believe in something (a doctrine, an idea, or the virtue of a practice). This is especially true in ethic religions.

ing beings, who have worshiped, cried for assistance, glorified, who have sung and lamented, who have trembled before the Great Mystery, who revolted and bethought themselves, who loved and prayed,—not only theologians, priests, or rituals.

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